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All children experience fear and 
anxiety, which is expected at some 
points during normal development. 
However, some children do not 
outgrow these fears or experience 
extensively high and long-lasting 
levels of anxiety. To get a better 
understanding of the development 
and maintenance of fear and anxiety 
in children, this dissertation focuses 
on cognitive and behavioral aspects 
that play a role in childhood fear 
and anxiety. What makes anxious 
children different from their non-
anxious peers? Do they perceive the 
world differently? How do fearful 
children behave in fearful situations? 
And how can we reduce anxiety in 
these children?
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All children experience fear, it is to be expected and common at specific times during normal 
development in children; fears emerge and disappear again at certain ages (Fonseca & Perrin, 2001). 
Young children may display fears to specific external events, such as fear for people other than their 
parents, being left alone, being in the dark, storms, or animals. Older children are more likely to face 
social fears and general distress. These differences can be explained by the fact that fears become more 
internal and abstract as cognition develops when the child gets older (Vasey, 1993). Fears typical for a 
certain age are presented in Table 1 (Beidel & Turner, 2005; Ollendick, Matson, & Helser, 1985). The cause 
of fear is not always clear, but can often be linked to learning experiences. A child could, for example, be 
afraid of wasps because he or his mother was stung in the past. In this case, wasps are associated with 
being stung and a feeling of pain. Biological factors can also cause fear in an indirect way through the 
child’s temperamental style. Children differ on traits such as fearlessness, nervousness, adventurousness, 
or inhibition. As a result, some children are more prone to react with fear towards specific situations than 
others (Andrews, Stewart, Allen, & Henderson, 1990; Caspi, Bem, & Elder, 1989).
Table  1. Typical fears at specific ages as described by Ollendick and colleagues (1985) and visualized by Beidel and 
Turner (p. 11, 2005).
Age Fears
< 1 year Loss of physical support, heights, sudden, intense, and unexpected noises 
1 – 2 years Strangers, toilet activities, being injured
3 – 5 years Animals (primarily dogs), imaginary creatures, dark, being alone
6 – 9 years Animals, lightning and thunder, personal safety, school, death
9 – 12 years Tests, personal health
13 years and older Personal injury, social interaction and personal conduct, economic and political catastrophes
Note. Copyright © 2005 (Beidel and Turner). Reprinted by Permission of Prof. Dr. D. H. Beidel
While normal childhood fears are unlikely to cause long-term impairments, fear can become a more 
enduring problem in some children. Fearful children are often very tense or uptight, and they tend to 
worry excessively. Elevated levels of fear can become a serious problem when they interrupt a child’s 
normal activities such as sleeping, attending school, and making friends. When fear becomes persistent 
and interferes with normal life, it is classified as an anxiety disorder (DSM-5, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Anxiety disorders are common amongst children and adolescents. The prevalence 
of anxiety disorders in children and adolescents varies between 2% and 10%, making them the most 
prevalent type of psychological disorders experienced by this population (for a review, see Rapee, 
Schniering, & Hudson, 2009). 
Anxiety disorders in children are associated with significant life impairments and increased risk of 
psychosocial impairments, including academic difficulties, high levels of depression, substance use, 
poor social and interpersonal adjustment, and impaired self-competence (Strauss, Frame, & Forehand, 
1987). Childhood anxiety disorders do not necessarily remit with age and if left untreated, can persist into 
Chapter 1
12
adolescence and adulthood. They are associated with increased risk of later depression and substance 
abuse (Keller et al., 1992). Although Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) for anxiety in children has shown 
good efficacy, there is room for improvement (for a review see, James, James, Cowdery, Solar, & Choke, 
2013). For example, James and colleagues (2013) conclude in their review that CBT is effective in 59% of 
cases. Therefore, it is important to find theoretical and practical innovations that could lead treatments 
to new directions. In order to implement more effective screening methods and treatments, a better 
understanding of how anxiety develops and persists over time is needed. If we can identify anxiety-
related cognitive processes in more detail and develop methods to influence them, we may be able 
to develop new directions for treatment addressing mechanisms, which are not targeted by traditional 
treatment strategies. Therefore, the main purpose of this dissertation was to address cognitive processes 
that play a role in the development and maintenance of childhood anxiety. 
In the following paragraphs, I will first discuss the most influential theories and information-processing 
models that describe cognitive processes that play a role in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders. These theories and models were the basis for the formulation of three research goals. The three 
research goals addressed: 1) the development and testing of methods to assess the role of cognitive 
processes in childhood anxiety, 2) the possible relations between different cognitive processes and how 
cognitive processes together influence the anxiety response, and 3) the potential to reduce anxiety by 
modifying biased cognitive processes. I will then describe the outline of this dissertation. This includes 
a specification of the participants and the specific research goals of the proposed empirical studies.
Cognitive theories of anxiety disorders
According to most theories, the origin of anxiety disorders lies in an interaction between the above-
mentioned factors: development, learning experiences, and biological factors (e.g., see Rachman, 
1977). In addition, cognitive theories have emphasized the importance of cognitive processes in the 
onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; for a review, see 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). The central assumption of these theories is that cognitive processes are 
driven by schemata. Schemata are cognitive structures of associations between knowledge elements 
that influence perception, attention, interpretation, and memory. In individuals with an anxiety disorder, 
schemata that are organized around the themes of threat and danger are chronically overactive, and as 
a result many situations and stimuli are associated with danger and fear (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, 
& Mathews, 1997; for a schema-based theory of child anxiety, see Kendall, 1985; Kendall & Ronan, 1990). 
If some stimuli have a particularly strong association with threat and fear (fear-related associations), 
these stimuli will attract attention quickly (attention bias), their interpretation will be biased towards 
danger (interpretation bias), and they will be primed in memory (memory bias). These cognitive biases 
are believed to be content-specific; only stimuli associated with threat and fear are biased. Fearful 
individuals should therefore only display biased cognitions for stimuli related to their own fear (e.g., 
Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1985; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). 
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Information-processing models may give a good framework to describe the role of biased cognitive 
processes in anxiety disorders (Williams et al., 1997). These models describe the different steps through 
which information is processed (Massaro & Cowan, 1993). Information-processing models provide 
several advantages. First, they give a framework for understanding the role of cognitive biases in anxiety 
disorders and how these biases may interact with each other. Second, they provide a basis to develop 
new assessment-methods to assess these biases. And finally, they often make a distinction between 
two types of processes that play a role in information processing; controlled and automatic (Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). Controlled processes are generally described as processes that are deliberate, strategic, 
slow and available to conscious awareness. Automatic processes are processes that are unintentional, 
fast and possibly occurring outside of awareness. Every behavior includes both controlled and automatic 
aspects. For example, you are asleep at night when you suddenly wake up because you hear a noise, 
you feel your heart bouncing and you feel frightened (automatic aspects). Then, you think of things that 
could have caused the noise and you remember that it is probably your new dog (controlled aspects). 
Processes do not necessarily have to be either fully controlled or fully automatic, but can be a mix 
of both. Both types of processes are thought to play an important role in anxiety and the associated 
biased cognitive processes. It is therefore important to study the role of both types of processes. Finally, 
information-processing models may be a starting point for the development or adaptation of (new) 
intervention methods.
One of the leading information-processing models in childhood anxiety is the one developed by 
Daleiden and Vasey (1997). They combined Kendall’s (1985) cognitive theory and the social information-
processing perspective developed by Crick and Dodge (1994). The information-processing model 
developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997) consists of six steps showing information processed through 
several different stages; the encoding stage, the interpretation stage, the goal clarification or selection 
stage, the response access or construction stage, the response selection stage and finally the enactment 
stage. Recently, Muris and Field (2008) addressed the encoding and interpretation phase and visualized 
this part of the information-processing model to summarize and evaluate the role of attention, 
interpretation and memory biases in childhood anxiety (see Figure 1). 
Muris and Field (pp. 397-398, 2008) explained the figure as follows: “Children are confronted with all 
kinds of situations that require an appropriate response. To achieve this goal, the stimuli that comprise 
each situation are quickly scanned and encoded, thereby attending to relevant cues while ignoring 
irrelevant stimuli. During the next stage of interpretation, the encoded stimuli are evaluated and 
meaning is attached to them. If the situation is interpreted as dangerous and threatening, the anxiety 
emotion will be elicited, which manifests itself in physiological, subjective and behavioral symptoms”. 
Like in Kendall’s theory (1985), in the ‘encoding phase’, fearful children are likely to quickly direct their 
attention to stimuli that are associated with fear (attention bias). In the ‘interpretation phase’, fearful 
children will be more likely to interpret the situation as dangerous (interpretation bias), and it will be 
primed in memory (memory bias). As the situation is interpreted as dangerous, fearful children are likely 
to display an anxious reaction. This reaction in turn may further strengthen the fear-related associations, 
thus maintaining the anxiety. 
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The following paragraphs will highlight the three research goals of this dissertation, which I developed, 
based on the information-processing models developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and 
Field (2008). These models provide a framework for my first research goal regarding the role of different 
cognitive biases in the processing of anxiety-related stimuli. Possible relations between the different 
cognitive biases and how together they influence the anxiety response formed my second research 
goal. The third research goal addressed the potential to reduce anxiety by modifying cognitive biases.
Attention 
bias
Interpretation 
bias
Memory 
bias
Encoding
Interpretation
Situation
Anxiety
Overactivity of 
vulnerability and 
danger schemas
Figure 1. Information-processing model developed by Muris and Field (p. 398, 2008). This model highlights the 
influence of cognitive biases in the processing of threat-related information.
Note. Copyright © 2008 (Routledge Taylor & Francis group). www.tandfonline.com
1. Assessing fear-related associations and cognitive biases
To assess fear-related associations and cognitive biases, both direct and indirect measures have been 
used. Direct measures are measures in which participants are directly asked to express attitudes or 
thoughts (de Houwer, 2006). Examples of direct measures are questionnaires or interviews. Advantages of 
these measures are that they are usually fast and easy to administer, and reliable, because measurement 
errors are small. A limitation of direct measures is that participants will only report what they are willing 
and able to report because responses are given in a controlled, deliberate manner (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). As a result, answers may be biased due to social desirability, limitations of introspection, and 
experimenter demands (Bijttebier, Vasey, & Braet, 2003). Direct measures tap into controlled processes, 
but cannot reliably capture automatic aspects of cognitive processes. In order to capture automatic 
aspects of cognitive processes, the use of indirect measures can be a better alternative. Indirect 
measures are measures in which participants are not directly asked to express attitudes or thoughts (de 
Houwer, 2006). De Houwer (2006) notes, however, that there is a great variability to what extent indirect 
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measures are able to capture automatic processes. An example of an indirect measure that is still highly 
susceptible to demand effects is the Vignette Paradigm (see also, Muris, 2010). In this task, participants 
are asked to formulate endings to ambiguous unfinished scenarios. While participants are not directly 
asked about their level of fear, it is relatively easy to answer in a socially desirable manner. Examples of 
indirect measures that are thought to capture automatic processes more purely are reaction time tasks, 
such as the Emotional Stroop Task (EST; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985), the Affective Priming Task (APT; 
De Houwer, 2003a) and the Approach Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007). However, it should 
be kept in mind that reaction time-based paradigms are usually less reliable than direct measures. This 
might especially be true in child samples because children are generally more easily distracted and have 
relatively short attention spans (Huijding, Wiers, & Field, 2010). To provide a compromise between direct 
and indirect measures, many studies make use of tasks that are considered to be more indirect, but that 
do not rely on reaction times, such as the Auditory Interpretation Task (AIT; e.g. Dearing & Gotlib, 2009) 
and the homophone task (Hadwin, Frost, French, & Richards, 1997; Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule 
& Dalgleish, 2000).
Although indirect measures have not been used as intensively in studies of child anxiety, as in 
studies of adults, more and more studies have been reported over the last years (for reviews, see Garner, 
2010; Huijding et al., 2010; Muris, 2010; Muris & Field, 2008; Nightingale, Field, & Kindt, 2010; Puliafico & 
Kendall, 2006). A few studies of child anxiety explored fear-related associations, and memory biases, but 
most studies explored attention biases or interpretation biases. A description of the most commonly 
used measures of fear-related associations and attention, interpretation and memory biases in children 
is given in the Appendix. Here, for the sake of brevity, I will only name them, giving no further details. The 
following subsection provides a brief overview of the studies that explored these biases and associations, 
and the studies that explored the content-specificity of these biases and associations.
Fear-related associations
Fear-related associations refer to the phenomenon that fearful children associate certain stimuli 
with fear. It is important to study fear associations, because according to cognitive theories, these 
associations are postulated to be the core of all cognitive biases (e.g. Williams et al., 1997). Surprisingly 
however, indirect measures of associations have rarely been used to explore fear-related associations in 
children. The most commonly used indirect measures to measure fear-related associations in adults are 
reaction time based paradigms, such as the Affective Priming Task (APT; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986), the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), and the Extrinsic 
Affective Simon Task (EAST; de Houwer, 2003b). In adult samples, there is evidence for the existence 
of fear-related associations (e.g., Ellwart, Becker, & Rinck, 2005; Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2006; Huijding 
& de Jong, 2005; Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001). In child research, the few studies that explored 
differences in associations between fearful and non-fearful children did not find any evidence for the 
existence of fear-related associations. Moreover, the studies were not specifically designed to measure 
the content specificity of fear-related associations (for a review, see Huijding et al., 2010).
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However, there are several studies that used these tasks, that were conditioned beforehand, as 
an indirect measure of preference (e.g., Askew & Field, 2007; Field, 2006; Field & Lawson, 2003; Field, 
Lawson, & Banerjee, 2008; Huijding et al., 2009; Lawson, Banerjee & Field, 2007). In these studies, novel 
stimuli were either positively or negatively conditioned; new stimuli such as unknown animals were 
either always followed by negatively valenced stimuli, or positively valenced stimuli. The results indicate 
that novel stimuli can be conditioned to acquire either positive valence or negative, threatening value. 
Moreover, the APT can be used to measure the positive or negative associations created this way (Askew 
& Field, 2007; Field, 2006; Field & Lawson, 2003; Field, et al., 2008; Huijding et al., 2009; Lawson et al., 2007). 
Attention bias
Attention bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have the tendency to quickly focus 
attention on stimuli that are associated with fear and threat, and that they find it difficult to disengage 
attention from these stimuli (Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews & Macleod, 1985). To measure 
attention biases in children, two tasks have been commonly used: the Emotional Stroop Task (EST) and 
the Visual Probe Task (Dot Probe; for reviews, for a discussion on what the EST and Dot Probe measure 
exactly, see Nightingale et al., 2010). Several studies using the EST or Dot Probe reported attention biases 
in fearful children. However, there are also a large number of studies that did not demonstrate these 
effects (for reviews see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; 
Ehrenreich & Gross, 2002; Nightingale et al., 2010). There are also a few studies that explored the specificity 
of attention biases within anxiety disorders. These studies all found evidence for the content-specificity 
of children’s attention bias (Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Canterbury, & Yule, 2003; Dubner 
& Motta, 1999; Martin & Cole, 2000; Martin, Horder, & Jones, 1992; Martin & Jones, 1995). Fearful children 
only showed an attention bias for their fear-related stimuli, and not for general fear-related stimuli.
Interpretation bias
Interpretation bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have the tendency to interpret 
ambiguous situations as threatening. A common way of assessing interpretation bias is through 
questionnaires, such as the Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire (Leitenberg, Leonard, & 
Carroll-Wilson, 1986) and the Children’s Evaluation of Everyday Social Encounters questionnaire (CHEESE; 
Bell, Luebbe, Swenon, & Allwood, 2009). Besides the use of direct measures, most studies make use of 
all sorts of variations of an ambiguous vignette paradigm (see Muris, 2010). Examples of tasks that can 
be used to explore interpretation biases in children in a more indirect way without using reaction times 
are the homophone task (Hadwin et al., 1997; Taghavi et al., 2000), the Auditory Interpretation Task (AIT; 
Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002) and a visual perception task that includes 
size and distance estimation (Clerkin, Cody, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Teachman, 2009; Teachman, Stefanucci, 
Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt, 2008; Vasey et al., 2012). So far, most studies found that fearful children show 
a tendency to interpret ambiguous situations in a generally negative way (for reviews, see Muris, 2010; 
Weems & Watts, 2005).
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Some of these studies explored the specificity of interpretation biases with mixed results. Some 
studies did not find any evidence for content-specific interpretations (Dalgleish et al., 2003; In-Albon, 
Dubi, Rapee, & Schneider, 2009; Muris et al., 2000), whereas other studies did (Bögels, Snieder, & Kindt, 
2003; In-Albon, Klein, Rinck, Becker, & Schneider, 2008).
Memory bias
Memory bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have the tendency to selectively recall 
negative information about oneself, past situations or events. There are only a few studies that have 
explored memory biases in children. In adult samples, there is some evidence for a recall bias in fearful 
adults, but the existence of a recognition bias and implicit memory biases in anxiety is highly doubted 
(for reviews, see Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Mitte, 2008). In children, there are only a handful of studies 
that explored memory biases. All studies used explicit memory tasks, but the results are inconsistent. 
There are three studies that provided some evidence for the existence of a memory bias in fearful 
children (Daleiden, 1998; Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule & Dalgleish, 2000; Watts & Weems, 2006). 
However, it should be noted that the results by Daleiden (1998) heavily relied on task characteristics, 
that the correlations between fear and memory bias reported by Watts and Weems (2006) were rather 
modest (r = .23 for child report; r = .26 for parent report), and that the memory bias found by Moradi 
and colleagues (2000) was for positive words rather than for negative words. A few studies found no 
evidence for the existence of memory biases in fearful children (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2003). Only Moradi 
and colleagues (2000) studied the specificity of memory bias, but they found no evidence that this bias 
was specific to threat-related stimuli.
First research goal: The role of cognitive biases in the processsing of anxiety-related stimuli
Compared to the adult literature, relatively few studies in children explored indirect measures to study 
cognitive biases and the content-specificity of these biases. So far, research in anxious children provided 
evidence for the existence of interpretation biases related to threat. Mixed results were found for the 
existence of attention biases and memory biases related to threat, and no evidence was found for the 
existence of fear-related associations. The few studies reported on content-specificity of these biases 
provide evidence for the content-specificity of attention biases. Inconsistent findings were found for the 
existence of content-specificity of interpretation biases, and no evidence was found for the existence 
of content-specificity of memory biases and fear-related associations. Clearly more research is needed 
to explore the different cognitive biases, and more specifically, fear-related associations and memory 
biases. Furthermore, research is needed to explore the content-specificity of these biases, should 
they exist. Therefore, the first goal of this dissertation was to study cognitive biases and to explore the 
specificity of these biases in anxious children.
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2. Combination of different cognitive biases and their relation with 
avoidance behavior
Although there is evidence how different cognitive biases in childhood anxiety are related to self-reported 
fear, there are only a few studies that check whether biases correlate with each other. Furthermore, 
there are no studies that relate cognitive biases to fear-related behavior in childhood anxiety. As fear-
related behavior is an important factor in the maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g., Rachman, 2004), 
reliable methods are needed to identify and quantify fear-related behavior in children. Traditionally, 
questionnaires have been used for this purpose, but these often show only moderate correlations with 
behavioral measures in the real world (e.g., Beidel, Turner, Hamlin, & Morris, 2000; Cartwright-Hatton, 
Hodges, & porter, 2003; Kindt, Brosschot, & Muris, 1996). An important extension is to relate cognitive 
biases to each other, to self-reported fear and to relate these biases and self-reports to fear-related 
behavior. This could enable the study of incremental predictive validity with respect to each other (see 
also, Muris and Field, 2008). Mogg and Bradley (1998) indeed suggested that cognitive information-
processing models would benefit from examination of different underlying components and stages of 
the processing of threat-related material. Also, Weems and Watts (2005) proposed an integrative model 
in which different cognitive biases work together to influence anxiety in children. This model predicts 
that the different cognitive biases will be related to each other, and that each bias, to some extent, will 
have a unique relation with anxiety. 
To date, there are only a few studies that have explored different biases in anxious children 
simultaneously, and also relating the biases to each other (e.g., Broeren, Muris, Bouwmeester, Field, & 
Voerman, 2011; Brown et al., 2014; Richards, French, Nash, Hadwin, & Donnelly, 2007; Weems, Costa, 
Watts, Taylor, & Cannon, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006). While some of the studies found some evidence 
for a relationship between the different cognitive biases (Richards et al., 2007; Weems et al., 2007), 
other studies did not (Broeren et al., 2011; Brown et al., (2014). Only Watts and Weems (2006)  explored 
both the correlations and the independent ability of different indirect measures to predict fear. They 
studied selective attention with a Dot Probe, memory bias with a cued recall task, and cognitive errors 
with a questionnaire. They concluded that selective attention, memory bias, and cognitive errors each 
predicted unique variance components of self-reported fear when controlling for age and gender. 
Selective attention, memory bias and cognitive errors were unrelated to each other. 
Although these studies explored a combination of different cognitive biases, none of them used 
a behavioral measure in addition to self-reported fear. A limitation of studying cognitive biases using 
direct and indirect tasks only is that they mainly measure semantic (e.g., questions on a self-report) and 
evaluative (e.g., pressing keys on a computer keyboard) aspects of cognitive representations. However, 
information-processing models propose that the information contained in cognitive representations is 
not only semantic and evaluative in nature, but also includes specific behavioral-response information. 
This is particularly relevant in fear and anxiety (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997), because they consist of 
a triad of responses: cognitive processes, physiological reactions, and a behavioral tendency to avoid 
the threatening stimuli. In the more general Reflective-Impulsive Model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the 
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association-based impulsive system contains both semantic and behavioral schemata (see Figure 2). In 
this model, both controlled processes (reflective system) and automatic processes (impulsive system) 
operate in parallel to control behavior. In the reflective system, behavior is initiated as a consequence of 
a conscious decision process which results in controlled behavioral responses. In the impulsive system, 
behavior may be initiated without intention or goal, and be biased towards highly relevant stimuli. The 
reflective and impulsive systems are thought to interact at various stages of processing; it is the mutual 
activation of both systems that controls both controlled and automatic aspects of behavior. A similar 
differentiation is the one between explicit and implicit fear-related cognitive processes (see Rinck & 
Becker, 2007; Teachman & Woody, 2004), both of which may influence fear-related behavior - particularly 
avoidance of feared stimuli - independently of each other.
Perception/
imagination
Behavioral
schemata
Noetic decision 
factual & evaluative
Reasoning Reasoning
Propositional
categorization
Behavioral
decision
Pointing &
referring Intenting
Behavior
Spreading activation
Reflective System
Impulsive System
“Reasoned
action”
“Impulsive
action”
Spreading activation
Associative store
Episodic and semantic links
Figure 2.  Dual processing model developed by Strack and Deutsch  (p. 222, 2004).  This model highlights the 
influence of both controlled and automatic aspects in information-processing. 
Note. Copyright © 2004 (SAGE Publications). Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications
Recently, a handful of studies on fearful behavior in adults compared both direct and indirect measures 
to behavior. These studies found that direct and indirect measures both have incremental predictive 
validity with respect to each other. The studies also showed that direct and indirect measures are not 
always correlated (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Huijding 
& de Jong, 2005, 2006; Teachman & Woody, 2003). Huijding and de Jong (2005) for example, found that 
the EAST (an indirect measure of fear-related associations) correlated significantly with automatic fear-
related behavior as measured with an eye blink startle response. Self-reported anxiety (direct measure 
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of anxiety) correlated significantly with relatively controllable avoidance behavior as measured with 
the Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). The EAST and self-reported anxiety did not correlate significantly 
with each other. However, studies relating both direct and indirect measures to fear-related behavior in 
children do not yet exist. 
Second research goal: The relationship between cognitive processes and the prediction of 
behavior
So far, there are only a few child studies that report on the combination of different cognitive biases 
that also explore the independent ability of indirect measures to predict fear. There are no published 
studies that relate both direct and indirect measures to fear-related behavior in childhood anxiety. Based 
on adult studies, it seems worthwhile to include a behavioral measure in combination with direct and 
indirect measures. Clearly more research is needed in this area. Therefore, my second goal was to study 
the relationship between the different cognitive biases, and to study the independent ability of direct 
and indirect measures to predict self-reported fear and fear-related behavior. More specifically, it is of 
great interest to study the possibility of indirect measures to both, and independently of one another 
predict, fear-related behavior in children, over and above the predictive power achieved by self-reports. 
This will underline the importance of automatic processes in fear-related behavior and support the use 
of indirect measures in research settings.
3. Changing anxiety by targeting cognitive biases
In the two research goals described above I addressed the existence of biased cognitions, their content-
specificity, the inter-correlations between biases and their correlation with fear-related behavior. However, 
these goals do not address the direction between biased cognitions and anxiety. The studies described 
above all explored fear-related associations and cognitive biases using a correlational design, meaning 
that the relation between biases and anxiety can be multi-directional. Questions regarding the causal 
role of cognitive biases remain unanswered For example, do children experience interpretation biases 
prior to developing an anxiety disorder, or do children with anxiety disorders develop an interpretation 
bias? And what happens when a negative interpretation bias disappears, does this automatically mean 
that levels of anxiety decrease as well?
 It is only recently that researchers have begun to test the causal status of cognitive biases by 
manipulating attention and interpretation biases and showing resultant changes in adult anxiety 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, Holker, 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Based on 
these encouraging initial results, the experimental paradigms have been adapted successfully to reduce 
existing cognitive biases in highly anxious adolescents and adults, as well as clinical populations with 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Lau, Belli, & Chopra, 2012; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 
2009; See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009; Teachman & Addison, 2008). There are now several published studies 
that underline the efficacy of different Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) formats with varying numbers 
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of training sessions in samples with different characteristics (for reviews, see Hertel & Mathews, 2011; 
Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 2014). 
Although CBM for interpretations (CBM-I) has now been well demonstrated to reduce negative 
interpretations in adults (for a review, see Hertel & Andrews, 2011), there are only a few published 
studies that evaluated this technique with anxious pre-adolescent children. The few studies using 
CBM-I that have been reported so far suggest that pre-adolescent children can be trained to alter 
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios in much the same way as adults (Lester, Field, & Muris, 2011a, 
2011b; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, & Hameetman, 2008; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, & Vreden, 
2009; Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prantzalou, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Blackwell, Moberly, & Karahaliou, 2012). 
Whether these alterations have subsequent effects on anxiety is much less clear. There are still several 
limitations in the research that prevent strong conclusions. Most importantly, there is only one study 
that studied children with elevated levels of anxiety. Given that non-anxious children have low levels 
of anxiety, it is not surprising that training in positive interpretations has limited effect. Nonetheless, 
training in negative interpretations should increase anxiety and this has not yet been demonstrated. 
In addition, anxious children may have more rigid or extreme interpretations, which may be harder 
to modify. More specific methodological limitations can be found among existing research. Some 
studies involve training (and testing) related to a hypothetical “other world” while other studies utilized 
novel (unknown) animals. Interpretations of hypothetical or unknown stimuli may be more malleable 
than interpretations for stimuli of which children have existing knowledge. Hence, these factors limit 
generalization to daily life and might produce stronger effects than would be found with previously 
formed interpretations. Finally, in the only study that demonstrated reductions in both interpretation 
bias and anxiety (Vassilopoulos et al., 2009), there was no “control training” condition, limiting the extent 
to which the effects could be attributed to positive training.
Third research goal: The effects of training in positive interpretations among children
Compared to the adult literature, relatively few studies in children explored CBM-I techniques to reduce 
existing biases. So far, research in children provided some evidence that existing biases can be trained, 
but there are still several limitations in the research that prevent drawing conclusions. Clearly more 
research is needed to address the limitations described above. Therefore, my third research goal was to 
further examine the effects of training in positive interpretations among children while addressing some 
of the earlier limitations. First, a sample of clinically anxious pre-adolescent children who were seeking 
treatment for their anxiety disorder were used. Second, the training and testing utilized hypothetical 
scenarios describing regular daily activities that the children would have previously encountered and 
would continue to encounter. Third, a neutral-training control condition was included.
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Outline of the dissertation
The main purpose of this dissertation was to learn more about the cognitive processes that play a role 
in childhood anxiety. To achieve this main goal, three specific goals were formulated. These goals were 
investigated in a systematic manner with ten highly interrelated studies that build on each other.
The first goal was to test whether fearful children display cognitive biases and show fear-related 
associations, and whether these biases and associations are specific to threat-related materials related to 
the content of an anxiety, should they exist. In order to be able to achieve this first goal, indirect measures 
that were originally developed for adults were adapted to study cognitive biases and fear-related 
associations in children. Chapters 3 to 11 describe measures that originate from the adult literature, but 
were adapted for children. All measures included simple task instructions and child friendly materials. 
Moreover, all measures contained stimuli to test for the content- specificity of the cognitive biases. 
The second goal of this dissertation was to study the relationships between different cognitive 
biases, and to study the independent ability of direct and indirect measures to predict fear-related 
behavior. More specifically, it is of great interest to study the ability of indirect measures to predict 
fear-related behavior in children, over and above the predictive power achieved by self-reports. This 
will underline the importance of automatic processes in fear-related behavior and support the use of 
indirect measures in research settings. Chapters 5, 6 and 8 contain more than one indirect measure to 
study different cognitive biases at the same time. The studies described in Chapters 2 to 8 included a 
behavioral task related to fear and each chapter included a self-report.
The third research goal was to further examine the effects of training in positive interpretations among 
children, while addressing some of the limitations of earlier studies. A child-friendly interpretation training 
was developed and tested in Chapter 11. This training included hypothetical scenarios describing regular 
daily activities that the children would have previously encountered and would continue to encounter.
Participants
The children who participated in the studies described in this dissertation were between 6 and 13 years 
of age. Investigating pre-adolescent children is of great interest, as the experience of fear is expected 
and usual at specific times during normal development in this age group (Fonseca & Perrin, 2001). 
Furthermore, anxiety disorders often start at a young age (Becker et al., 2007; Rapee et al., 2009; Wittchen 
& Fehm, 2003). Moreover, as several studies state that the influence of cognitive biases may be different 
across different age groups (see Field & Lester, 2010 for a review), I did not want the age range to be too 
large. This enables the studies described in this dissertation to be compared to each other and to be 
compared to the existing literature.  The children were only included if they were older than 6 years of 
age, as the children needed to be able to understand the different materials used in the questionnaires 
and tasks. Most questionnaires and interviews used are validated from this age and up (e.g., Silverman 
& Albano, 1996). Furthermore, in the studies in where I used reaction-time based tasks, children were 
included from the age of 8, as research shows that children are generally more easily distracted and have 
relatively short attention spans, something especially true for young children (Greenberg & Waldman, 
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1993; Huijding et al., 2010). Greenberg and Waldman (1993) for instance, found that attention and 
impulse control develops in a non-linear way, with rapid changes in children aged six and seven, and 
slower changes for older children. They also found greater variability between boys and girls in the ages 
six and seven, more so than in the older age groups (8 - 13). 
The children who participated in the studies described in this dissertation experienced different 
types of fears and anxieties. However I mostly studied children with varying levels of spider fear (Chapters 
2 to 8). I chose to study fear of spiders in Chapters 2 to 8 for several reasons. First, specific fears such as 
fear of spiders are highly prevalent in children (Strauss & Last, 1993). It is important to know more about 
the underlying mechanisms that play a role in the development and maintenance of specific phobias. 
It is also relatively easy to find children varying in their levels of fear of spiders. Second, normative fears 
such as fear of spiders, are often used as model for studying the development of other fears, because 
several studies suggest that the underlying processes of fears are similar (Williams, et al., 1997). Third, 
unlike other fears and anxieties, there are good behavioral tasks available to measure fear-related 
behavior related to spiders (see also Huijding & de Jong, 2006). Finally, I followed the recommendation 
by Spence, Lipp, Liebermann, & March (2006), to create specific threat stimuli that match the content 
of children’s fear. As fear of spiders is a specific fear, it is relatively easy to create specific stimuli. As I also 
wanted to relate the different cognitive biases to other fears, children with different types of fears and 
anxieties were studied in Chapter 7 and in Chapters 9 to 11, namely social anxiety (Chapters 7, 10 and 
11), generalized anxiety and/or separation anxiety (Chapters 9, 10 and 11).  
The children in Chapters 2 to 9 all varied in their levels of spider fear, social anxiety and generalized 
anxiety, but it was unknown if children had an anxiety disorder. It is often stated that anxiety represents 
a dimensional construct, meaning that normal and abnormal anxiety are part of the same continuum 
(Macleod, 1991; Muris, 2007; Rapee, 2001). Thus, the underlying cognitive processes that play a role in 
children with elevated anxiety levels versus children with an anxiety disorder may be similar (e.g., Muris 
& Field, 2008). To this end, studying typically developing children instead of children with an anxiety 
disorder has two advantages. First, typically developing children are more accessible compared to clinical 
populations. Second, and more importantly, although more and more studies on cognitive processes in 
children are reported, researchers are still exploring the role of cognitive processes in childhood anxiety. 
Clinically anxious children should not be tested over and over again only to validate or explore new 
paradigms. However, as I also wanted to test for the content-specificity of cognitive biases in clinically 
anxious children, interpretation bias was also studied in a clinically anxious sample (Chapters 10 and 
11). I chose to study interpretation biases, because the evidence for interpretation biases in childhood 
anxiety is the most robust of all cognitive biases. The results described in Chapters 2 to 9 regarding fear-
related association, attention bias and memory bias were not based on a clinical sample. 
Finally, some of the children participated in several studies described in the different chapters. 
The samples in the studies described in Chapter 2 (study 1), 3, and 4 partly overlapped. Some of the 
children who participated in the studies described in Chapter 2 (study 3) also participated in the studies 
described in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Some children who participated in the study described in Chapter 10 
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also participated in the study described in Chapter 11. Finally, the children who participated in the studies 
described in Chapters 5 to 8 performed more than one cognitive bias measure. There were two main 
reasons to combine data in this dissertation. The first reason was a practical one; it is almost impossible 
to recruit a new sample for every research goal in such a large research project. By combining different 
research goals, I tried to minimize the burden on the schools, teachers, parents and children. The second 
reason was a methodological one; some of the research goals regarding the intercorrelations between 
the different cognitive biases made it necessary to combine data in order to answer these goals. This 
means that some of the results of the studies described in different chapters are not independent. This 
has to be taken into account when interpreting the results. This is also described in the methods sections 
of the respective chapters.
Content
Chapter 2 describes the development of a short screening to assess fear and disgust of spiders, the 
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). The purpose of this study was to develop 
a new questionnaire specific, short, with increased response options, and suitable for children of both 
genders. The already existing questionnaires are far from optimal; one only contains one item about fear 
of spiders, another only measures fear of small animals in general and a third questionnaire is relatively 
long and not validated for boys. The development of this screening was important because it served as 
the direct measure in Chapters 3 to 8. 
Chapter 3 describes a task designed to study the automatic fear-related approach and avoidance 
tendencies elicited by spiders, the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007). In this AAT, 
single stimuli were presented to children on a computer screen. The children’s task was to respond 
as quickly as possible to each stimulus by pushing or pulling a joystick. The goal of this study was to 
evaluate the usefulness of the AAT in children varying in their level of spider fear. It seems that the AAT 
was never used for measuring already existing avoidance tendencies in children. The SADS-C and the 
Spider Phobia Questionnaire for Children (SPQ-C; Kindt et al., 1996) served as the direct measures. Also, 
a behavioral measure to study relatively controllable avoidance of spiders, the Behavioral Assessment 
Test (BAT) was used. In this BAT, children were asked to approach a spider in a cage, step by step. The 
first goal of this study was to test whether spider-fearful children show automatic avoidance tendencies 
in response to spider stimuli. The second goal was to investigate whether avoidance is specific to 
spider-related materials, or whether spider-fearful children also show avoidance of other stimuli. The 
exploration of the AAT was important because this task taps into more automatic aspect of avoidance 
tendencies, compared to the BAT. The BAT measures more controlled aspects of avoidance behavior 
related to spiders. Therefore the AAT might be useful to assess fear-related behavior in Chapters 4 to 8 in 
addition to the BAT (see also Huijding & de Jong, 2006). 
Chapter 4 describes a task designed to study attention bias in children with varying levels of spider 
fear. A pictorial card version of the Emotional Stroop Task (EST; Mathews & Macleod, 1985) was created. 
In this task, children were asked to name colors of pictures that were presented on a card as fast as 
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possible. The SADS-C and SPQ-C (Kindt et al., 1996) were used as direct measures. The BAT was used as 
the behavioral measure. The first purpose of this study was to test whether fearful children display an 
attention bias. The second purpose of this study was to investigate whether an indirect measure, the EST, 
and direct measures, the SADS-C and SPQ-C, are useful for predicting unique variance components of 
fear-related behavior in children. 
Chapter 5 follows up on Chapter 4, and describes an additional task (besides the EST) designed to 
study fear-related associations to spiders, the Affective Priming Task (APT; de Houwer, 2003a). In this task, 
words served as primes and pictures as targets. Children were asked to respond as fast as possible to the 
emotion in the picture of a child, by pressing the corresponding button. The first goal of this study was 
to replicate the findings described in Chapter 3. The second goal was to include the APT as a measure of 
fear-related associations, next to the SADS-C and the EST, and to compare their independent ability to 
predict performance during the BAT.
Chapter 6 describes a task designed to study interpretation bias, recall bias and source memory 
bias in children with varying levels of spider fear. Recall bias and source memory bias are both variations 
of a memory bias. Recall bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have the tendency 
to selectively recall threatening stimuli or events (see also Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 
2008). A source memory bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have the tendency 
to produce intrusions that reflect the nature of their own negative interpretations. An interpretation 
task with 18 ambiguous scenarios was created. Children were asked to formulate endings to these 
scenarios. In a following memory task, children were asked to recall the original scenario and their 
own ending from memory. Again, the SADS-C was used as the direct measure, and the BAT was used 
as the behavioral measure. The first purpose of this study was to test whether spider-fearful children 
display an interpretation bias, a recall bias and a source memory bias, and whether these biases were 
specific to threat-related materials. The second purpose was to compare the independent ability of the 
interpretation and memory biases to predict spider fear. 
Chapter 7 follows up on Chapter 6 and describes a study that was designed to investigate the 
specificity of interpretation biases in a sample of girls with symptoms of spider fear and social anxiety. 
The interpretation task described in Chapter 6 was adapted, so that it included 8 spider-related 
scenarios and 8 social-related scenarios. Children were asked to formulate endings to the scenarios. 
Again, the SADS-C and the BAT were included to get an indication of the level of self-reported spider 
fear, and behavioral avoidance of spiders. Additionally, children also filled in the social anxiety subscale 
of the Screen for Child Anxiety Related Disorders (SCARED; Bodden, Bögels, & Muris, 2009) to obtain 
an indication of their level of self-reported social anxiety. They also performed a Social Speech Task to 
measure state social anxiety during a behavioral task. The first purpose of this study was to replicate the 
findings of Chapter 6 concerning the interpretation bias related to spider threat. The second purpose 
was to study the specificity of interpretation biases related to social anxiety and spider fear. The third 
goal was to compare the independent ability of self-reported fear and the interpretation task to predict 
performance during the behavioral measures. 
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Chapter 8 follows up on Chapters 4 to 7 and was designed to measure fear-related associations, 
attention bias, interpretation bias and memory bias in children with varying levels of spider fear. Fear-
related associations were measured by an adapted version of the APT (Chapter 5). Attention bias was 
measured by the pictorial version of the EST created in Chapters 4 and 5, and by a newly developed word 
version of the EST.  Memory bias was measured by a free recall task that directly followed the APT. Finally, 
interpretation bias was measured by a newly developed task in which children were asked to indicate 
the size of a spider and the distance towards a spider in a cage (Clerkin et al., 2009; Teachman, 2008; Vasey 
et al., 2012). The first purpose of this study was to replicate the findings concerning spider attention 
bias reported in Chapters 4 and 5 and fear-related associations related to spiders reported in Chapter 
5. The second goal of this study was to test the newly developed task to measure interpretation bias 
related to spiders. The third goal was to explore the correlations between the different measures and to 
compare the independent ability of the different tasks to predict spider fear-related avoidance behavior.
Chapter 9 also addresses interpretation bias, but describes the assessment of interpretation bias by 
means of an Auditory Interpretation Task (AIT; see also Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). This task was developed 
to study interpretation bias in a more indirect way in children with varying levels of Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD). The AIT in this study was an adapted version of the AIT created by Dearing and Gotlib 
(2009). In this AIT, multiple-choice or open-ended responses were collected, and children filled in the 
GAD subscale of the SCARED (Bodden et al., 2009). The first purpose of this study was to test whether 
children with high levels of GAD also display an interpretation bias. The second goal was to investigate 
whether this bias was specific to GAD-related materials or whether children with symptoms of GAD also 
display an interpretation bias for other stimuli. 
Chapter 10 follows up on Chapters 6, 7, and 9, and describes the assessment of content-specificity 
of interpretation biases in children with a diagnosed anxiety disorder. The interpretation task used in 
Chapters 6 and 7 were adapted. Children were asked to finish 15 scenarios that were related to social 
threat, general threat or separation threat, by choosing one of the four endings to the scenario. Children 
and their mothers were assessed with the ADIS-C/P (Silverman & Albano, 1996) and the Spence Children’s 
Anxiety Scale (SCAS; Spence, 1998). The first purpose of this study was to test whether clinically anxious 
children display interpretation biases. The second goal was to test whether these biases are specific to 
threat-related materials. 
Chapter 11 describes the final empirical study. This study was designed to train benign interpretations 
in clinically anxious children. Clinically anxious children were randomly assigned to either a positive 
cognitive bias modification training for interpretation (CBM-I) or a neutral (placebo) CBM-I training. Both 
versions included 15 training sessions in a two-week period. Interpretation bias was measured with an 
interpretation task (see Chapters 6, 7 and 10). Children and their parents were assessed with the ADIS-
C/P (Silverman & Albano, 1996) and the SCAS (Spence, 1998) prior to training. Directly following the 
training, children performed a different version of the interpretation task, and children and their parents 
also filled in the SCAS again. The main goal of this study was to examine the effects of the training on 
interpretation bias and self-reported anxiety. 
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Chapter 12 gives an overview of the major findings reported in Chapters 2 to 11. Furthermore, it 
provides an integration of the findings, resulting in the development of a new information-processing 
model describing the role of cognitive processes in the maintenance of childhood anxiety. Finally, this 
chapter provides general limitations of the studies and directions for future research followed by the 
final conclusions.
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Chapter 2
The Spider Anxiety and Disgust 
Screening for Children (SADS-C): 
Reliability and Validity of a
Screening for Children
Based on: Klein, A. M., van Niekerk, R. E., Baartmans, J. M. D., Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2015). The spider 
anxiety and disgust screening for children (SADS-C): Reliability and validity of a screening for children. Invited 
to revise and resubmit.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper was to develop a short, reliable, and valid questionnaire to assess spider fear 
and spider disgust in children: The Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). In Study 
1, we tested the items of the SADS-C. In Study 2, we tested the psychometric properties related to the 
validity and reliability. In Study 3, we administered the SADS-C in a large sample in order to provide 
normative data. The results indicate good validity and reliability of the SADS-C; it was able to predict 
SPQ-C, SCARED-animal, and BAT scores. Furthermore, children with subclinical levels of spider phobia 
scored significantly higher on the SADS-C than those who did not. The SADS-C is a suitable questionnaire 
for assessing spider fear and disgust in children and is very suitable for epidemiological studies or for the 
screening of children in experimental research for which there is currently no appropriate instrument.
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All children experience some fear; this is expected and normal at specific times during typical 
development. Whereas isolated occurrences of fear are normally short-lived, fear can become 
problematic in some children. Therefore, disruptive levels of fear should be detected and followed early 
on, even more so because it is a risk factor for later psychopathology (e.g., Becker et al., 2007). Especially, 
specific fears are highly prevalent in children, with lifetime prevalence rates varying between 6.3 and 
11.3 (e.g., Kessler et al., 2009; Strauss & Last, 1993; for a review see Merckelbach, de Jong, Muris, & van den 
Hout, 1996). Furthermore, specific fears, such as fear of spiders, are often used as a model for studying 
the development of other fears, because several studies suggest that the underlying processes of fear 
are similar (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). There are indeed many studies of spider fear in 
adults as well as in children (Williams et al., 1997). Therefore, for the screening of spider fear in children, a 
good, fast, and reliable screening instrument is needed.
Unfortunately, however, such an instrument does not seem to exist yet. Although spider fear has 
been intensively studied in children, it seems that questionnaires for assessing fear of spiders are far from 
optimal. Most of the questionnaires measuring fear were not specifically developed to measure spider 
fear, like the Revised Fear Survey Schedule for Children (FFSC-R; Ollendick, 1983), and the Screen for 
Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders-71 (SCARED-71; Bodden, Bögels, & Muris, 2009). The FSSC-R 
contains only one question addressing fear of spiders and the SCARED-71 has one subscale about fear 
of small animals, but not specifically fear of spiders. In contrast, specific questionnaires for assessing 
fear of spiders are relatively long, like the most commonly used Spider Phobia Questionnaire for 
Children (SPQ-C) that consists of 29 items (Kindt, Brosschot, & Muris, 1996). Another disadvantage of this 
questionnaire is the range of responses available for each statement, which is limited to ‘true and ‘not 
true’. Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995) addressed this issue when comparing the adult version of the 
SPQ with the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ). They argued that the restricted response possibility of 
the SPQ could make the instrument insensitive to treatment effects or the ability to distinguish between 
fearful and non-fearful individuals. The same would apply to the SPQ-C.
The Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS; Rinck et al., 2002) may be a promising alternative. The SAS 
consists of only four items, each of which is rated in terms of agreement along a seven-point Likert 
scale. However, this questionnaire is designed for adults, and the statements are formulated in German. 
Moreover, it does not address disgust for spiders, although several studies have shown that disgust may 
be an important factor in the etiology and maintenance of psychopathology (e.g., Phillips, Senior, Fahy, 
& David, 1998). In particular, a number of studies found that spider-fearful children show more disgust 
sensitivity than non-fearful children (De Jong, Andrea, & Muris, 1997; De Jong & Muris, 2002; Muris, van 
der Heiden, & Rassin, 2008). Therefore, we decided that a spider fear screening should address disgust 
for spiders as well. 
The purpose of this paper was to develop a new questionnaire to assess spider fear and disgust 
in children, a questionnaire that is specific, short, and with increased response options. This new 
questionnaire, the Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C), is based on the Spider 
Anxiety Screening (SAS; Rinck et al., 2002). The four statements of the SAS were translated into Dutch, 
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and adapted so that children could understand them. These statements address: fear of spiders, physical 
reactions when confronted with a spider, avoidance related behavior (split into two items), and meta-
cognitions about being afraid of spiders. We also added a sixth statement addressing disgust for 
spiders. As a first step, we tested the items of the SADS-C. Next, in a new study, we tested psychometric 
properties related to the validity and reliability of the SADS-C. Finally, we administered the SADS-C in 
a large sample in order to provide normative data. By developing the SADS-C, we hoped to enable 
validated quantification of spider fear and disgust in children, in a quicker and easier manner than before. 
Study 1: Testing of items
Methods
Participants
An unselected group of children was recruited from two elementary schools in the Netherlands. 
Following parental consent, a total of 127 children (53 boys) between 9 and 12 years of age participated 
in the study (M = 10.4). The Ethical Committee of the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, approved this study.
 
Instruments
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). The SADS-C is the newly developed self-report, 
measuring responses to 6 spider-related statements on a 5-point Likert scale. A sum-score is computed, 
which evaluates degree of spider fear. During the data collection, it appeared that the children had 
great difficulties with the reversed formulation of Statement 3 “I love to go to places where spiders are”. 
This item was therefore removed from the questionnaire before the analysis. See Table 1 for the five 
remaining items and a summary of the univariate descriptives. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the items of the SADS-C (n = 127).
Inter-item correlations
Items M SD 1. 2. 4. 5.
1. I am afraid of spiders 2.57 1.7 - - - -
2. When I see a spider, I get nervous and my 
 heart beats quickly
1.92 0.1 .72** - - -
4. When I see a spider, I run away 1.72 0.9 .66** .68** - -
5. I do not like the fact that I am afraid of spidersa 2.11 1.3 .51** .39** .29* -
6. I find spiders disgusting 2.66 1.2 .61** .63** .55** .25*
a.   This item was removed from the final questionnaire. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
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Results and Discussion
Confirmatory Factor Analysis was used to test the hypothesized one-factor structure of the SADS-C. 
We used Lisrel to estimate the model parameters based upon the covariances between the 5 items 
of the SADS-C. The covariance matrices were estimates with Prelis using list-wise deletion. The Chi2 
test suggested that the one-factor measurement model with 5 items did not have an acceptable fit 
(X2 = 11.92, df = 5, p = .036). Item 5 had a standardized factor loading of .5, meaning that it was a weak 
indicator of the SADS-C. Item 5, ‘I do not like the fact that I am afraid of spiders’, was therefore removed 
from the model. The Chi2 test for the one-factor model with 4 items showed a very good fit (X2 = .031, 
df = 2. p = .86). The standardized factor loadings for the items in this model were: .85 for Item 1,  .87 for 
Item 2, .80 for Item 4, and .73 for Item 6. Based upon these results we decided to exclude Item 5 from 
further versions of the questionnaire. In conclusion, the final SADS-C consists of items 1, 2, 4, and 6.  
Study 2: Psychometric properties
Methods 
Participants
An unselected group of children was recruited from an elementary school in the Netherlands. Following 
parental consent, a total of 69 children (34 boys) between 8 and 13 years of age participated in the study 
(M = 9.9). Of these children, 1 child fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for spider phobia (APA, 2000) and 8 children 
met criteria for a subclinical diagnosis, that is although they reported significant fear and avoidance of 
spiders the interference and distress was not considered at a clinical level. The Ethical Committee of the 
Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, approved this study.
Instruments
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). The SADS-C is the newly developed self-report 
questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-related statements on a 5-point scale. The four 
statements address fear of spiders, physical reactions, avoidance, and disgust. 
Spider Phobia Questionnaire for Children (SPQ-C; Kindt et al., 1996). The SPQ-C is a self-report that allows 
for ‘true’ and ‘not true’ responses to 29 spider-related statements. A mean score is computed, which 
evaluates degree of spider fear. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability were satisfactory (α = .89, 
r = .61; Kindt et al., 1996). In this study, internal consistency was excellent (α = .94).
Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders-71 (SCARED-71; Bodden et al., 2009). The SCARED 
is a self-report questionnaire that measures anxiety symptoms according to the DSM-IV-TR. The 
questionnaire consists of 71 items (divided into 7 subscales) on a 3-point scale ranging from ‘almost 
never’ to ‘often’. The children in this study only filled in the subscale ‘fear of small animals’ (3 items). 
Internal consistency of this subscale was satisfactory (α = .87, r = .61; Bodden et al., 2009). In this study, 
internal consistency was moderate (α = .68).
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Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovacs, 1981). The CDI was chosen to yield an indication of 
general depression level, in order to determine divergent validity of the SADS-C. Internal consistency of 
the original scale was shown to be good, retest reliability was shown to be moderate (e.g., Kovacs, 1981). 
Internal consistency in this study was satisfactory (α = .86).
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). This task was used to assess the children’s avoidance behavior when 
confronted with a tarantula skin, which children believed to be a real, living spider. The task was identical 
to the BAT described by Klein, Becker, and Rinck (2011). BAT performance was scored on a scale ranging 
from zero (no approach) to 8 (touching the spider).
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV-C/P; Silverman & Albano, 1996). All children and 
parents were interviewed separately using the ADIS-IV-C/P. Diagnoses and severity ratings (on a scale of 
0-8) were assigned by graduate students in clinical psychology, based on a composite parent and child 
report. Qualified clinical psychologists supervised the students. 
Procedure
The children filled in the SADS-C, the SPQ-C, and the CDI as a group in their regular classroom 
environment. Then they individually performed the BAT in a separate room located in the school. The 
group filled out the SADS-C questionnaire a second time after a week of the initial testing, and a third 
time after two months of initial testing. Children were interviewed with the ADIS at school, parents were 
interviewed with the ADIS at school or at their homes.
Results
Reliability and Validity
The SADS-C had good internal consistency coefficients for all measurements (T1 α = .89, T2 α = .92, T3 
α = .93). Short-term retest reliability (r = .89, p < .001) and long-term retest reliability were good (r = .85, 
p < .001). The correlation between the SADS-C and the SPQ-C was r = .32 (p = .01), and between the 
SADS-C and the SCARED-animal was r = .47 (p < .001). The SPQ-C and the SCARED-animal also correlated 
significantly with each other r = .25 (p = .04). The correlation between the SADS-C and the BAT was 
r = -.34 (p < .001), such that higher SADS-C scores predicted more fearful behavior. The correlations 
between the SPQ-C and the BAT (r = -.37, p < .001) and between the SCARED-animal and the BAT 
(r = -.37, p < .001) were similar to the correlation of the SADS-C and the BAT. As expected, the SADS-C 
only correlated very weakly with the CDI (r = .21, p = .08), as did the SPQ-C (r = .10, p > .1) and the 
SCARED-animal (r = .19, p > .1). All correlations were controlled for gender. 
The discriminant validity of the SADS-C was examined by comparing the SADS-C scores of children 
with subclinical levels of spider phobia to those who did not. An ANCOVA with gender and age as 
covariates revealed that children with subclinical levels of spider phobia reported significantly higher 
SADS-C scores (M = 15.9, SD = 3.1) than those who did not (M = 8.3, SD = 3.9), F(1,63) = 23.2, p < .001, 
η2 = .27. We repeated this analysis for the SPQ-C and the SCARED-animal. In the ANCOVA with SPQ-C scores 
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as dependent variable, we found that children with subclinical levels of spider phobia reported significantly 
higher SPQ-C scores (M = 19.4, SD = 5.3) than those who did not (M = 8.7, SD = 7.9), F(1,64) = 11.6, p = .001, 
η2 = .15. Finally, in the ANCOVA with the SCARED-animal scores as dependent variable, we found that 
children with subclinical levels of spider phobia reported marginally significant higher SCARED-animal 
scores (M = 1.3, SD = 1.6) than children who did not fulfill these criteria (M = 0.6, SD = 1.0) F(1,65) = 3.9, p = .052, 
η2 = .06. 
Study 3: Normative data
In a third study, which was part of a large community based project about childhood anxiety (Klein et 
al., 2015a, 2015b, 2015c), a large group of children was recruited from regular elementary schools in 
the Netherlands in order to provide normative data. Following parental consent, a total of 705 children 
(357 boys) aged between 7 and 13 years (M = 10.3) participated in this study. The Ethical Committee of 
the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University Nijmegen, theNetherlands, approved this study. 
The children filled in the SADS-C in their classroom. The internal consistency was good (total α = .89; boys 
α = .80; girls α = .80). The mean SADS-C score for the entire sample was 9.4 (SD = 4.8, min = 2, 
max = 20). An ANCOVA with SADS-C scores as dependent variable, gender as between-subjects variable, 
and age as covariate was conducted to test for gender and age differences on the SADS-C. There was a 
main effect of gender because boys scored lower on the SADS-C (M = 7.4; SD = 3.7 min = 3, max = 20) 
than girls (M = 11.4; SD = 5.0; min = 2, max = 20), F(1,690) = 147.6, p < .001, η2 =.18. There was no effect 
of age, F(1,690) < .01, p > .1, η2 < .001. Appendix A presents SADS-C cumulative percentages for the total 
sample, and also separately for boys and girls.
General Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to develop a new questionnaire which assesses spider fear and disgust in 
children, and which is short and specific. This questionnaire, the Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening 
for Children (SADS-C) is based on the Spider Anxiety Screening for adults (SAS; Rinck et al., 2002). Internal 
consistency was high, as was short-term retest reliability and long-term reliability. Moreover, validity 
scores were good: Scores on the SADS-C showed sufficient to high correlations with the SPQ-C, the 
SCARED-animal and the BAT. In contrast, the correlation between the SADS-C and the CDI was very 
low, indicating divergent validity. The SADS-C correlated as highly with the BAT as the SPQ-C and the 
SCARED-animal did. Furthermore, children with subclinical levels of spider phobia scored significantly 
higher on the SADS-C and the SPQ-C than those who did not, which was not true for the SCARED-animal 
subscale. This indicates that, despite having only four statements, the final version of the SADS-C was as 
good as the SPQ-C and SCARED-animal subscale in predicting behavior, and as good as the SPQ-C and 
better than the SCARED-animal subscale in predicting DSM-IV criteria for spider phobia. 
This study has several shortcomings. First, we removed both Item 3 and Item 5 from the final 
questionnaire. Item 3 was a reversed item, and it produced great comprehension difficulties. We also 
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removed Item 5, because the results showed that the proposed one-factor model only had a good fit 
after deleting this item. The other four items queried direct feelings and behavior related to spider fear. 
In contrast, Item 5 attempts to assess meta-cognitions about being afraid of spiders. Low validity of 
this item may be due to difficulties in children’s meta-cognitive abilities. The final version of the SADS-C 
therefore consists of only four items. Three of them address fear of spiders, and one measures disgust 
for spiders. Second, the children used in the studies were non-referred children from a community 
sample. Even though some of the children had subclinical levels of spider phobia, the severity scores 
were relatively low; only one child was diagnosed with a Spider Phobia and none of the children were 
seeking treatment for their spider fear. Finally, the children filled in the SADS-C and SPQ-C in their own 
classroom environment, whereas the BAT was administered individually in a separate room, and the 
ADIS was administered at school or at home. We have tried to minimize the time between all three 
measurements, but the differences in time and location might have influenced the correlation between 
the different measures. 
In conclusion, our results indicate that the SADS-C is a suitable questionnaire for assessing spider 
fear and disgust in children. Due to the small number of items and the child-friendly phrasing, this 
screening instrument could help to identify spider-fearful children much more easily. The SADS-C is 
therefore very suitable for epidemiological studies and for the screening of children in research settings.
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Appendix A. Norms for the SADS-C: Cumulative percentages for the total sample of children (n = 705) aged 8 to 13, 
including separate percentages for boys and girls. 
SADS-C score Total Sample Boys Girls
(n = 705) (n = 357) (n = 348)
0 - - -
1 - - -
2 0.1 - 0.3
3 0.3 0.3 0.3
4 20.1 28.6 11.5
5 28.8 40.1 17.2
6 35.6 49.3 21.6
7 42.6 58.8 25.9
8 50.8 70.9 30.2
9 57.3 77.3 36.8
10 63.8 82.4 44.8
11 68.4 85.2 51.1
12 74.5 89.1 59.5
13 78.3 91.6 64.7
14 82.6 93.8 71.0
15 85.1 95.5 74.4
16 88.1 97.2 78.7
17 92.1 98.3 85.6
18 94.0 98.6 89.4
19 95.6 98.9 92.2
20 100 100 100
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Chapter 3
Approach and Avoidance Tendencies 
in Spider Fearful Children: 
The Approach-Avoidance Task 
Based on: Klein, A. M., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M. (2011). Approach and avoidance tendencies in spider 
fearful children: The approach-avoidance task. Journal of Child and Family studies, 41, 110-116.
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Abstract
Fear in children is associated with the tendency to avoid situations related to the fear. In this study, the 
Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) was evaluated as a test of automatic behavioral avoidance tendencies 
in children. A sample of 195 children aged between 9 and 12 years completed an AAT, a Behavioral 
Assessment Task (BAT), and two spider fear questionnaires. The results indicate that all children showed 
an automatic avoidance tendency in response to spider pictures, but not pictures of butterflies or neutral 
pictures. Girls who reported more fear of spiders on the self-reports and behaved more anxiously during 
the BAT also showed a greater avoidance tendency in the AAT. These relationships were absent in boys.
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All children experience some fear and anxiety; this is expected at specific times during development. 
While isolated occurrences of fear are normal and short-lived, a prolonged high level of fear can hinder 
children’s development. Therefore, disruptive levels of fear should be detected and followed early on, 
especially as anxiety is a risk factor for later psychopathology (e.g., Essau, Conradt, & Petermann, 2000). 
Since many fears develop in childhood, it is essential to have valid measurements to quantify fear in 
children and to further investigate the development and maintenance of related disorders. 
In the past decades, cognitive theories have emphasized the importance of cognitive processes in 
the onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders (for a review, see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). The central 
assumption of these theories is that cognitive processes are driven by schemata. Schemata are cognitive 
structures of associations between knowledge elements that influence perception, interpretation, 
attention, and memory. In individuals with an anxiety disorder, schemata that are organized around 
the themes of threat and danger are chronically overactive (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997; for a schema-based theory of childhood anxiety, see Kendall & Ronan, 1990). Due to processing 
resources being focused chronically and disproportionately upon threat-relevant information, biases in 
perception, interpretation, attention, and memory occur (for a review, see Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). 
To assess cognitive processes biased by fear and anxiety, both direct and indirect measures have 
been used. Direct measures are for example questionnaires or interviews in which participants are asked 
about their feelings and opinions. An advantage of these measures is that they are fast and easy to 
administer, and that they are reliable in the sense that measurement errors are small. A limitation of 
direct measures is that participants will only report what they are willing and able to report because 
responses are given in a controlled, deliberate manner (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As a result, answers 
may be biased by social desirability, limitations of introspection, and experimenter demands (e.g., 
Bijttebier, Vasey, & Braet, 2003). Therefore, direct measures cannot reliably capture cognitive processes 
that are fast and automatic in nature. In order to capture specific automatic cognitive processes more 
purely, indirect measures can be used. Indirect measures are often reaction time tasks that require fast 
responses which are thought to reflect more automatic processes. Although indirect measures have 
not been used in studies of child anxiety as intensively as in adults, more and more studies have been 
reported over the last few years (for reviews, see Huijding, Wiers, & Field, 2009; Puliafico & Kendall, 2006).
A limitation of these indirect tasks is that they mainly measure behavior (e.g., pressing keys on a 
computer keyboard) that is not directly related to fear and anxiety. Information processing models, 
however, propose that the information contained in cognitive representations is not only semantic 
and evaluative in nature, but also includes specific behavioral-response information. This is particularly 
relevant in fear and anxiety (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997), because they consist of a triad of responses: 
cognitive processes, physiological reactions, and a behavioral tendency to avoid the threatening stimuli. 
In the more general Reflective-Impulsive Model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the association-based impulsive 
system also contains both semantic and behavioral schemata. The indirect measures described above, 
however, tell us little about behavioral schemata, namely how fearful children differ from non-fearful 
children in their automatic approach and avoidance reactions.
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To assess approach-avoidance tendencies, the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 
2007) may be a good alternative. The AAT is a task in which single stimuli are presented to participants 
on a computer screen. The participants’ task is to respond as quickly as possible to each stimulus by 
pushing or pulling a joystick. The AAT is based on the finding that approach and avoidance are basic 
responses associated with the primary motive systems of the brain that underlie complex emotional 
responding (Lang et al., 1997). In particular, pleasant stimuli produce automatic approach tendencies, 
whereas negative stimuli produce automatic avoidance tendencies (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999). Several 
studies have shown that avoidance is associated with pushing objects away from oneself, and approach 
is associated with pulling the objects closer (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Solarz, 1960). However, the AAT 
is not merely a measure of stimulus valence: Even positively evaluated stimuli can evoke an avoidance 
reaction, e.g., smiling faces in the socially anxious (Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007; Lange, Keijsers, Rinck, 
& Becker; 2008), and even negatively evaluated stimuli can evoke an approach reaction (e.g., alcohol 
pictures in alcoholics).
Rinck and Becker (2007) used the AAT to study approach–avoidance responses in spider fearful 
adults. In one of their experiments, the participants’ task was to respond to each stimulus presented on 
the computer screen by pushing or pulling a joystick. The pictures showed spiders and ‘empty’ pictures 
(backgrounds without spiders), but the participants were told to ignore the contents of the pictures. 
Instead they pushed or pulled the joystick depending on picture format (landscape vs. portrait). A critical 
feature of this AAT is the use of a ‘‘zooming’’ function: When participants push the joystick away from 
themselves, the picture on the screen shrinks. When the joystick is pulled, the picture grows until it fills 
the screen. This zooming effect creates the visual impression that the pictures are coming closer upon 
pulling of the joystick and that they move away upon pushing it. Although picture contents was task-
irrelevant in the study by Rinck and Becker (2007), a stimulus-response compatibility effect was found: 
Spider-fearful participants were faster to push spider pictures away than to pull them closer, which was 
not true for empty pictures or for non-fearfuls. Rinck and Becker (2007) concluded that the AAT might be 
a valid procedure to assess how strongly individuals react with automatic avoidance.
The AAT has been used many times to study approach and avoidance tendencies in different fears 
(e.g., Heuer et al., 2007; Lange et al., 2008; Lange, Salemink, Windey, Keijsers, Krans, Becker, Rinck, 2010; 
Roelofs, Putman, Schouten, Lange, Volman, & Rinck, 2010) and in addiction (Wiers, Rinck, Dictus, & van 
den Wildenberg, 2009). Moreover, it was also used for training purposes in adult samples (Wiers, Rinck, 
Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 2010; Woud, Becker, & Rinck, 2008). However, we only know of a single study 
that used the AAT in a child sample (Huijding, Field, De Houwer, Vandenbosch, Rinck, & Oeveren, 2009). 
In this study, the AAT was used as a training task. The children had to repeatedly push away some 
unknown animals and repeatedly pull closer other animals. As a result, the children reported increased 
fear of previously pushed-away animals. This effect was only found for girls, and there were no training 
effects found on implicit attitudes. This study tells us that repeatedly pushing away an object may cause 
a fear response, but it does not tell us whether fearful children also show a spontaneous behavioral 
avoidance tendency to a feared object. This study also leaves open whether the measurement of 
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reaction times (RTs) in the AAT is reliable enough for child studies. In a training task, it is only important 
that children push or pull the joystick repeatedly, but differences in RTs between pulling and pushing 
are not necessarily calculated.
Although it seems that the AAT was never used for measuring already existing avoidance tendencies 
in children, it can be expected that the AAT should be suitable for children, due to the simple task 
instructions and the use of non-verbal stimuli. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to evaluate the 
usefulness of the AAT in children. More specifically, the AAT was used to measure automatic behavioral 
avoidance tendencies in children varying in their level of spider fear. We chose to assess spider fear for 
several reasons. First, specific phobias are common and highly persistent in children (Strauss & Last, 
1993). It is therefore important to know more about the underlying mechanisms that play a role in 
the development and maintenance of specific phobias. Using the AAT could shed more light onto the 
automatic behavioral processes that play a role in these phobias. Knowing more about these processes 
in specific phobias could be useful for prevention and treatment. Second, we wanted this study to be 
comparable to the study by Rinck and Becker (2007), because it would be more meaningful to compare 
and discuss the results of the AAT in adults and children if the same AAT with the same stimuli is used. 
Third, spider fear is often used as a model for studying other types of fear, since the underlying processes 
are believed to be very similar (Williams et al., 1997). Finally, there are good behavioral measures for fear 
of spiders, unlike for other fears and anxieties. 
An analogue sample of children varying in their level of spider fear participated in this study. Besides 
participating in the AAT, the children also filled out two questionnaires to assess self-reported fear 
of spiders. As in one of the experiments by Rinck and Becker (2007), the children also performed a 
Behavioral Assessment Task (BAT). This particular BAT measures relatively controllable approach behavior 
related to spiders by asking children to approach a spider step-by-step. Following the findings by Rinck 
and Becker (2007), we expected that children with high self-reported fear of spiders should be slow to 
pull spider pictures towards themselves, compared to other children and compared to other pictures. 
The other children were also expected to show avoidance, but not as much as fearful children. We 
further expected that the children who showed avoidance in the AAT would also have problems to 
approach a real spider in the BAT. However, because this BAT measures relatively controllable approach 
behavior, we expected BAT performance to correlate more strongly with the questionnaires than with 
the AAT, and we did not expect the AAT to explain variance in BAT performance over and above what 
was explained by the questionnaires. We had no particular predictions regarding moderating effects of 
gender. However, several studies suggest that girls generally report higher levels of (spider) fear than 
boys (e.g. Kindt, Brosschot, & Muris, 1996; Ollendick, King, & Muris, 2002). Therefore, we analyzed boys 
and girls separately. Moreover, Rinck, Hu, van Noorden, Verhoeven, Woud, and Becker (2010) recently 
found that AAT effects were largest at the beginning of an AAT. Therefore, we analyzed AAT effects 
separately for the different blocks of the current AAT.
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Methods
Participants
An analogue sample of children was recruited from three regular elementary schools in the Netherlands. 
After parental consent had been granted, a total of 195 children between 9 and 12 years of age 
participated in the study. Some of these children also participated in two other studies to validate the 
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein, van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & 
Becker, 2015) and an Emotional Stroop Task (Klein, Becker, & Rinck, 2011).
Materials
Approach - Avoidance Task (AAT). The AAT required children to react to a single picture displayed centrally 
on a computer screen by pulling or pushing a joystick. The stimulus set consisted of six pictures of 
spiders, six pictures of butterflies, and one grey image (control picture; see Figure 1). The AAT was 
administered via a laptop computer with an external 17’’ LCD color monitor. The joystick was connected 
to the computer, and each picture was presented until a reaction was registered. When the child pushed 
the joystick away, the size of the picture decreased, disappearing when the joystick had reached an 
angle of approx. 30 degrees. For pulling reactions, the size of the picture increased and then disappeared 
when the child had pulled the joystick 30 degrees towards himself. The joystick had to be returned to the 
middle position, and the trigger button was pushed to bring up the following picture.
A round and a square version were created of each picture (spider, butterfly, and control). Half of 
the children were asked to push the joystick away from themselves for round pictures and to pull the 
joystick towards themselves for square pictures. The other half received reversed instructions. Following 
22 practice trials, 6 blocks of 12 spider trials, 12 butterfly trials, and 12 control trials each were presented 
in pseudo-randomized order. After three blocks (108 trials), the children took a short break. The order of 
stimuli was designed so that no more than 3 trials of the same type were presented successively. In sum, 
each child performed 36 trials for each of the 6 possible combinations of picture type (spider, butterfly, 
control) and response direction (pull/push). 
Figure 1. Sample pictures used in the AAT; Spider, Butterfly, and Control.
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Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein et al., 2015). The SADS-C is a self-report 
questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-related statements on a 5-point scale ranging from 
‘completely untrue’ to ‘completely true’. The four statements address fear of spiders, physical reactions, 
avoidance, and disgust. A total score is computed from the 4 items. Internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability were satisfactory (α = .88, r = .91; Klein et al., 2015). In this study, internal consistency was 
satisfactory as well (α = .84).
Spider Phobia Questionnaire for Children (SPQ-C; Kindt et al., 1996). The SPQ-C is a self-report measure 
which allows for ‘true’ or ‘not true’ responses to 29 spider-related statements. A total score is computed 
from the 29 statements. Internal consistency as well as test-retest reliability were satisfactory (α = .89, 
r = .61; Kindt et al., 1996). In this study, internal consistency was satisfactory as well (α = .86).
Behavioral Assessment Task (BAT). This task was used to assess the children’s fear-related behavior 
when confronted with a spider (see also Kindt et al., 1996). BAT performance was scored on an eight-
point scale and proceeded as follows: The child was asked to enter a room in which a covered box 
containing a tarantula was located (unbeknown to the children, it was only the spider’s skin, which 
looked like a living tarantula). The child was asked to stand on a mark visible on the ground three meters 
away from the box. The experimenter explained to the child that a real tarantula was in the box. The 
child’s task was to approach the box as closely as it liked. The experimenter stressed that the procedure 
was not a competition, and if the child did not want to approach any further, it could say so immediately. 
The experimenter then uncovered the box and the child was told to look at the tarantula. The child 
received points initially for each meter traversed towards the box (1 meter closer to the box: 1 point, 
2 meters: 2 points, and next to the box: 3 points). The child was then asked to put a hand on the box for 
more than ten seconds (4 points), and then to lift the box (5 points). After putting down the box, the 
child was then asked to open it (6 points), and to put one hand in the box (7 points). The last step was 
to touch the tarantula with one hand (8 points). If a child failed to take any particular step, or wanted to 
stop, the last completed step was recorded as the BAT score. During the child’s performance of the BAT, 
the experimenter knew neither the child’s SADS-C or SPQ-C scores nor its AAT score.
Procedure
First, the children individually performed the AAT in a separate room located at the school. Next, the 
children individually performed the BAT in the same room. Later, they filled out the SADS-C and the 
SPQ-C as a group in their regular classroom environment. The teacher in each class read aloud the 
instructions for each self-report. Before the self-reports were filled in individually, the children practiced 
with two example statements from the SPQ-C. The children were then allowed to ask either the teacher 
or the experimenter questions, but were not allowed to discuss the statements amongst each other. 
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Results
Descriptives
To clear the AAT dataset of errors, all incorrect reactions (4.6 %), i.e., pushing instead of pulling and vice 
versa, were removed from the dataset. Next, all reaction times under 200 ms or above 5000 ms were 
removed. Reaction times differing more than two SD from the mean were also removed, resulting in 
removal of 1.7 % of correct responses. The data of 20 children with more than 20 % incorrect or outlier 
reactions were excluded from the analyses. As a result, the data of 175 children (75 boys and 100 girls) 
between 9 and 12 years of age (M = 10.37) were used in subsequent analyses.
Approach - Avoidance Task. First, AAT scores for every single block were calculated. To compute 
the AAT scores, the difference between push reaction times and pull reaction times was calculated 
separately for each of the three picture types. A negative AAT score indicates an avoidance tendency 
because pushing away is faster than pulling closer. Correspondingly, a positive AAT score indicates an 
approach tendency because pulling closer is faster than pushing away. The resultant AAT scores and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. AAT mean scores and standard deviations for each picture type shown separately for each block.
Block Spider (SD) Control (SD) Butterfly (SD)
1  -36.74 (150.81)      6.43 (136.14) 28.14 (165.17)
2    -5.82 (129.47)    -5.38 (120.18) -12.45 (145.65)
3    -9.95 (134.23)  -10.22 (122.05) -9.40 (140.40)
4  -22.17 (142.69)    -2.27 (140.19) -1.28 (120.24)
5    -7.82 (124.05)     7.39 (143.96) -21.89 (137.86)
6    -6.46  (136.00)  -17.67 (120.46) 2.02 (145.88)
Total  -14.83  (70.27)    -3.62   (60.32) -2.60   (70.18)
The internal consistency of AAT scores across all 6 blocks was α = .45 for spider images, α = .26 for 
control images, and α = .34 for butterfly images. A mixed-factor ANCOVA with Picture Type (spider/
butterfly/neutral) as within-subjects factor, Gender as between-subjects factor, and Age as covariate 
was conducted.
The AAT scores for different picture types were compared using the Bonferroni correction. There 
was neither a main effect of Gender (F(1,172) = 0.79) nor of Age (F(1,172) = 0.01), but a significant main 
effect of Picture Type (F(2,171) = 8.24, p < .001). The AAT score for spider images was significantly more 
negative than the ones for control images (p = .006) and butterfly images (p < .001). The latter two 
scores did not differ from each other significantly (p > .05). Additionally, three one-sample t-tests were 
conducted to test whether the three AAT scores were significantly different from 0. This value was chosen 
because a score of 0 would indicate a neutral score, meaning that there were no differences between 
push and pull movements. As expected, the spider AAT score was significantly negative (t(174) = -3.2, 
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p = .002), and the AAT score was significantly positive (t(174) = 2.3, p = .025). The AAT score for the neutral 
picture did not differ significantly from 0 (t(174) = 0.63, p > .05). These differences were only found 
in Block 1, however, in accordance with the findings of Rinck and colleagues (2010). In the following 
analyses, therefore, the spider AAT score for Block 1 and the combined spider AAT score for Blocks 2 to 
6 were treated as separate variables. The control AAT score and the butterfly AAT score  did not differ 
significantly across blocks (t(175) = 0.16, n.s.).
Self-reports. The mean score on the SADS-C was 2.25 (SD = 0.92), the mean score on the SPQ-C was 
1.22 (SD = 0.16). A multivariate ANCOVA with SADS-C scores and SPQ-C scores as dependent variables, 
Gender as between-subject variable, and Age as covariate was conducted. A multivariate effect was 
found for Gender (F(2,171) = 12.45, p < .001), but not for Age (F(2,171) = 0.02). Univariate tests showed 
that there was a main effect of Gender on the SADS-C (F(1,172) = 20.07,  p < .001), because boys 
(M = 1.90, SD = 0.71) scored lower than girls (M = 2.50, SD = 0.97). There was also a main effect of Gender 
on the SPQ-C (F(1,172) = 23.69,  p < .001). Again, boys (M = 1.27, SD = 0.11) scored lower than girls 
(M = 1.50, SD = 0.18). In addition to the lower means, the boys also showed less variation in spider 
fear than girls did, as evidenced by significantly smaller standard deviations on both the SPQ-C 
(F(74,99) = 2.60, p < .001) and the SADS-C (F(74,99) = 1.91, p < .001). On both questionnaires, relatively 
few boys indicated high fear of spiders.
Behavioral Assessment Task (BAT). The mean BAT score was 6.53 (SD = 1.68), the higher the 
score, the less fearful the child). An ANCOVA with BAT score as the dependent variable, Gender as 
between-subjects factor, and Age as covariate was conducted. There was a main effect of Gender 
(F(1,172) = 4.90,  p = .029), because boys (M = 6.85, SD = 1.52) scored higher than girls (M = 6.29; 
SD = 1.77), but no effect of age (F(1,172) = 0.47). We also tested for differences between the standard 
deviations for boys and girls, finding that the boys’ standard deviation was smaller than the girls’ standard 
deviation (F(74,99) = 73.37, p < .001). This indicates that relatively few boys had a low score on the BAT.
Correlations separately for boys and girls
Because of the gender differences on the self-reports and the BAT, correlations were calculated separately 
for boys and girls. All correlations were controlled for age. 
Girls. The correlation between the SADS-C and the SPQ-C was r = .81 (p < .001). As expected, the 
self-reports correlated with the BAT: girls who reported less fear of spiders approached the spider more 
closely (BAT and SPQ-C: r = -.40, p < .001; BAT and SADS-C r = -.35, p < .001). The spider AAT score of Block 
1 correlated significantly with the SPQ-C (r = -.25, p = .006), and with the SADS-C (r = -.20, p = .026): Girls 
who reported more spider fear also showed a stronger automatic avoidance tendency on the AAT. The 
spider AAT score of Block 1 also correlated significantly with the BAT (r = .20, p = .024): Girls who showed 
a stronger automatic avoidance tendency on the AAT also had more problems to approach the spider 
during the BAT. These correlations were absent for the spider AAT score of Blocks 2 to 6 (with SPQ-C: 
r = -.06, n.s.; SADS-C: r = .09, n.s.; BAT: r = -.01, n.s.). As expected, the control AAT scores did not correlate 
significantly with either the SADS-C (r = .16, n.s.), the SPQ-C (r = -.14, n.s.), or the BAT (r = -.08, n.s.), 
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and neither did the butterfly AAT scores (SADS-C: r = -.01, n.s.; SPQ-C: r = -.01, n.s.; BAT: r = -.18, n.s.). 
This indicates that girls who report fear of spiders or show an avoidance reaction on the BAT do not 
necessarily show an automatic avoidance or approach reaction towards neutral stimuli or butterflies. 
This result suggests that the AAT does indeed measure spider-specific response tendencies.
Boys. The correlation between the SADS-C and the SPQ-C was r = .62 (p < .001), slightly lower than 
in girls. As expected, the self-reports correlated with the BAT: Boys who reported less fear of spiders 
approached the spider more closely (BAT and SPQ-C: r = -.35, p = .001; BAT and SADS-C: r = -.39, 
p < .001). Unlike for girls, the spider AAT scores of Block 1 did not correlate significantly with the SPQ-C 
(r = -.03, n.s.), the SADS-C (r = .01, n.s.), or the BAT (r = -.03, n.s.). The spider AAT scores for Blocks 2 to 6 
did not correlate significantly with the SPQ-C (r = .08, n.s.) or the SADS-C (r = .10, n.s.), but did show an 
unexpected correlation with the BAT (r = -.30, p = .009). This means that boys who showed an automatic 
avoidance reaction on the later parts of the AAT approached the spider more closely during the BAT. 
This finding was limited to Block 6, in which boys reacted in the opposite direction of what we expected. 
As expected, the AAT scores for the control image did not correlate with the SADS-C (r = -.17, n.s.), the 
SPQ-C (r = -.08, n.s.), or the BAT (r = .08, n.s.). The butterfly AAT scores did not correlate with the SADS-C 
(r = .01, n.s.), the SPQ-C (r = .04, n.s.), or the BAT (r = -.06, n.s.) either.
Keeping in mind that there were far fewer boys who scored high on the questionnaires than girls, we 
ran an additional analysis with only those 16 boys who scored medium to high on the SADS-C (SADS-C 
score > 2.5). For them, we calculated correlations between the SPQ-C, BAT, SADS-C, and spider AAT score 
of Block 1. Although not statistically significant because of the small sample, the correlations between 
these variables were in the same direction as the ones for girls (SPQ-C and AAT: r = -.34, p = .099; BAT and 
AAT: r = .21, p >.05; SADS-C and AAT: r = -.29, p > .05). This suggests that highly fearful boys do appear to 
show an automatic avoidance reaction on the BAT which is larger than the one exhibited by medium-
fearful boys. 
Regression analysis
In order to predict the relatively controllable behavior measured by the BAT, we used two hierarchical 
regression analyses, separately for boys and girls. The BAT score was used as the dependent variable, the 
predictors were the SADS-C, the SPQ-C, and the spider AAT score of block 1. We included the SADS-C 
and the SPQ-C in step 1 and the spider AAT score in step 2, because our main interest was the amount 
of predictive power the AAT could add to the direct measures. For girls, the SADS-C and the spider AAT 
score did not explain a significant amount of additional variance. The regression model with only the 
SPQ-C was significant (F(1,98) = 16.82, p < .001), and it explained 14.7 % of the total variance. For boys, 
the SPQ-C and the spider AAT score did not explain a significant amount of additional variance. The 
regression model with only the SADS-C was significant (F(1,73) = 11.41, p < .001), and it explained 13.5 % 
of the total variance. Thus, only one of the two questionnaires was necessary to predict behavior on the 
BAT; for girls it was the SADS-C, for boys it only the SPQ-C.
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Discussion
The goal of the present study was to examine the usefulness of the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) for 
measuring automatic behavioral avoidance tendencies in spider-fearful children. Following the findings 
by Rinck and Becker (2007), we expected that children who are highly fearful of spiders should show 
automatic avoidance, that is a negative AAT score, for spider pictures, but not for butterflies or neutral 
pictures. The non-fearful children were also expected to show avoidance of spider pictures, but not 
to the same degree as fearful children. Moreover, we expected that children who show an automatic 
avoidance reaction towards spiders in the AAT would also have problems to approach a real spider 
during the BAT. While we expected correlations between the AAT, the self-report measures, and the BAT, 
this would not necessarily mean that the questionnaires and the AAT predict unique variance in BAT 
performance. Moreover, we expected the largest AAT effects at the beginning of the AAT, and based on 
the literature, we expected girls to report higher levels of spider fear than boys.
As expected, the observed results indicate that all children showed an automatic avoidance reaction 
in response to pictures of spiders, but not to control images or butterfly pictures. This effect was only 
found for the first block of the AAT. When looking at the relation between reported fear of spiders and 
the AAT scores for Block 1 in girls, we found significant correlations between the spider AAT scores, the 
SPQ-C, the SADS-C, and the BAT. These relationships were absent in the subsequent blocks, indicating 
that the avoidance response to threatening stimuli is initially present in girls, but becomes more difficult 
to measure with extended duration of the AAT. The latter results fits in nicely with recent results by Rinck 
and colleagues (2010), and may be due to practice effects: With extended practice, participants may 
learn to concentrate on the task-relevant format of the pictures and to ignore the task-irrelevant picture 
contents. Therefore, the early AAT effects reflect automatic avoidance tendencies more reliably, and they 
also correlate more reliably with self-reports and approach behavior towards a real spider.
Furthermore, habituation may have occurred. Children (and adults alike) may react with automatic 
avoidance only for the first few times they are confronted with the spider stimuli. After longer exposure, 
they might become used to the stimuli, as pictures of spiders are more easily habituated to than real 
spiders. It is therefore not surprising that we did not find any correlations between the spider AAT scores 
for Blocks 2 to 6 and the self-reports or the BAT. The positive conclusion that one might derive from this 
result is that a brief and time-saving version of the AAT is not only sufficient, but actually optimal for 
measuring automatic behavior tendencies in children. As expected, neither the control image AAT score 
or the butterfly AAT score correlated with the self-reports or the BAT, indicating discriminative ability of 
the AAT.
As expected, boys reported less spider fear on the questionnaires and behaved more “bravely” in the 
BAT than girls. In the current study, the variance in our girl sample was also larger than in the boy sample. 
As a result of a lower mean and smaller variance, there were only very few boys who showed a high 
level of fear on the questionnaires and a high avoidance reaction on the BAT. This low variation in self-
reported fear and behavioral avoidance might explain our lack of correlations with AAT scores for boys. 
Indeed, when looking at the correlation within medium-to-highly fearful boys, we did see the same 
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pattern as in girls. A follow-up study with more medium-fearful to high-fearful boys could show whether 
boys do indeed exhibit the same correlational pattern as girls when they are spider fearful. In the current 
study, the only remarkable finding for boys was that in Block 6, they reacted in the opposite direction 
of what was expected: Boys with an avoidance spider AAT score in Block 6 approached the spider more 
closely in the BAT. We have no plausible theoretical explanation of this finding, and we suspect that it 
reflects a chance fluctuation in the data.
The regression analyses revealed that the AAT spider scores did not add unique additional variance 
over and above the questionnaires when explaining the relatively controllable avoidance behavior 
measured with the current BAT. This was to be expected because the AAT measures automatic avoidance 
behavior, whereas the questionnaires and the BAT measure relatively controllable processes. This result 
is also perfectly in line with the findings of Huijding and de Jong (2006) who used an EAST to measure 
automatic associations towards spiders. They used a comparable BAT to measure relatively controllable 
behavior, and startle probe response to measure relatively uncontrollable fear responses. They found 
that questionnaires best predicted BAT scores, whereas the EAST best predicted startle probe response. 
The only seemingly contradictory finding was reported by Rinck and Becker (2007). In their study, the 
AAT did predict variance in a BAT over and above what the questionnaires predicted. However, in that 
study, the dependent BAT variable was approach speed, which contains more automatic aspects than 
the dependent variable of the BAT used in this study.
It should also be noted that the AAT has some limitations, when compared to other indirect 
measures. While the AAT takes automatic behavioral tendencies into account, these tendencies are 
limited to approach and avoidance behavior in a standard setting. Second, the AAT does not distinguish 
between different types of associations, all of which might relate to approach and avoidance behavior. 
The AAT cannot, for example, distinguish between fear of spiders and disgust of spiders. 
Further research is required to evaluate the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) for studying the 
underlying mechanisms of fear in boys. So far, it seems that differences in AAT responses between highly 
fearful and non-fearful girls indicate that pictures of spiders are evaluated as threatening, and that the 
body immediately responds to this threat stimulus by preparing an avoidance reaction. This shows that 
the AAT is suitable for studies of children, at least in girls.
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Chapter 4
Direct and Indirect Measures of Spider 
Fear Predict Unique Variance in Children’s 
Fear-Related Behavior
Based on: Klein, A. M., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M. (2011). Direct and indirect measures of spider fear predict 
unique variance in children’s fear-related behavior. Cognition and Emotion, 25, 1205-2013.
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Abstract
This study investigated whether direct and indirect measures predict unique variance components of 
fearful behavior in children. 189 children aged between 9 and 12 performed a pictorial version of the 
Emotional Stroop Task (EST), filled out the Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C), 
the Spider Phobia Questionnaire for Children (SPQ-C), and took part in a Behavioral Assessment Test 
(BAT). The EST did not correlate with self-reports. Correlations of the self-reports and the BAT remained 
significant after partialing out EST performance. Likewise, the EST and the BAT still correlated significantly 
with each other when controlling for the self-reports. This indicates that both direct and indirect measures 
are useful for predicting unique variance components of fearful behavior in children. Moreover, it may 
explain why some previous studies have not found a relationship between self-reported fear and EST 
performance.
Direct and indirect measures of spider fear predict unique variance
65
4
All children experience some fear and anxiety; this has to be expected at specific times during 
development. While isolated occurrences of fear are normal and short-lived, prolonged high levels 
of fear can hinder children’s development. Therefore, disruptive levels of fear should be detected and 
followed early on, especially because anxiety is a risk factor for later psychopathology (e.g., Becker et 
al., 2007; Essau, Conradt, & Petermann, 2000). Since many fears develop in childhood, it is essential 
to have valid measurements to quantify fear in children and to further investigate the development 
and maintenance of related disorders. To this end, studying fearful behavior in addition to subjective 
reports of fear may provide additional insights because avoidant behavior is an important factor in the 
maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g., Rachman, 2004). Thus, reliable methods are needed to identify 
and quantify fearful behavior in children. Traditionally, questionnaires have been used for this purpose, 
but these often show only moderate correlations with behavioral measures in the real world (e.g. Beidel, 
Turner, Hamlin, & Morris, 2000; Cartwright-Hatton, Hodges, & Porter, 2003; Kindt, Brosschot, & Muris, 
1996; Klein, van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & Becker, 2015). This may be due to the contribution of both 
automatic and controlled processes to behavior, which should both be taken into account in studying 
fear reactions.
Several information-processing models highlight the role of controlled and automatic processes 
in explaining behavior in general, and fearful behavior in particular (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). Strack and Deutsch (2004), for example, proposed a reflective-impulsive model in which 
both controlled processes (reflective system) and automatic processes (impulsive system) operate in 
parallel to control behavior. In the reflective system, behavior is initiated as a consequence of a conscious 
decision process, while in the impulsive system, behavior may be initiated without intention or goal, and 
be biased towards highly relevant stimuli. The reflective and impulsive system are thought to interact at 
various stages of processing; it is the mutual activation of both systems that controls behavior. A similar 
differentiation is the one between explicit and implicit fear-related cognitive processes (see Rinck & 
Becker, 2007; Teachman & Woody, 2004), both of which may influence fear-related behavior - particularly 
avoidance of feared stimuli - independently of each other. 
While controlled or explicit processes may be assessed by direct measures such as questionnaires 
or interviews, different aspects of automatic or implicit processes can only be assessed by indirect 
measures, such as the Emotional Stroop Task, the Affective Priming Task, the Approach Avoidance Task, 
or others (De Houwer, 2003a; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Rinck & Becker, 2007). Although the use of 
indirect measures has been extensively studied in adults, considerably fewer studies have used indirect 
measures in fearful children (for reviews, see Huijding, Wiers, & Field, 2010; Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). One 
instrument that was repeatedly used to study automatic processes in fearful children is the Emotional 
Stroop Task (EST; see Nightingale, Field, & Kindt, 2010; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). In the original 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), participants have to name the color of words denoting colors (e.g., blue, red). 
In the EST, however, the words do not denote colors, but are emotionally valenced. The EST can be seen 
as an indirect measure of the implicit aspects of fear because it measures response times for naming 
the print color of anxiety-provoking stimuli while participants are asked to ignore the words’ meaning. 
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Highly fearful children are expected to have difficulty ignoring the threatening meaning of fear-relevant 
stimuli, resulting in longer color naming times for these words. In this case, automatic processes such as 
threat processing interfere with controlled processes such as color-naming. In contrast, direct measures 
such as self-reports measure the explicit, subjective experience of fear, which may or may not be related 
to implicit aspects of fear (Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007).
One of the first studies employing the EST in highly fearful children was reported by Martin, Horder 
and Jones (1992) who found stronger distraction by threat stimuli in fearful compared to non-fearful 
children. Although these results may be questionable because the experimenters who measured the 
reaction times were aware of the children’s anxiety status, several studies were able to replicate the 
effect. In contrast, a number of other studies were unable to demonstrate the effect (for reviews, see 
Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Ehrenreich & Gross, 2002; 
Nightingale et al., 2010). These diverging findings cannot be explained by variability in the employed 
Stroop tasks or by different fears studied, nor by age differences in the samples. A shortcoming of prior 
studies, however, is that almost all of them tried to compare EST performance of groups differing in self-
reported fear. This may seem straightforward, but what if direct measures (e.g., self-reports) and indirect 
ones (e.g., EST) are both valid, but more or less independent of each other? In this case, it might well be 
that the EST performance of children with low self-reported fear does not differ from the performance 
of those with high self-reported fear.
To the best of our knowledge, only Kindt and Brosschot (1999) used an alternative to assessing fear 
of spiders via self-report, namely, a Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). However, the BAT was only used to 
create groups, and the authors did not correlate self-report, BAT, and EST performance with each other. 
The BAT for spider fear is reliable and well validated (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2006), but studies with 
children that make use of the BAT are lacking. This is unfortunate because both automatic and controlled 
processes should express themselves in fearful behavior (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Ellwart, Rinck, & 
Becker, 2006; Huijding & de Jong 2006). Moreover, self-reports also have the disadvantage that children 
need sufficient reading abilities and meta-cognitive skills to complete them in a valid way. Self-reports 
may also be more susceptible to social desirability than behavioral or indirect measures (e.g., Bijttebier, 
Vasey, & Braet, 2003). It would therefore be critical to not only compare self-reports to behavior and 
indirect measures to self-reports, but to compare all three measures to each other in a combined study. 
Therefore, the first aim of this study was to investigate whether an indirect measure, the EST, and 
direct measures, namely self-reports, are useful for predicting unique variance components of fearful 
behavior in children. The second goal was to find out whether EST and self-reports would also correlate 
with each other. We chose to study fear of spiders for three different reasons. First, specific fears such as 
fear of spiders are highly prevalent in children (Strauss & Last, 1993). Second, fear of spiders is often used as 
a model for studying the development of other fears, because several studies suggest that the underlying 
processes of fear are similar (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). By studying fear of spiders, 
we can compare our study to the existing literature. Third, unlike other fears and anxieties, there are 
good behavioral tasks available to measure fearful behavior related to spiders (Huijding & de Jong, 2006). 
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We created a pictorial card version of the EST with 24 items of the same category presented on 
each card (spiders, butterflies, wheels). We chose a pictorial card version of the Stroop because the 
impulsive system is thought to activate behavioral schemata in response to the perceptual information 
of the shapes of spiders (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Moreover, Ellwart, Becker and Rinck (2005) showed that 
spider-related words were not automatically associated with fear, whereas pictures of spiders should 
activate the corresponding fear associations easily. Furthermore, the results of pictorial tests are not 
influenced by reading ability, as in versions using words. In order to compare this indirect measure with 
direct measures, children filled in two self-reports assessing the level of their perceived fear of spiders. The 
children also performed a behavioral task assessing their actual behavior when confronted with a spider.
By studying the relationship between behavioral and non-behavioral measures such as self-reports 
and the EST, we can determine whether direct and indirect measures correlate with each other, whether 
they both predict fear-related behavior, and whether indirect measures can explain variance in behavior 
over and above the variance explained by direct measures.
Methods
Participants
An unselected group of children was recruited from three regular elementary schools in the Netherlands. 
After parental consent had been granted, a total of 189 children (78 boys and 111 girls) between 9 and 
12 years of age (M = 10.3) participated in the study. These children also participated in another study to 
validate the Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein et al., 2015).
Materials
Emotional Stroop Task. The EST used in this study was a card version; consisting of three different cards 
(spider, butterfly, wheel) and a practice card (round dots; see Figure 1). Spiders served as the threat items, 
butterflies were chosen because they are also small animals but have a pleasant valence, and wheels 
were chosen because they are visually similar to spiders, but emotionally neutral. When the experimenter 
pressed the computer’s space bar, a card was presented on the computer screen, showing 24 identical 
shapes presented in four different colors (green, blue, red, yellow). Following the practice card, the three 
experimental cards were shown in random order. For each card, the children were instructed to name 
the different colors as quickly as possible without making errors. As soon as the child named all colors 
of the 24 shapes, the experimenter pushed the space bar again and the pictures disappeared. During 
the task, the experimenter recorded all color naming mistakes, while the time between appearance and 
disappearance of each card was measured automatically and served as the dependent variable. During 
the administration of the Stroop Task, the experimenter knew neither the children’s self-reported level of 
spider fear, nor their BAT performance.
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Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein et al. 2015). The SADS-C is a self-report 
questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-related statements on a 5-point scale ranging from 
‘completely untrue’ to ‘completely true’. The four statements address fear of spiders, physical reactions, 
avoidance, and disgust. A total score is computed from the 4 items. Internal consistency as well as test-
retest reliability were satisfactory (α = .88, r = .91; Klein et al., 2015). In this study, internal consistency was 
satisfactory as well (α = .84).
Spider Phobia Questionnaire for Children (SPQ-C; Kindt et al., 1996). The SPQ-C is a self-report which 
allows for ‘true’ or ‘not true’ responses to 29 spider-related statements. A total score is computed 
from the 29 statements. Internal consistency as well as test-retest reliability were satisfactory 
(α = .89, r = .61; Kindt et al., 1996). In this study, internal consistency was satisfactory as well (α = .87).
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). This task was used to assess the children’s fear-related behavior when 
confronted with a spider (see Kindt et al., 1996). BAT performance was scored on an 8-point scale: The 
child was asked to enter a room in which a covered box containing a tarantula was located (unbeknown 
to the children, it was only the spider’s skin, which looked like a living tarantula). The child was asked 
to stand on a mark visible on the ground three meters away from the box. The experimenter explained 
to the child that a real tarantula was in the box. The child’s task was to approach the box as closely as it 
liked. The experimenter stressed that the procedure was not a competition, and if the child did not want 
to approach any further, it could say so immediately. The experimenter then uncovered the box and the 
child was told to look at the tarantula. The child received points initially for each meter traversed towards 
the box (1 meter closer to the box: 1 point, 2 meters: 2 points, and next to the box: 3 points). The child 
was then asked to put a hand on the box for more than ten seconds (4 points), and then to lift the box (5 
points). After putting down the box, the child was then asked to open it (6 points), and to put one hand 
in the box (7 points). The last step was to touch the tarantula with one hand (8 points). If a child failed 
to take any particular step, or wanted to stop, the last completed step was recorded as the BAT score. 
During the child’s performance of the BAT, the experimenter knew neither the child’s SADS-C or SPQ-C 
scores nor its Stroop color-naming times.
Figure 1. The four different pictures used in the Emotional Stroop Task. 
Note. Original stimuli were in color.
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Procedure
First, the children individually performed the EST and then individually performed the BAT in a separate 
room located at the school. Later, they filled out the SADS-C and the SPQ-C as a group in their regular 
classroom environment. The teacher in each class read aloud the instructions for each self-report. Before 
the self-reports were filled in individually, the children practiced with two sample statements from the 
SPQ-C. The children were then allowed to ask either the teacher or the experimenter questions, but were 
not allowed to discuss the statements amongst each other. 
Results
Descriptives
Emotional Stroop Task. The number of mistakes was low overall (0.5 %), with no differences between 
the cards, F(2,376) = 0.28, n.s., η2 = .002. With regard to reaction times (RTs), reliability was very good 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .89). The RTs were analyzed with a 3 (card type) x 2 (gender) x 4 (age group) mixed-
factor ANCOVA. This analysis revealed neither differences between the three cards F(2,372) = 0.58, 
n.s., η2 = .003, nor between boys and girls, F(1,186) = 0.001, n.s., η2  < .001. There was a main effect of 
age, however: The older the children were, the more quickly they reacted, F(1,186) = 22.14, p < .001, 
η2 = .11 (see Table 1). Additional tests also revealed a main effect of order: RTs for the first card were faster 
than for the second, t(188) = 3.51, p = .001, d = .19, and the third card, t(188) = 6.34, p < .001, d = .31, as 
was the second card compared to the third card, t(188) = 2.27, p = .024, d = .13.
Self-reports. The mean score on the SADS-C was 2.2. There was a main effect of gender, F(1,187) 
= 25.46,  p < .001, η2  =.12, because boys (M = 1.9) scored lower than girls (M = 2.5). The mean score 
on the SPQ-C was 1.2, with boys (M = 1.1) scoring lower than girls (M = 1.3), F(1,187) = 33.56,  p < .001, 
η2  = .15.
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). The mean BAT score was 6.5 (the higher the score, the closer the 
approach). A 2 (gender) x 4 (age) ANCOVA revealed a significant main effect of gender, F(1,186) = 4.53, 
p = .035, η2  = .024, because boys (M = 4.9) approached the spider more closely than girls (M = 4.4). There 
was no main effect of age, F(1,186) = 0.64, n.s., η2  = .003.
Correlations 
All correlations were controlled for gender and age. Before the correlations were computed, the Stroop 
RTs for the three different cards were subtracted from each other in order to calculate two relative 
scores; Spider-Stroop score (RT-Spider minus RT-Neutral) and Butterfly-Stroop score (RT-Butterfly 
minus RT-Neutral): Higher scores indicate larger interference by the animal. A mixed-factor ANCOVA 
with EST difference scores (Spider-Stroop score/Butterfly-Stroop score) as within subjects variables, 
Gender as between-subject factor and Age as covariate was conducted. There was no overall difference 
between the two difference scores F(1,186) = 1.08, n.s., η2  = .006. There were no main effects of gender 
F(1,186) = 0.69 n.s., η2  = .004 or age either F(1,186) = 0.02, n.s., η2  < .001 (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Means, difference scores, and standard deviations for the three cards used in the Stroop Task, separately for 
age and gender (n = 189).
Cards
Means  
Spider card  
(SD)
Means  
Butterfly card 
(SD)
Means  
Wheel card
(SD)
Spider-Stroop 
Score  
(SD)
Butterfly- Stroop  
Score  
(SD)
Girls
Age
9 24.3 (4.2) 24.7 (4.7) 23.9 (4.4) .34 (3.5) .74 (2.9)
10 21.3 (4.4) 21.5 (4.2) 20.9 (4.5) .40 (3.5) .57 (3.1)
11 19.8 (4.9) 20.1 (6.6) 19.8 (4.5) -.05 (2.2) .26 (4.4)
12 19.4 (2.9) 18.5 (2.6) 19.0 (3.7) .37 (2.3) -.48 (3.0)
Total 21.3 (4.6) 21.4 (5.2) 21.0 (4.6) .27 (3.0) .37 (3.4)
Boys
Age
9 21.8 (3.5) 21.6 (3.0) 22.2 (4.5) .34 (3.2) -.31 (3.5)
10 21.7 (4.2) 21.8 (5.8) 22.1 (3.7) .37 (3.8) -.27 (4.4)
11 20.6 (4.0) 20.9 (4.2) 20.8 (4.2) .22 (2.5) .06 (3.3)
12 21.1 (2.9) 19.4 (2.9) 18.4 (3.7) 2.7 (5.5) 1.0 (2.5)
Total 21.2 (3.8) 21.2 (4.3) 21.3 (4.2) .03 (3.4) -.03 (3.6)
Total 21.3 (4.3) 21.3 (4.8) 21.1 (4.4) .14 (3.2) -.20 (3.5)
The correlation between the SADS-C and the SPQ-C was r = .72 (p < .001). As expected, the Spider-
Stroop score as well as the self-reports correlated with the BAT: Children who reported less fear of spiders 
or showed less spider-related interference approached the spider more closely. Correlations between 
the self-reports and the BAT were r = -.39 (p < .001) for the SADS-C and  r = -.43 (p < .001) for the SPQ-C. 
Despite the large sample size, these correlations were not significantly higher (z = 1.46, n.s., for the 
SADS-C; z = 1.92, n.s., for the SPQ-C) than the correlation between the Spider-Stroop score and the BAT 
(r = -.26, p < .001, also controlled for card order). Moreover, self-reported fear and Stroop interference were 
unrelated: The Spider-Stroop score correlated neither with the SADS-C (r = -.11; n.s.), nor with the SPQ-C 
(r = -.09; n.s.).
As expected, correlations between the self-reports and the BAT remained significant after partialing 
out the Spider-Stroop score (r = -.38, p < .001 for SADS-C, r = -.42, p < .001 for SPQ-C). Most importantly, 
however, the reverse was also true: the Spider-Stroop score and the BAT still correlated significantly with 
each other when controlling for the self-reports (r = -.26,  p < .001).  As expected, the Butterfly-Stroop 
score was unrelated to the SADS-C (r = .07, n.s.), the SPQ-C (r = .11, n.s.), and also the BAT (r = .05, n.s.).
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Regression analysis
In order to predict the behavior measured by the BAT, we used a hierarchical regression analyses. The BAT 
score was used as the dependent variable, the predictors were the SADS-C, the SPQ-C, and the Spider-
Stroop score. We also included gender and age in step 1 of the regression, in order to control for these 
variables. We included the SADS-C and the SPQ-C in step 2, and the Spider-Stroop score in step 3, because 
our main interest was the amount of predictive power the Stroop could add to the direct measures. We 
found that age did not explain a significant amount of variance and was therefore removed from the 
analysis. The regression model with the remaining variables was significant (F(4,184) = 16.80, p < .001) and 
explained 26.8 % of the total variance. The first step in the model, gender, explained 2.4 % of the variance 
(B  = .15, p  = .035). In the second step, the SADS-C (B =  -.18, p = .083), and the SPQ-C (B = -.33, p = .002), explained 
another 19.1% of the total variance. In the third step, the Spider-Stroop score explained another 5.3 % (B = .23, 
p < .001).
Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether an indirect measure, the Emotional 
Stroop Task, which assesses more implicit aspects of fear processing, and direct measures, namely the 
questionnaires SADS-C and SPQ-C, which address explicit self-reports of subjective fear, were both 
useful for predicting unique variance components of spider-fearful behavior in children, measured with 
a BAT. The results show that the EST and the self-reports showed independent, significant correlations 
with the BAT, irrespectively of gender and age. Thus, despite the use of two self-reports, the Stroop task 
was still able to predict unique variance components in fear-related behavior measured with the BAT. 
This shows that the prediction of children’s spider-fearful behavior is improved by using both direct and 
indirect measures.
Both direct and indirect measures correlated significantly with BAT performance, and the 
correlations between self-reports and BAT were not significantly higher than the correlation between 
Stroop score and BAT. This is unusual because it is widely assumed that the behavior measured with 
the BAT is controllable: The children were asked to approach a spider, and could decide themselves 
how far they wanted to go. Several authors have suggested that direct measures such as self-reports 
should be better suited for the prediction of controlled behavior, while indirect measures may be more 
predictive of automatic behavior (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2006). Therefore, one might have expected 
that the SADS-C and the SPQ-C should correlate more strongly with the BAT than the EST. In light of this 
reasoning, it is even more remarkable that in the current study, the Spider-Stroop score was a significant 
predictor of BAT performance (for similar results obtained with another indirect measure, see Rinck & 
Becker, 2007).
Another remarkable finding is the fact that the self-reports and the Stroop did not correlate with 
each other. Although the reflective and impulsive system are two different processes, they are thought 
to interact at certain points. It is therefore expected that these two measures will not correlate highly 
with each other, but should show some overlap with each other. In this study however, the EST and the 
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two self-reports did not correlate with each other at all. This may also explain why some earlier studies 
did not find stronger color-naming interference in children with high self-reported fear than in those 
with low self-reported fear. Instead of casting doubt on the validity of the EST, this result might indicate 
that self-reports and indirect tasks measure different constructs which are not necessarily closely related 
to each other.
Alternatively, one might speculate that the lack of a correlation between EST and questionnaires 
can be explained by insufficient reliability of these measures. This seems quite unlikely, however, 
given the good reliabilities found here and elsewhere, and the significant correlations that all these 
measures showed with the BAT. A possible explanation might be that automatic fear associations and 
self-reported fear levels are simply not as closely related to each other as one might expect at first 
sight. Marks (1987) suggested that the three main components of an emotional response (cognitive-
subjective, physiological, and motor-behavioral) are often poorly correlated with each other, varying in 
appearance and meaning in different situations and individuals. Thus, if we see the automatic cognitive 
processes studied here as a component of the list, they might very well show some desynchrony with 
the other components.
In the future, we will need more research about exactly which aspects of behavior are predicted 
better by direct and indirect measures, respectively. We also need to know whether other indirect 
measures that address other implicit processes can predict behavior beyond the prediction achieved 
with the EST. We also need to test whether these results can be replicated using other fears than spider 
fear. The results of the current study confirm the reflective-impulsive model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), 
and they indicate that both direct and indirect measures are useful for predicting fear-related behavior 
in children.
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Chapter 5
Subjective Fear, Interference by Threat, 
and Fear Associations Independently 
Predict Fear-Related Behavior 
in Children
Based on: Klein, A. M., Kleinherenbrink, A. V., Simons, C., de Gier, E., Klein, S., Allart, E., Bögels, S. M., Becker, E. 
S., & Rinck, M. (2012).  Subjective fear, interference by threat, and fear associations independently predict 
fear-related behavior in children. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 43, 952-958.
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Abstract
Several information-processing models highlight the independent roles of controlled and automatic 
processes in explaining fearful behavior. Therefore, we investigated whether direct measures of 
controlled processes and indirect measures of automatic processes predict unique variance components 
of children’s spider fear-related behavior. Seventy-seven children between 8 and 13 years performed 
an Affective Priming Task (APT) measuring associative bias, a pictorial version of the Emotional Stroop 
Task (EST) measuring attentional bias, filled out the Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children 
(SADS-C) in order to assess self-perceived fear, and took part in a Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT) 
to measure avoidance of spiders. The SADS-C, EST, and APT did not correlate with each other. Spider 
fear-related behavior was best explained by SADS-C, APT, and EST together; they explained 51% of the 
variance in BAT behavior. No children with clinical levels of spider phobia were tested. The direct and 
the different indirect measures did no correlate with each other. These results indicate that both direct 
and indirect measures are useful for predicting unique variance components of fear-related behavior 
in children. The lack of relations between direct and indirect measures may explain why some earlier 
studies did not find stronger color-naming interference or stronger fear associations in children with 
high levels of self-reported fear. It also suggests that children with high levels of spider-fearful behavior 
have different fear-related associations and display higher interference by spider stimuli than children 
with non-fearful behavior.
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Anxiety disorders are amongst the most common disorders in childhood and are very persistent 
(Anderson, 1994; Becker et al., 2007). To some extent, anxiety is a normal developmental phenomenon 
in children; fears emerge and disappear again at certain ages. However, some children do not ‘outgrow’ 
these fears and experience extensively high and long lasting levels of anxiety. Since fear is a normal part 
of development, these children can easily be overlooked (Hirsfeld-Becker & Biederman, 2002). Preventive 
screening is therefore important to identify highly fearful children, even more so since extensive fear in 
childhood is an important risk factor for later anxiety disorders and psychopathology in general (e.g., 
Essau, Conradt, & Petermann, 2000). In order to implement effective screenings and treatments, a better 
understanding of how anxiety develops and persists over time is needed. To this end, studying fearful 
behavior in addition to subjective reports may provide additional insights, because avoidant behavior is 
an important factor in the maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g., Rachman, 2004). Thus, reliable methods 
are needed to identify and quantify fearful behavior in children. Traditionally, questionnaires have been 
used for this purpose, but these often show only moderate correlations with behavioral measures in 
the real world (Beidel, Turner, Hamlin, & Morris, 2000; Cartwright-Hatton, Hodges, & Porter, 2003; Kindt, 
Brosschot, & Muris, 1996; Klein, van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & Becker, 2015). This may be due to the 
contribution of both automatic and controlled processes to behavior, which should both be taken into 
account in studying fear reactions. Therefore, the aim of this study was to predict fearful behavior in 
children by means of both automatic and controlled processes.
Several information-processing models highlight the role of controlled and automatic processes 
in explaining behavior in general, and fearful behavior in particular (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). A similar differentiation is the one between explicit and implicit fear-related cognitive 
processes (see Rinck & Becker, 2007; Teachman & Woody, 2004), both of which may influence fear-related 
behavior - particularly avoidance of feared stimuli - independently of each other. It is therefore important 
to study both controlled and automatic processes in order to understand behavior in general, and fearful 
behavior in particular.
While controlled/explicit processes may be assessed by direct measures such as questionnaires or 
interviews, different aspects of automatic/implicit processes can only be assessed by indirect measures, 
such as the Emotional Stroop Task, the Affective Priming Task, or others (De Houwer, 2003a; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985). Recently, a handful of studies on fearful behavior in adults have compared both direct 
and indirect measures to behavior. These studies have found that direct and indirect measures both 
have incremental predictive validity with respect to each other, and that direct and indirect measures 
are not always correlated (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; 
Huijding & de Jong, 2005; 2006; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Teachman & Woody, 2003). Studies relating both 
direct and indirect measures to fear-related behavior in children seem to be lacking, however. We only 
know a single study that has compared all three measures to each other (Klein, Becker, & Rinck, 2011). 
Klein et al. (2011) found that the Emotional Stroop Task (EST) still correlated with children’s spider-fearful 
behavior when controlling for two questionnaires that measure self-reported fear of spiders in children. 
Moreover, the EST and the questionnaires were not related to each other.
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The study by Klein et al. (2011) supports the importance of using both indirect and direct measures 
to predict fearful behavior in children. However, this study addressed only a single automatic cognitive 
process, namely attentional bias measured by the EST. An important extension is therefore to include 
other indirect measures that assess different cognitive processes, for example, fear-related associations. 
Mogg and Bradley (1998) indeed suggest that cognitive information processing models would benefit 
from separate examination of different underlying components and stages of the processing of threat-
related material. These should be measured separately of each other, and separately of explicit processes 
that are measured directly by questionnaires or interviews. Also, Weems and Watts (2005) proposed an 
integrative model in which different cognitive biases work together to influence anxiety in children. They 
emphasize the need for additional research to study different biases together, in order to explore the 
intercorrelations among the different cognitive constructs. In this study, we therefore not only focused on 
attentional biases for threat, but also on fear-related associations, and compared their relations to behavior. 
Examples of indirect measures of associations include the Affective Priming Task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998), and the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (De Houwer, 2003b). These measures are often used in adult research and 
can successfully distinguish between fearful and non-fearful individuals (e.g., Ellwart, Becker, & Rinck, 
2005; Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2006; Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001). In child 
research, however, indirect measures of associations have rarely been used  (for a review, see Huijding, 
Wiers, & Field, 2010). This is remarkable, since these measures may be particularly advantageous in 
children. Their insight and verbalization skills tend to be less developed than those of adults, and children 
may be more sensitive to experimenter demand than adults (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Several authors 
have indeed expressed the need for more research using indirect measures of associations in children 
(e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Huijding et al., 2010). In their review, Huijding et al. (2010) conclude that 
indirect measures such as the APT are suitable for children, and that these measures can yield important 
information about fear, in addition to direct measures.
The Affective Priming Task (APT) is a task in which target stimuli have to be categorized as either 
positive or negative. Each target stimulus is preceded by a so-called prime stimulus that does not require 
a response. It is expected that responses to the targets are faster when the prime and the target are 
congruent in valence than when they are incongruent, resulting in a so-called positive priming effect. 
Studies have indeed found positive priming effects after both positive and negative primes (e.g., De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Fazio et al., 1986). However, there are also studies that found a priming 
effect after positive primes, but were unable to find a priming effect after negative primes, or even 
reported a reversed, negative priming effect after them (e.g., Klauer & Musch, 2001; Glaser & Banaji, 1999). 
The results published on adults are also inconclusive regarding the effect of anxiety on affective priming. 
While some studies report differences between anxious and non-anxious individuals (e.g., Richards & 
French, 1992; Calvo & Castillo, 2001), others were unable to find differences (e.g., Schniering & Rapee, 
1997). More recently, Maier, Berner, and Pekrun (2003) and Berner and Maier (2004) found no overall 
priming effects after negative primes, but found a negative priming effect depending on trait anxiety. 
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In children, the APT has mainly been used as an indirect measure of preferences that were 
conditioned beforehand (Askew & Field, 2007; Field, 2006; Lawson, Banerjee, & Field, 2007). However, we 
only know of a single study that used the APT to differentiate between fearful and non-fearful children 
(Spence, Lipp, Lieberman, & March, 2006). These authors compared clinically anxious children to non-
anxious children. They found age-related differences depending on the valence (positive/negative) of 
the primes. All children showed a positive priming effect after positive primes. For the threat primes, 
older children (11-14 years) did not show any priming effects, while the younger children (7-10 years) 
showed a reversed priming effect: They responded more quickly to threat-incongruent targets than to 
threat-congruent targets. Moreover, Spence et al. (2006) did not find an interaction between anxiety 
level and priming effects; all children reacted in the same way, irrespective of their anxiety. One of the 
potential explanations for the lack of an interaction between anxiety and priming effects was the variety 
of anxiety disorders the children displayed (e.g., social anxiety, separation anxiety, generalized anxiety). 
Spence et al. (2006) speculated that the match between type of threat stimuli and the specific nature of 
children’s anxiety disorder may not have been strong enough to result in a bias. Despite the few studies 
that are reported in children, Huijding et al. (2010) concluded that the APT is a task that promises to be 
a good indirect measure of fear-related associations in children.
In this study, we used the APT as an indirect measure of associations, the EST as an indirect measure of 
attentional bias, and the Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein et al., 2015) as 
a direct measure of subjective fear. All three of them were used to predict children’s fear-related behavior 
in a Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). We chose to study fear of spiders for several reasons. First, specific 
fears such as fear of spiders are highly prevalent in children (Strauss & Last, 1993). Second, we wanted 
this study to be comparable to the study by Klein et al. (2011), because we wanted to replicate and 
extend this study. Third, fear of spiders is often used as a model for studying the development of other 
fears, because several studies suggest that the underlying processes of fear are similar (Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Matthews, 1997). Fourth, unlike other fears and anxieties, there are good behavioral tasks 
available to measure behavior related to fear of spiders. Finally, we wanted to follow the recommendation 
by Spence et al. (2006) to create specific threat stimuli that match the content of children’s fear. As fear 
of spiders is a specific fear, it is relatively easy to create specific stimuli.
We used the pictorial card-by-card version of the EST created by Klein et al. (2011). In addition, we 
created an APT with five categories of prime words (bodily symptoms, negative feelings, happiness, 
spiders, and general fear). We included bodily symptoms, negative feelings, and general fear words to 
check the discriminant validity of the APT. The target stimuli consisted of pictures of six children’s faces 
looking either happy or fearful, and they had to be categorized into these two emotions. We chose 
words as primes and pictures as targets because we expected that pictures would be associated with 
positive or negative feelings more easily, similar to the EST. This should make responding to the targets 
easier for the children.
The goals of this study were twofold. The first goal was to replicate the study reported by Klein et 
al. (2011), and to see if the results were similar. Klein et al. (2011) found that the EST predicts a unique 
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variance component of fearful behavior when controlling for self-reported fear of spiders in the SADS-C. 
The second goal was to include the APT as a measure of fear associations, in addition to the attention 
bias measured with the EST, and to explicit processes measured with the SADS-C, and to compare their 
independent ability to predict performance during the BAT. 
Following Klein et al. (2011), we expected spider-fearful children to show interference by spider-
related materials on the EST. We also expected them to show priming effects on the APT. However, we 
had no definite hypothesis concerning the direction of the interaction between fear and priming effects 
on the APT, because of the mixed findings in the adult literature and the single child study reported. 
Following the results by Maier et al. (2003) and Berner and Maier (2004), a negative priming effect might 
occur; or a change in direction from positive to negative with increasing level of fear. Most importantly, 
we expected the SADS-C, the EST, and the APT to have unique predictive value for the BAT. First, we 
expected the direct and the two indirect measures to have unique predictive value for the BAT, because 
both types of measures tap into distinct processes. Second, we also expected the EST and the APT to 
have unique predictive value for the BAT, because both measures differ with regard to the concepts 
that they are assumed to measure: the EST measures attention processes, and the APT measures fear 
associations. In general, this study was designed to provide support for the hypothesis that direct and 
different indirect measures tap into distinct processes. If that were true, it would be worthwhile for future 
studies to also address the power of direct and indirect measures for predicting treatment success and 
relapse probability in fearful and phobic children.
Methods
Participants
An unselected sample of children was recruited from a regular elementary school in the Netherlands. 
After parental consent had been granted, a total of 77 children (42 boys and 35 girls) between 8 and 13 
years of age (M = 10.2) participated in the study. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of 
the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Materials
Emotional Stroop Task: The EST used in this study was identical to the task used by Klein et al. (2011). 
It employed a card version; consisting of three different cards (showing differently colored shapes 
of spiders, butterflies, or wheels) and one practice card (round dots). Spiders served as threat items, 
butterflies were chosen because they are also small animals but have a positive valence, and wheels 
were chosen because they are visually similar to spiders, but emotionally neutral. When the experimenter 
pressed the computer’s space bar, a single, complete card was presented on the computer screen, 
showing 24 identical shapes presented in four different colors (green, blue, red, yellow). The children 
were instructed to name the different colors column by column as quickly as possible without making 
errors. As soon as the child had named the colors of all 24 shapes, the experimenter pressed the space 
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bar again and the pictures disappeared. Following the practice card, the three experimental cards were 
shown in random order. During the task, the experimenter recorded all color naming mistakes, while 
the time between appearance and disappearance of each card was measured automatically and served 
as the dependent variable. During the administration of the EST, the experimenter knew neither the 
children’s self-reported level of spider fear, their APT reaction times (RTs), nor their BAT performance. The 
stimulus materials are available from the first author at request.
Affective Priming Task. The APT is a task in which associations between prime stimuli and target 
stimuli are examined. The target stimuli were pictures of six faces of children (three boys, three girls) that 
looked either happy or fearful. These pictures had to be evaluated as either positive or negative as fast as 
possible by pushing either the happy key (marked with a happy smiley) or the fearful key (with a smiley 
looking fearful) on the keyboard. The key positions were counterbalanced across the sample, and the 
pictures of the faces were shown in random order. Before each target stimulus, a prime stimulus word 
was presented. The prime words (three per category) were related to five different categories: bodily 
symptoms, negative feelings, happiness, spiders, and general fear words (see Appendix A for all stimulus 
words). The prime words were presented for 1000 ms, after which the target faces were presented 
until the children reacted by pressing a key. The time between the presentation of the target face and 
the reaction was measured. The children were instructed to first look at a cross that was presented in 
the middle of the screen, because this would be the place were the prime appeared. When the prime 
appeared on the screen, the children were asked to look at the prime, but to ignore this prime when 
categorizing the subsequent target stimulus into negative or positive. All five prime categories were 
fully combined with the two target categories, yielding 10 combinations, each of which was presented 
18 times. In total, the children categorized 180 faces, which were divided into four blocks of 45 trials 
each. The children had self-paced breaks between the blocks. While the APT was administered, the 
experimenter knew neither the children’s self-reported level of spider fear, their EST color-naming times, 
nor their BAT performance. The words and pictures were created by the authors and had been piloted in 
an analogue sample of 60 children between 8 and 13 years of age.
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). This task was used to assess the children’s fear-related behavior 
when confronted with a spider (see Klein et al., 2011; Kindt et al., 1996). BAT performance was scored on 
an 8-point scale: The child was asked to enter a room in which a covered box containing a tarantula was 
located (unbeknown to the children, it was only the spider’s skin, which looked like a living tarantula). 
The child was asked to stand on a mark visible on the ground three meters away from the box. The 
experimenter explained to the child that a real tarantula was in the box. The child’s task was to approach 
the box as closely as it liked. The experimenter stressed that the procedure was not a competition, and 
if the child did not want to approach any further, it could say so immediately. The experimenter then 
uncovered the box and the child was told to look at the tarantula. The child received points initially for 
each meter traversed towards the box (1 meter closer to the box: 1 point, 2 meters: 2 points, and next 
to the box: 3 points). The child was then asked to put a hand on the box for more than ten seconds 
(4 points), and then to lift the box (5 points). After putting down the box, the child was then asked to open 
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it (6 points), and to put one hand into the box (7 points). The last step was to touch the tarantula with 
one hand (8 points). If the child failed to take any particular step, or wanted to stop, the last completed 
step was recorded as the BAT score. While the child performed the BAT, the experimenter knew neither 
the child’s SADS-C score, APT reaction times, nor its EST color-naming times. 
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein, van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & 
Becker, 2015). The SADS-C is a self-report questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-related 
statements on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘completely untrue’ to ‘completely true’. The four statements 
address fear of spiders, physical reactions, avoidance, and disgust. The SADS-C consists of one subscale 
that can be calculated by computing a total score from these 4 items. Internal consistency as well as test-
retest reliability were satisfactory (α = .88, r = .91), just as internal and external validity (Klein et al., 2015). 
In the current, internal consistency was satisfactory as well (α = .87).
Procedure
First, the children individually performed the EST, then the APT, and finally the BAT in a small bus parked 
outside the school. This bus was specially set up as a mobile testing unit, ensuring an undisturbed and 
standardized testing environment. A trained master student administered all tasks. Later, the children 
filled out the SADS-C as a group in their regular classroom environment. We chose this order because of 
the necessity to measure reliable reaction times during the EST and the APT, given a limited attention 
span in children. The children performed the EST first, because there was only one reaction time per 
category. The SADS-C had to be administered in a group to minimize the time that children spent out of 
the classroom. After administering all tasks and the questionnaire, the children were debriefed. 
Results
Descriptives
Four children did not complete all tasks due to personal circumstances (e.g., not being present at 
school) and their available data were excluded from the analyses. The data of another five children were 
excluded due to extremely high reaction times or high error scores on the EST  (> 3 SD; > 20% wrong) or 
the APT (> 3 SD; > 20% wrong). As a result, the data of 68 children (37 boys; 31 girls) between 8 and 13 
years of age (M = 10.2) were used in subsequent analyses.
Emotional Stroop Task (EST). The number of mistakes was low overall (0.4 %), and distributed evenly 
across conditions. From the three EST card RTs (spider/butterfly/neutral) of each child, two relative 
scores were computed; that is, the spider Stroop score (RT-Spider minus RT-Neutral) and the butterfly 
Stroop score (RT-Butterfly minus RT-Neutral). Higher scores indicate larger interference by the animal. 
A mixed-factor ANCOVA of these scores with Animal (spider vs. butterfly) as within-subjects factor, 
Gender as between-subjects factor, and Age as covariate was conducted. None of these effects yielded 
a significant main effect or interaction. Most importantly, the mean spider Stroop score was not larger 
than the mean butterfly Stroop score (9.9 vs. 10.8 sec, F(1,65) = 1.8, n.s.). Thus, on average, the children 
did not show a significant amount of interference specifically related to spiders.
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Affective Priming Task (APT).  The average number of mistakes was 6.7 % (SD = 0.04), and did not vary 
across conditions. From the RTs, five relative priming scores were calculated for each child: The mean 
negative target RT was subtracted from the mean positive target RT, separately for each prime word type 
(spider, bodily symptoms, negative feelings, happiness, general fear). Positive scores indicate that a given 
prime type pre-activates fearful faces more than smiling faces, and vice versa for negative scores (see 
Table 1). A mixed-factor ANCOVA of these scores with Prime Type (spider, bodily symptoms, negative 
feelings, happiness, general fear) as within-subjects factor, Gender as between-subjects factor, and Age 
as covariate was conducted. There was neither a main effect of Prime Type, F(4,62) = 0.24, n.s., nor of 
Gender, F(1,65) = 2.8, n.s., or Age, F(1,65) = 0.19, n.s. Additionally, five one-sample t-tests were conducted 
to test whether the five priming scores differed significantly from 0. As expected, the happiness score 
was significantly negative, t(67) = 2.04, p = .046, while the other scores did not differ significantly from 0, 
all t(67) < 1.01, n.s. Thus, on average, the children did not show significantly negative associations related 
to any of the negative prime word categories.
Table 1. Mean Reaction Times (RTs) in ms, priming scores, and standard deviations for the five Affective Priming Task 
(APT) categories (n = 68).
Prime category
Positive targets Negative targets Priming scores 
Mean RT  (SD) Mean RT  (SD) Difference RT  (SD)
Spider 1117 (229) 1094 (213)  23 (188)
Bodily Symptoms 1107 (230) 1125 (223) -18 (179)
Negative Feelings 1110 (229) 1120 (248) -10 (207)
Happiness 1083 (201) 1119 (217) -37 (148)
General Fear 1135 (258) 1116 (209)  19 (215)
Total 1110 (229) 1115 (222) - 5 (187)
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). The mean score on the SADS-C was 2.2 
(SD = 1.1).  An ANCOVA with SADS-C scores as the dependent variable, Gender as between-subjects 
factor and Age as covariate was conducted. An effect was found for Gender, F(1,65) = 23.72,  p < .001, 
because girls (M = 2.8, SD = 1.2) reported significantly more fear of spiders than boys (M = 1.6, SD = 0.8). 
There was no main effect of age,  F(1,65) = 0.15, n.s.
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). The children’s mean BAT score was 6.7 (SD = 2.1; min = 2, 
max = 8; the higher the score, the closer the approach). An ANCOVA with BAT scores as dependent 
variable, Gender as between-subjects factor and Age as covariate revealed no effects of Gender, 
F(1,65) = 2.18, n.s., or Age, F(1,65) = 1.15, n.s.
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Correlations
All correlations were controlled for gender and age. As expected, the spider Stroop scores, the spider 
priming scores, and the SADS-C scores correlated significantly with the BAT scores: Children who 
reported less fear of spiders or showed less spider-related interference on the EST approached the spider 
more closely (SADS-C and BAT: r = -.62, p < .001; EST and BAT: r = -.30, p = .016). The correlation between 
spider priming scores in the APT and BAT scores was significant as well, but it was positive (r = .34, 
p = .005). Behavioral approach on the BAT (higher BAT scores) was related to stronger fear associations 
(higher APT scores) rather than stronger positive associations. Moreover, self-reported fear was unrelated 
to the indirect measures: The SADS-C scores correlated neither with spider Stroop scores, nor with spider 
priming scores. Finally, spider Stroop scores and spider priming scores did not correlate with each other 
either, indicating that the EST and the APT measure different constructs.
As expected, the butterfly Stroop scores were unrelated to the SADS-C scores, the priming scores, 
and the BAT scores, although they correlated with the spider Stroop scores (r = .36, p = .003). As expected, 
the 4 remaining priming scores (general fear, bodily symptoms, happiness, negative feelings) were also 
unrelated to SADS-C scores. Moreover, bodily symptoms, happiness, and negative feelings did not 
correlate with BAT scores. The general fear priming scores, however, mirrored the spider fear scores 
in that they correlated positively with BAT scores (r = .27, p = .029), suggesting that spider-approach 
behavior was also related to stronger general fear associations rather than stronger positive associations. 
As expected, the spider priming scores correlated significantly with the general fear scores (r = .48, 
p < .001), but not with any other priming score (see Table 2 for all correlations).
Table 2. Correlations between the SADS-C, the BAT, the APT and the EST (n = 68).
SADS-C BAT APT-spider EST-spider
SADS-C - -.62** -.14 .19
BAT - - .34* -.30*
APT-spider - - - -.03
EST-butterfly .09 -.01 -.04 .36*
APT-general fear .15 .27* .48** -.15
APT-positive -.13 .09 .08 .15
APT-negative feelings .16 .05 .01 .06
APT-bodily symptoms -.03 .21 .19 -.01
* p < .05, ** p < .001.
Regression Analysis
In order to predict the fear-related behavior measured by the BAT, we used a hierarchical regression 
analysis with BAT scores as the dependent variable. SADS-C scores, Spider Stroop scores, and Spider 
priming scores were used as predictors. We also included Gender and Age in step 1 of the regression, in 
order to control for these variables. In step 2, we included the SADS-C scores. The spider Stroop scores 
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and the spider priming scores were not included until step 3, because our main interest was the amount 
of predictive power the indirect measures could add to the direct measure. 
The model with only gender and age did not reach significance (p > .1). After the second step, the 
model was significant F(3,64) = 15.33, p < .001, and it explained 42 % of the variance in BAT behavior. 
This model was significantly better than the first model F(1,64) = 40.36, p < .001. After the third step, 
the model also reached significance F(6,61) = 13.00, p < .001, and it explained 51 % of the variance in 
in BAT behavior. This third model was also significantly better than the second model F(2,62) = 5.96, 
p = .004.  For this third regression, gender (B = .22, p = .044), SADS-C scores (B = -.63, p < .001), spider Stroop 
scores (B = -.19, p = .049), and spider priming scores, (B = .26, p = .007) were significant predictors. Thus, 
gender, the questionnaire, and both indirect measures each predicted unique variance components of 
fear-related behavior in the BAT (see Table 3).
Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting BAT scores from Gender, Age, SADS-C scores, EST-spider scores 
and APT-spider scores (n = 68).
Criterion variable Step R² R² change Predictor β
BAT-score 1 .05 .05
Gender -.18
Age .13
2 .42 .37**
Gender .19
Age .10
SADS-C -.71**
3 .51 .09*
Gender .22*
Age .08
SADS-C -.63**
EST-spider -.19*
APT-spider .26*
*p < .05, ** p < .001. standardized β coefficients are reported.
Discussion
The first goal of this study was to replicate the main result of the study by Klein et al. (2011), namely 
that interference caused by spider-related materials in an Emotional Stroop Task (EST) predicts a unique 
variance component of fearful behavior in a Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT), over and above the 
prediction achieved by self-reported fear in the SADS-C questionnaire. The second goal was to include 
an Affective Priming Task (APT) as a measure of spider-related fear associations besides the questionnaire 
and the EST, in order to predict fear-related behavior even better. The results show that self-reported fear 
in SADS-C, fear associations in the APT, and fear-related interference in the EST all showed significant 
Chapter 5
88
and independent correlations with the avoidance behavior in the BAT. Most importantly, all three 
measures predicted unique variance components of fear-related behavior assessed with the BAT. 
This means that both direct and indirect measures were necessary for an optimal prediction of spider 
fear-related behavior in children. This also means that the inclusion of the APT, besides the EST as an 
indirect measure, predicted even more variance components of fear-related behavior. These findings 
underline the importance of both attentional processes and fear-related associations in explaining 
fearful behavior. The current results are similar to the results reported by Klein et al. (2011), and are in 
line with findings reported in adult anxiety (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2007). They indicate that the APT and 
the EST are both, and independently of each other, useful for predicting spider fear-related behavior 
in children, over and above the predictive power achieved by self-reports. These findings underline 
the importance of automatic processes in fear-related behavior, and they support the use of indirect 
measures as assessment tools in both research and clinical settings.
Unlike Spence et al. (2006), we did not find age-related effects for any primes; all children responded 
in the same way, irrespectively of age. Regarding the relationship between fear associations and fear-
related behavior, we found a positive correlation between priming effects and BAT scores, which was 
true for both the spider priming score and the general fear priming score. No correlations were found 
for the other priming scores, indicating discriminant validity of the APT. Most importantly, for the spider 
score and the general fear score, a reversed relation between fear associations and avoidance behavior 
was observed: The more children avoided the spider during the BAT, the more slowly (rather than more 
quickly) they responded to congruent compared to incongruent trials of the APT. This result is in line 
with several adult studies that also found reversed priming effects for anxious adults (e.g., Maier et al., 
2003; Berner & Maier, 2004). Various theoretical models have been proposed to explain reversed priming 
effects (Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Hermans, Spruyt, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2003; Maier et al., 2003; Wentura 
& Rothermund, 2003). Glaser and Banaji (1999), for instance, proposed that the reverse priming effect 
is due to an automatic overcorrection in an attempt to counteract the possible biasing influence of 
a prime. Following this model, it might be the case that fearful children have a higher tendency to 
automatically over-correct when primed with a fearful stimulus than non-anxious children. Clearly, 
more research is needed to further explore the interaction between priming effects, anxiety, and fearful 
behavior in children.
Interestingly, we did not find a significant correlation of self-reported fear in the SADS-C with either 
priming effects in the APT or interference in the EST. Correlations between direct and indirect measures 
have indeed been found in previous adult research (e.g., Teachman & Woody, 2003), but results similar 
to ours have also been reported (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Klein et al., 2011). The lack of relations 
between direct and indirect measures may explain why some earlier studies did not find stronger color-
naming interference or stronger fear associations in children with high levels of self-reported fear. This 
result might indicate that self-reports and indirect tasks measure different underlying processes, which 
are not necessarily closely related to each other (see also Klein et al., 2011).
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Another remarkable finding is the fact that the APT and the EST did not correlate with each other. 
Although they are supposed to tap into distinct automatic processes, these processes are thought to 
interact at certain points. It is therefore expected that these two measures will not correlate highly with 
each other, but should show some overlap. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
reports on the link between fear-related associations and attentional bias in children, and therefore it 
cannot be compared to the existing literature. However, we know of one study in spider-fearful adults 
that did not find significant correlations between fear-related associations and attentional bias either 
(van Bockstaele, Verschuere, Koster, Tibboel, de Houwer, & Crombez, 2011). The lack of correlations 
between indirect measures, such as the APT and the EST, might be explained by insufficient reliability 
of these measures (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). Furthermore, the different task structures 
underlying the APT and the EST may also be a reason why both tasks did not correlate with each other 
(see also de Houwer, 2003a). Alternatively, one might speculate that fear-related associations and threat 
interference are simply not as closely related to each other as one might expect (see also van Bockstaele 
et al., 2011; Watts & Weems, 2006). Clearly more research on this topic is needed, using different tasks 
and different samples.
Based on our findings, we recommend to use both direct and indirect measures to assess fear in 
children, because they seem to tap into distinct processes which complement each other in the prediction 
of fearful behavior. Moreover, both types of measures have specific advantages and disadvantages. Direct 
measures are fast, easy and reliable, but also more sensitive to experimenter demand, social desirability, 
and limited self-awareness (e.g., Bijttebier, Vasey, & Braet, 2003). Indirect measures may provide a clearer 
picture of the underlying cognitive processes, but they are frequently less reliable than direct measures 
because they usually require the measurement of reaction times. This measurement may be especially 
difficult in child samples because young children are generally more easily distracted and have relatively 
short attention spans, which may render the measurement of reaction times less reliable (Huijding et al., 
2010). This is one of the reasons for our choice of a “card” version of the EST, rather than a version in which 
latencies of reactions to single stimuli are measured (see also Klein et al., 2011).
We further recommend the simultaneous use of different indirect measures, as it seems that fearful 
children differ from other children with respect to several cognitive processes (see also Weems & Watts, 
2005; Watts & Weems, 2006). Here, we found evidence of differences in both fear-related associations 
and interference, and other differences might be present as well. Future research of childhood spider 
anxiety should therefore also add other potential biases, besides the study of attentional bias and fear 
associations, for instance, interpretation processes (e.g., Bögels & Zigterman, 2000; Klein et al., 2011). This 
study was limited to fear of spiders, and we recommend to study other types of fears and anxieties as 
well.
In conclusion, we found that the current versions of the Affective Priming Task and the Emotional 
Stroop Task are able to independently predict fear-related behavior over and above the variance explained 
by the self-report. Therefore, using these tasks in addition to self-reports allows for an improved prediction 
of fear-related avoidance behavior. This is a significant methodological advancement, theoretically 
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supported by recent dual process models (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Beck & Clark, 1997). To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that found evidence that fearful children and non-fearful children 
react differently on the Affective Priming Task. This suggests that fear-related associations can be present 
at a young age already. This unique insight can be used to improve the diagnosis of fearful children who 
are at risk of developing further psychopathology later in life. Identifying and assisting these children at 
an early age might help to prevent developmental problems and to make their future easier.
Subjective fear, interference by threat, and fear associations
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Appendix A. Prime words used in the Affective Priming Task.
Words
bodily symptoms muggy
panic
choking
negative feelings shame
bullied
stupid
happiness happy
pleasant
fun
spiders spiders
cross spider
spider web
general fear anxious
afraid
horror
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Abstract
This study investigated multiple cognitive biases in children simultaneously, to investigate whether 
spider-fearful children display an interpretation bias, a recall bias, and source-monitoring errors, and 
whether these biases are specific to spider-related materials. Furthermore, the independent ability of 
these biases to predict spider fear was investigated. A total of 121 children filled out the Spider Anxiety 
and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C), and they performed an interpretation task, a memory task, 
and a Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). As expected, a specific interpretation bias was found: Spider-
fearful children showed more negative interpretations of ambiguous spider-related scenarios, but not 
of other scenarios. We also found specific source-monitoring errors: Spider-fearful children made more 
fear-related source-monitoring errors for the spider-related scenarios, but not for the other scenarios. 
Only limited support was found for a recall bias. Finally, interpretation bias, recall bias, and source-
monitoring errors predicted unique variance components of spider fear.
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All children experience fear; it is normal and expected at specific times during typical development. 
While normal childhood fears are unlikely to cause long-term damage, fear can become a more 
enduring problem in some children. Therefore, disruptive levels of fear should be detected and followed 
early on, especially because they are a risk factor for later psychopathology (e.g., Becker et al., 2007). 
Cognitive theories of fear and anxiety emphasize the importance of cognitive processes in the onset 
and maintenance of anxiety disorders. According to these theories, fearful adults and children have 
anxiety-related schemata that direct processing resources towards threat-relevant information, resulting 
in cognitive biases in attention, interpretation, and memory (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997; for a schema-based theory of childhood anxiety, see Kendall & Ronan, 1990). These cognitive biases 
are believed to be content-specific; only stimuli that are associated with threat and fear are processed 
preferably. 
Research with fearful children has provided evidence of interpretation biases related to fear and threat 
(for a review, see Muris, 2010). Interpretation bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have 
the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening. Most studies of interpretation bias make 
use of variations of an “ambiguous scenario” paradigm, in which children are asked to finish scenarios 
(short texts) about everyday situations. Commonly, responses to these scenarios involve a multiple-
choice format where children choose their ending from a number of provided possibilities. Alternatively, 
responses to scenarios can be open-ended where children are asked to produce their own endings to 
the scenarios. So far, most studies found that fearful children show a tendency to interpret ambiguous 
situations in a generally negative way (see Muris, 2010; Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). Some 
of these studies also explored whether interpretation biases are specific to anxiety, or whether children 
with other disorders, for instance externalizing disorders, also show a negative interpretation bias for 
anxiety-related stimuli. Here, the results are less consistent: While some studies found evidence for the 
specificity of interpretation biases in anxiety (Bögels & Zigterman, 2000; Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, 
Moradi, Yule, & Canterbury, 1997; Dineen & Hadwin, 2004), a study by Reid, Salmon and Lovibond (2006) 
found interpretation biases across a broad range of symptoms in youths. There are also a few studies 
that explored the specificity of interpretation biases within anxiety disorders, with mixed results (Muris et 
al., 2000; Bögels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003). While Muris and colleagues (2000) did not find content-specific 
interpretations, Bögels and colleagues (2003) did find some evidence for the specificity of children’s 
interpretations. 
Although interpretation and memory are related and there is evidence of interpretation biases 
in childhood anxiety, the same cannot be said for memory biases, the tendency to selectively recall 
negative information pertaining to threat (for reviews, see Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). 
In children, there are only a few studies that explored memory biases, and with inconsistent results. 
There are three studies that provided some evidence for the existence of memory biases in fearful 
children (Daleiden, 1998; Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000; Watts & Weems, 2006). 
It should be noted, however, that the results by Daleiden (1998) depended on the tasks employed, the 
correlations between fear and memory bias reported by Watts and Weems (2006) were rather modest, 
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and the memory bias found by Moradi and colleagues (2000) was for positive words rather than for 
threat-related words or depression-related words. A few studies did not find memory biases in fearful 
children (e.g., Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Canterbury, & Yule, 2003). Moradi and colleagues 
(2000) studied the specificity of memory biases, but did not find any evidence that memory biases were 
specific to threat-related stimuli. 
In conclusion, the existing studies support the existence of interpretation biases in childhood 
anxiety, but the existence of memory biases and the content-specificity of both biases within childhood 
anxiety are still unclear. Besides the need to replicate and extend the results on memory bias and the 
content-specificity of both types of biases, an important extension is to combine measures to assess 
different biases simultaneously, here interpretation and memory biases, because they are closely related 
(see also Weems & Watts, 2005). 
To date, there are only a few published studies that explored different biases together (e.g. Dalgleish 
et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2012; Watts & Weems, 2006). To the best of our knowledge, only Dalgleish 
and colleagues (2003) and Watts and Weems (2006) combined interpretation bias and memory bias. 
Dalgleish and colleagues (2003) found an attention bias, and differences in prospective cognition (a 
variation of interpretation bias), but no memory bias in a group of clinically anxious children and a group 
of depressed children. They also found some evidence for the content-specificity of attention bias and 
interpretation bias. Unfortunately, they did not compare the tasks to each other. Watts and Weems (2006) 
also studied the intercorrelations of the different biases. They found that selective attention, memory 
bias, and cognitive errors (a variation of interpretation bias) predicted unique variance components of 
fear, when controlling for age and gender in typically developing children who varied in level of fear. 
Attention bias, cognitive errors, and memory bias were unrelated. Unfortunately, they were not able to 
test whether the biases were specific, because their tests did not include stimuli for each specific fear. 
The main focus of this study was to combine interpretation bias and memory bias, to study the 
specificity of both biases, and to explore whether interpretation bias and memory bias both predict 
unique variance components of self-reported spider fear and fear-related behavior. We studied fear of 
spiders for several reasons. First, specific fears such as fear of spiders are highly prevalent in children 
(Strauss & Last, 1993). Second, normative fears, such as fear of spiders are often used as a model for 
studying the development of other fears, because several studies suggest that the underlying processes 
of fear are similar (Williams et al., 1997). Finally, unlike other fears, there are good behavioral tasks available 
to measure behavior related to fear of spiders. 
The current study was based on recent work with socially anxious adults (Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, 
& Gotlib, 2008) using a novel interpretation/memory paradigm. Hertel and colleagues (2008) asked 
socially anxious adults and healthy controls to formulate endings to 20 ambiguous unfinished scenarios. 
After completion of the interpretation task, the first sentence of each scenario was presented again, and 
the participants’ task was to recall the rest of the story and also their own ending. This procedure allowed 
us to study interpretation of the scenarios, memory for the scenario contents, and source-monitoring 
errors. A source-monitoring error refers to a persons’ inability to distinguish information contained in the 
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scenario from information that he/she produced in the self-created ending. For the present study, we 
adapted the interpretation/memory task so that children could understand the task. 
Based on earlier studies, we hypothesized that spider-fearful children would create more negative 
interpretations of ambiguous spider-related scenarios than non-fearful children. We had no definite 
hypothesis concerning a possible recall bias in spider fear, because the few published studies reported 
mixed findings. Hertel and colleagues (2008) found source-monitoring errors in socially anxious adults, 
but the existence of source errors was never tested in children. As cognitive theories propose that the 
underlying processes in anxiety are similar for children and adults, we could expect that spider-fearful 
children would have more source-monitoring errors. In line with the content specificity hypothesis, we 
expected that spider-fearful children would display an interpretation bias and a memory bias for spider-
related materials only. Finally, following Watts and Weems (2006), we expected that interpretation bias 
and memory bias would predict unique variance components of self-reported spider fear and avoidance 
behavior.
Methods
Participants 
An unselected sample of children was recruited from a regular elementary school in the Netherlands. 
After parental consent had been granted, a total of 121 children participated in this study. The data of 
13 participants were excluded from the dataset, due to technical problems with the recording of their 
verbal responses. As a result, the data of 108 children (54 boys) between 7 and 13 years of age (M = 10.1, 
SD = 1.4) were used. The Ethics Committee of the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, approved this study.
General Procedure
The children first performed the interpretation task individually, directly followed by the memory task in 
a separate room at their school, accompanied by a trained research assistant. During the interpretation 
task, the children were unaware of the fact that they had to recall the scenarios and their own endings 
later on. The children then individually performed the BAT. They filled out the SADS-C as a group in their 
regular classroom environment.
Materials
Interpretation task. The interpretation task consisted of 18 open-ended scenarios, each scenario 
contained 5 short sentences. All scenarios were ambiguous, such that they could be interpreted in a 
positive, neutral, or negative way. In total, 12 scenarios were adapted and translated into Dutch from 
already existing materials (Bögels et al., 2003; Muris et al. 2000; Hertel et al., 2008; Schneider, Unnewehr, 
Florin, & Margraf, 2002), and 6 scenarios were created by the authors. The 18 scenarios were divided 
into three categories: spider-related scenarios, social-related scenarios, and scenarios related to physical 
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reactions. The latter two were included to test for content-specificity of the interpretation bias (see Table 
1 for sample stories). 
The children were asked to read aloud three blocks of six scenarios presented on a computer screen, 
while imagining themselves as the central character of each scenario. For each scenario, they were asked 
to think of approximately two sentences to finish it. They spoke their own endings into a microphone, to 
be transcribed and scored later. Between the blocks, they had short breaks. Scenarios were presented in 
random order, but each block consisted of two scenarios of each category. 
Two master students in Clinical Psychology, blind to the children’s level of fear, were trained to code 
each interpretation. The endings were scored on a five-point scale, ranging from 1 = positive, 2 = slightly 
positive, 3 = neutral,  4 = slightly threatening, to 5 = very threatening. The higher the score, the more the 
child tended to interpret the scenario as threatening. In case a scenario ending was unclassifiable, for 
instance due to unclear recording, the raters coded the scenario as missing value. First, 10 % of the scenarios 
were coded by both raters independently of each other, resulting in an inter-rater reliability of .86. Next, all 
remaining scenarios were also coded by both raters independently of each other. In case of disagreement, 
coding of the scenario was discussed with the first author until mutual agreement was reached.
Memory task. We cued recall for each scenario by presenting its first sentence, and then we asked the 
children to say the remaining four sentences of the scenario aloud from memory. After the children had 
finished recalling the scenario, they were asked to recall their own ending. The order of the scenarios was 
similar to the interpretation task, so that time between first appearance and recall was approximately 
the same for each scenario. The children’s answers were audio-taped and transcribed for further rating.
Two Master students in Clinical Psychology were trained to rate the number of correctly remembered 
content elements of each original scenario. Each scenario consisted of 5 short sentences, expressing 
eight elements per scenario. One of the students rated all scenarios, the other student rated 10% of 
the scenarios, resulting in an inter-rater reliability of .88 (see Table 1). One of the raters then coded each 
of the recalled scenarios on whether new information (source-monitoring error) was added to the 
scenario. For each recalled scenario containing a source-monitoring error, a second judgment was made 
to determine the valence of the source error. There were four different valence categories: positive, 
neutral, generally anxious, or specifically anxious (i.e., matching the category of the original scenario 
type, separately for the three scenario types spider/social/physical; see Table 2).
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein, van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & 
Becker, 2015). The SADS-C is a self-report questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-related 
statements on a 5-point scale. The four statements address fear of spiders, physical reactions, avoidance, 
and disgust. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability are satisfactory (α = .88, r = .91; Klein et al., 
2015). In this study, internal consistency was satisfactory as well (α = .84).
Behavior-Assessment Test (BAT). This task was used to assess the children’s avoidance behavior when 
confronted with a spider (see also, Klein, Becker, & Rinck, 2011). BAT performance was scored on an 
8-point scale: The child was asked to enter a room in which a covered box containing a tarantula was 
located (unbeknown to the children, it was only the spider’s skin, which looked like a living tarantula). 
The child was asked to stand on a mark visible on the ground three meters away from the box. The 
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experimenter explained to the child that a real tarantula was in the box. The child’s task was to approach 
the box as closely as it liked. The experimenter stressed that the procedure was not a competition, and 
if the child did not want to approach any further, it could say so immediately. The experimenter then 
uncovered the box and the child was told to look at the tarantula. The child received points initially for 
each meter traversed towards the box (1 meter closer to the box: 1 point, 2 meters: 2 points, and next 
to the box: 3 points). The child was then asked to put a hand on the box for more than ten seconds 
(4 points), and then to lift the box (5 points). After putting down the box, the child was then asked to 
open the lid (6 points), and to put one hand in the box (7 points). The last step was to touch the tarantula 
with one hand (8 points). If a child failed to take any particular step, or wanted to stop, the last completed 
step was recorded as the BAT score. During the child’s performance of the BAT, the experimenter knew 
neither the child’s SADS-C scores nor its interpretation task or memory task scores.
Table 1. Samples stories, story elements, and sample endings and source-errors of the three scenarion types of the 
interpretation task.
Scenario with eight story elements Sample ending and intrusion
Spider-related scenario: “Television” Ending
The television has to be repaired. You have to pull out 
the plug. Therefore you will have to crawl under the 
drawer. It is very dark and you can barely see anything. 
You feel something itching on your arm…
‘oh  no, it is a huge hairy spider that wants to bite me’. 
Source-error 
‘I will have to crawl under the television. It is very dark 
and I cannot see anything. Then all of a sudden I see a 
huge hairy spider that wants to bite me’.
Physical-related scenario: “Night” Ending
It is the middle of the night. You suddenly wake up. 
When you look at your alarm clock, you see it is 2 o'clock. 
You tuck yourself in again and try to go to sleep. You 
notice that your heart is beating faster…
‘within 5 minutes, I am falling asleep again’.
Social-related scenario: “A visit” Ending
Today you are visiting friends of your parents. Their dog 
is sitting beside you. You receive a piece of cake and a 
drink. Then suddenly the dog knocks over your drink. 
The people stop talking and look at you…
‘they say that it is not my fault, because the dog knocked 
over the drink, and I get a new drink’.
Data-analysis
To explore differences between the three scenario types and possible influences of age and gender, 
we computed a repeated-measures ANOVA each for interpretation bias scores, recall bias scores, and 
source-monitoring error scores. The three categories (spider, physical, social) served as within-subjects 
factor, and gender and age as between-subjects factors. Furthermore, we calculated an ANOVA each for 
the SADS-C and the BAT.
To test the hypothesis that spider-fearful children would produce more negative interpretations 
of ambiguous spider-related scenarios than non-fearful children, we computed correlations between 
the SADS-C, the BAT, and spider-related interpretations. Next, to answer the question whether spider-
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fearful children display a recall bias related to spider materials, we computed correlations between the 
SADS-C, the BAT and the number of recalled items of the spider-related scenarios. Third, to answer the 
question whether spider-fearful children display anxious source-monitoring errors related to spider 
materials (spider errors), we correlated SADS-C scores and BAT scores with the number of times children 
committed a spider-specific source error that matched the spider scenarios. Fourth, because we 
expected interpretation bias, recall bias and source-monitoring errors to be content-specific, we also 
computed correlations of the physical threat and social threat-related scenarios of the interpretation 
and memory task with the SADS-C and the BAT. Finally, to replicate and extend the results reported by 
Watts and Weems (2006) that interpretation bias and memory bias predicted independent variance in 
self-reported fear, we calculated a regression analysis with the SADS-C as criterion and interpretation 
bias, recall bias, and source errors as predictors. We also added the interaction between predictors in 
the analysis, because we wanted to see whether the different biases might influence each other in 
predicting self-reported spider fear. Additionally, we also computed an analysis with the BAT as criterion, 
and the SADS-C, interpretation bias, recall bias, source errors and their interactions as predictors, to see 
if both biases predicted variance over and above the variance predicted by the SADS-C (see Klein et al., 
2011, 2012, for similar approaches). 
Results
Descriptives 
Interpretation task. The mean score on the interpretation task was 3.17 (SD = 0.58) for spider threat-
related scenarios, 3.13 (SD = 0.51) for physical threat-related scenarios, and 2.77 (SD = 0.73) for social 
threat-related scenarios. A repeated-measures ANOVA of these scores with Scenario-type (spider, 
physical, social) as within-subjects factor, and Gender and Age as between-subjects factors was 
conducted. There were significant differences between the three scenario-types, F(2,95) = 4.16,  p = .019, 
η2 = .08, because children produced more threatening interpretations of spider-related than social-related 
scenarios, F(1,96) = 6.76,  p = .011, η2 = .07. Children also produced more threatening interpretations of 
physical threat-related than social threat-related scenarios, F(1,96) = 7.31,  p = .008, η2 = .07. There were 
no significant main effects of gender or age, nor were there any interactions.
Memory task. The mean number of recalled elements was 2.40 (SD = 1.22) for spider-threat related 
scenarios, 2.35 (SD = 1.09) for physical threat-related scenarios, and 2.95 (SD = 1.31) for social-related 
scenarios. A repeated-measures ANOVA of these scores with Scenario-type (spider, physical, social) 
as within-subjects factor and Gender and Age as between-subjects factors revealed differences 
between the three scenario-types, F(2,95) = 7.21,  p = .001, η2 = .13. Children remembered more items 
from the social threat-related scenarios than from the spider threat-related scenarios, F(1,96) = 10.68, 
p = .002, η2 = .10, and the physical threat-related scenarios, F(1,96) = 11.57,   p = .001, η2 = .11. There were 
no significant main effects of gender or age, nor were there any interactions.
The total number of source-monitoring errors, separately for each valence category and each 
scenario type, is presented in Table 2. From the individual errors, we calculated a repeated-measures 
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ANOVA for the different source-monitoring errors, with Scenario-type (spider, physical, social), and 
Source error valence category (positive, neutral, general anxiety, specific anxiety) as within-subjects 
factors, and Gender and Age as between-subjects factors. There was a main effect of Source monitoring 
error valence, F(3,94) = 320.94,  p < .001, η2 = .40, because children produced more neutral and anxiety 
source-monitoring errors matching the category of the original scenario than positive and general 
anxiety errors (all p’s <.001). There was also a main effect of scenario-type, F(2,95) = 3.41,  p = .037, 
η2 = .07, because children produced more source errors on physical threat-related scenarios than on 
social threat-related scenarios, F(1,96) = 6.59, p = .012, η2 = .06. There was also an interaction effect, 
F(6,91) = 5.08, p < .001, η2 = .25, because the error-types varied across scenario-types. There were no 
significant main effects for gender or age, nor were there any interaction effects involving age or gender.
Table 2. Number of source-monitoring errors for every combination of Scenario-Type and Error-Type. 
Scenario Type
Error Type Spider Physical Social
Positive 11 10 14 
Neutral 64 66 54 
General anxiety 38 25 6 
Specific anxiety 9 100 41
Total 122 201 115
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). The mean score on the SADS-C was 2.18 
(SD = 1.17; min = 1, max = 5). An ANOVA with SADS-C scores as dependent variable, and Gender and 
Age as between-subjects factors revealed an effect of gender, F(1,96) = 15.42, p < .001, η2 = .12, because 
girls (M = 2.63, SD = 1.21) reported significantly more fear of spiders than boys (M = 1.73, SD = 0.94). There 
was no main effect of age.
Behavior Assessment Test (BAT). The children’s mean BAT score was 6.85 (SD = 1.90; min = 0, 
max = 8; the higher the score, the closer the approach). An ANOVA with BAT scores as dependent variable 
and Gender and Age as between-subjects factors revealed a significant effect of gender, F(1,96) = 5.73, 
p = .019, η2 = .06, because boys (M = 7.22) approached the spider more closely than girls (M = 6.48). There 
was no main effect of age.
Correlations
All correlations were controlled for gender because of the gender difference on the SADS-C and the BAT 
reported above. As expected, the correlation between SADS-C scores and BAT scores was significant, 
r = -.56 (p < .001): Children who reported less fear of spiders approached the spider more closely.
Interpretation task. As expected, the spider-interpretation scores correlated significantly with the 
SADS-C scores (r = .21, p = .030) and marginally significantly with the BAT scores (r = -.18, p = .068): 
Children who reported more fear of spiders or avoided the spider more, tended to produce more 
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negative interpretations of the spider-related scenarios. As expected, the physical threat-related 
interpretation scores and the social threat-related interpretation scores were unrelated to the SADS-C 
scores (physical treat: r = .02, n.s.; social: r = -.05, n.s.), and the BAT scores (physical: r = -.07, n.s.; social: 
r = .09, n.s.). Children who reported more fear of spiders or avoided the spider more, did not show more 
negative interpretations of the other scenarios. Thus, the negative interpretations of spider-fearful 
children were specific to spider-related materials (see Table 3).
Memory task. First, we computed correlations of the number of elements remembered on the 
memory task with the SADS-C and the BAT. The spider-recall scores correlated marginally significantly 
with the SADS-C scores (r = .18, p = .06), but not with the BAT scores (r = -.08, n.s.). Thus, children who 
remembered more details from the spider threat-related scenarios tended to report more spider fear, but 
they did not avoid the spider more during the BAT. As expected, the physical recall scores and the social 
recall scores were unrelated to self-reported spider fear or avoidance behavior (all p’s > .1; see Table 3). 
Table 3. Correlations of dependent variables with SADS-C and BAT.
SADS-C BAT
Interpretation bias
SADS-C - -.56**
Spider .21* -.18+
Physical .02 -.07
Social -.05 -.09
Cued recall
Spider .18+ -.08
Physical .14 < .01
Social .13 < .01
Source monitoring errors
Spider positive .11 .03
neutral .07 -.06
generally anxious .08 -.09
specific anxious .25* -.29*
Physical positive .10 < .01
neutral .08 -.01
generally anxious .06 -.07
specific anxious .09 .02
Social positive -.10 .14
neutral .07 -.03
generally anxious .04 -.05
specific anxious .04 -.11
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .001.
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Next, we computed correlations of the source-monitoring errors separately for each of the four valence 
categories (positive/neutral/general anxiety/specific anxiety) with the SADS-C and the BAT. As expected, 
only the number of times children had a specific anxiety source error matching the original spider 
scenario type (spider-error score) correlated significantly with the SADS-C scores (r = .25, p = .01) and 
the BAT scores (r = -.29, p = .003). The other valence categories of the spider category (positive/neutral/
generally anxious) correlated neither with the SADS-C nor with the BAT (all p’s > .1). Also, all error scores 
of the physical and social category were unrelated to the SADS-C scores (all p’s > .1), and the BAT scores 
(all p’s > .1). Thus, spider-fearful children had more anxious spider source-monitoring errors only on the 
scenarios that were related to spiders (see Table 3).
Finally, we computed correlations between spider-interpretation scores, spider-recall scores, and 
spider-error scores finding that all scores were unrelated to each other (all p’s > .1). Thus, children with a 
more negative interpretation bias on the spider-related scenarios did not necessarily remember more 
items of these scenarios or had more anxious spider-related source-monitoring errors (see Table 3). 
Regression analyses
In order to predict spider fear, we computed two hierarchical regression analyses. In the first regression 
analysis, self-reported fear as measured with the SADS-C served as the dependent variable. We included 
gender in step 1 of the regression because of the gender differences on the SADS-C and the BAT. Spider-
interpretation scores, spider recall scores, and spider-error scores were included in step 2, and the interaction 
between these scores was included in step 3. The resulting regression model was significant, F(7,100) = 6.06, 
p < .001, and it explained 30 % of the variance in self-reported fear. The first step in the model, 
gender, explained 14.7 % of the variance, (B = .38, p < .001). In the second step, the model improved 
significantly (p = .003), with spider-interpretation score (B = .18, p = .047), the spider-recall score (B = .16, 
p = .067), and the spider-error score (B = .21, p = .016), explaining 10.8 % additional variance. In the third step, 
the model did not improve significantly (p = .12), because the interaction between spider-interpretation 
score and spider-recall score (B = .14, p > .1), the interaction between spider-interpretation score and spider-
error score (B = -.05, p > .1), and the interaction between spider-recall score and spider-error score (B = -.18, 
p = .051), together explained only another 4.3 % of the variance. 
In the corresponding second analysis, fear-related behavior as measured with the BAT served as 
the dependent variable. Spider-interpretation scores, spider recall scores, spider-error scores and their 
interactions were used as predictors. We again included gender in step 1 of the regression. Before 
entering the bias scores and their interactions, we added SADS-C scores in step 2 in order to determine 
whether the biases were able to predict unique variance in avoidance behavior, over and above self-
reported fear. The resulting regression model was significant, F(8,99) = 8.53, p < .001, and it explained 40.8 
% of the variance in BAT behavior. The first step in the model, gender, explained 3.8 % of the variance, 
(B = -.20, p = .043). In the second step, the model improved significantly (p < .001), with the SADS-C 
score explaining another 30.5 % of the variance (B = -.60, p < .001). In the third step, the model did not 
improve significantly (p > .1) because spider-interpretation score (B = -.06, p > .10), spider recall score 
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(B = .015, p > .10), and spider-error score (B = -.15, p = .068) together explained only another 2.5 % of the 
variance. In the fourth step, the model did not improve significantly either (p = .088), with the interaction 
between spider-interpretation score and spider-recall score (B = -.01, p > .1), the interaction between the 
spider-interpretation score and the spider-error score (B = -.19, p = .051), and the interaction between 
the spider-recall score and the spider-error score (B = .07, p > .1), together explaining only another 4.0 % 
of the variance. 
Thus, spider-interpretation scores and the source-monitoring errors each predicted unique variance 
components of self-reported fear in the SADS-C. When explaining fear-related behavior in the BAT, only 
the SADS-C predicted unique variance components.
Discussion
We investigated whether children varying in their level of spider fear display an interpretation bias, 
a recall bias and source-monitoring errors, and whether these biases are specific to spider-related 
materials. As expected, spider-fearful children displayed an interpretation bias and source-monitoring 
errors. These biases were only found for spider-related stimuli, indicating that spider-fearful children 
display an interpretation bias and source-monitoring errors to content-specific materials only, and not 
for other ambiguous materials. Only limited support was found for the existence of a specific memory 
bias when memory was measured by means of free recall. The number of recalled items on the spider-
related scenarios correlated only marginally with self-reported fear in the SADS-C, and did not correlate 
with avoidance behavior in the BAT. This result is in line with our hypothesis and with the mixed results 
in both childhood anxiety and adult anxiety (e.g. Hertel et al., 2008; Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 
2005). As Watts and Weems (2006), we also assessed the independent abilities of the interpretation task 
and the memory task to predict self-reported fear: Both tasks predicted unique variance components of 
self-reported fear in the SADS-C. The current results confirm our hypothesis and those reported by Watts 
and Weems (2006), and they indicate that interpretation bias and memory bias, both and independently 
of each other, are useful for predicting self-reported spider fear. For explaining fear-related behavior in 
the BAT, only self-reported fear was a significant predictor. This could be due to the high correlation 
between the BAT and the SADS-C, which made it very difficult to find additional significant predictors 
of BAT behavior. We did, however, find a marginally significant interaction effect of interpretation bias 
and source errors. A closer inspection of this interaction suggests that children with more negative 
interpretations and more source errors displayed more avoidance behavior on the BAT. Clearly, more 
research is needed into the possible interaction between interpretation and memory processes. 
Like Watts and Weems (2006), we did not find a significant correlation between interpretation bias 
and recall bias. We also found only a very weak link between interpretation bias and source-monitoring 
errors, that is, children with a stronger interpretation bias did not necessarily have more source errors 
during recall. Closer inspection of the spider-related source errors revealed that almost all of them 
originated from the children’s initial interpretation of the scenario (78%). Although the overall number 
of these errors was too low to reach significance, this is exactly what one would expect, even in the 
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absence of interpretation biases. Also, correlations of the interpretation task and the memory task with 
the questionnaire and the behavioral task were rather modest, which might have occurred because the 
children in this study came from an unselected, non-clinical sample. The anxiety-related schemata of 
the fearful children studied here might not be as chronically active as those of children with an anxiety 
disorder. Therefore, interpretation biases and memory biases and their link might be less visible in fearful 
children than in clinically anxious children. Schneider and colleagues (2002), for instance, only found 
biases in fearful children after these children were primed with a video about their mothers’ anxiety. 
Future research in typically developing children could therefore use a similar priming procedure to 
activate anxiety-related schemata. Moreover, studying children with an anxiety disorder might also 
clarify the link between both biases. 
Based on our findings, we recommend to study different biases simultaneously, as it seems that 
fearful children differ from other children with respect to several cognitive processes (see also Klein 
et al., 2012; Watts & Weems, 2006; Weems & Watts, 2005), mirroring findings from adult research (e.g., 
Rinck & Becker, 2005). Here, we found evidence of differences in both interpretation bias and source 
monitoring errors, and other differences might be present as well. Furthermore, we also found evidence 
to suggest that these biases are content-specific. Future research of childhood anxiety should therefore 
assess combinations of other potential biases and study the specificity of theses biases, for instance 
in attention, interpretation, and memory processes. This study was limited to fear of spiders, and we 
recommend to study other types of fears and anxiety as well. 
In conclusion, we found that the interpretation task and the memory task can be useful instruments 
for assessing cognitive processes in spider-fearful children. Fear-related interpretations can be present at 
a young age already, and memory processes can be biased similarly.
Chapter 6
110
References
Becker, E. S., Rinck, M., Türke, V., Kause, P., Goodwin, R., 
Neumer, S., & Margraf, J. (2007). Epidemiology of 
specific phobia subtypes: Findings from the Dresden 
mental health study. European Psychiatry, 22, 69-74.
Bögels, S. M., Snieder, N., & Kindt, M. (2003). Specificity of 
dysfunctional thinking in children with symptoms 
of social anxiety, separation anxiety and generalized 
anxiety. Behaviour Change, 20, 160-169. 
Bögels, S. M. & Zigterman, D. (2000). Dysfunctional 
cognitions in children with social phobia, separation 
anxiety, and generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 28, 205-211.
Bijttebier, P., Vasey, M. W., & Braet, C. (2003). The information-
processing paradigm: A valuable framework for 
clinical child and adolescent psychology. Journal of 
Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 32, 2-9.
Daleiden, E. L. (1998). Childhood anxiety and memory 
functioning: A comparison of systemic and 
processing accounts. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 68, 216-235.
Dalgleish, T., Taghavi, R., Neshat-Doost, H., Moradi, A., Yule, 
W., & Canterbury, R. (1997). Information processing 
in clinically depressed and anxious children and 
adolescents. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 38, 535-541.
Dalgleish, T., Taghavi, R., Neshat-Doost, H., Moradi, 
A., Canterbury, R. & Yule, W. (2003). Patterns of 
processing bias for emotional information across 
clinical disorders: A comparison of attention, 
memory, and prospective cognition in children and 
adolescents with depression, generalized anxiety, 
and posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Clinical 
Child and Adolescent Psychology, 32, 10–21.
Dineen, K. A., & Hadwin, J. A. (2004). Anxious and depressive 
symptoms and children’s judgements of their own 
and others’ interpretation of ambiguous social 
scenarios. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 18, 499-513. 
Hertel, P., Brozovich, F., Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. (2008). 
Biases in interpretation and memory in generalized 
social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 
278-288.
Huijding, J., Wiers, R. W., & Field, A. P. (2010). The assessment 
of fear-related automatic associations in children 
and adolescents. In J. Hadwin & A. P. Field (Eds.), 
Information processing biases and anxiety: A 
developmental perspective (pp. 151-182). Chichester: 
Wiley.
Kendall, P. C. & Ronan, K. R. (1990). Assessment of children’s 
anxieties, fear, and phobias: Cognitive-behavioral 
models and methods. In C. R. Reynolds & K. W. 
Kamphaus (Eds.), Handbook of psychological and 
educational assessment of children (pp. 223-244). New 
York: Guilford Press.
Klein, A., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M. (2011). Direct and indirect 
measures of spider fear predict unique variance 
in children’s fear-related behaviour. Cognition and 
Emotion, 25, 1205-1213.
Klein, A. M., Kleinherenbrink, A. V., Simons, C., de Gier, E., 
Klein, S., Allart E., Bögels, S. M., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, 
M. (2012). Subjective fear, interference by threat, and 
fear associations independently predict fear-related 
behavior in children. Journal of Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry, 43, 952-958.
Klein, A. M., van Niekerk, R. E., Baartmans, J. M. D., Rinck, M., 
& Becker, E. S. (2015). The spider anxiety and disgust 
screening for children (SADS-C): Reliability and validity 
of a screening for children. Invited to revise and 
resubmit. 
Moradi, A. R., Taghavi, M. R., Neshat Doost, H. T., Yule, W., 
& Dalgleish, T. (2000). Memory bias for emotional 
information in children and adolescents with 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 14, 521-534.
Muris, P. (2010). Anxiety-related reasoning biases in 
children and adolescents. In J. Hadwin & A. P. Field 
(Eds.), Information processing biases and anxiety: A 
developmental perspective (pp. 22-45). Chichester: 
Wiley.
Muris, P. & Field, A. (2008). Distorted cognition and 
pathological anxiety in children and adolescents. 
Cognition and Emotion, 22, 395-421.
Muris, P., Kindt, M., Bögels, S. M., Merckelbach, H., Gadet, B., 
& Mouleart, V. (2000). Anxiety and threat perception 
abnormalities in normal children. Journal of 
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 22, 
192-199. 
Reid, S. C., Salmon, K. & Lovibond, P. F. (2006). Cognitive 
biases in childhood anxiety, depression and 
aggression: are they pervasive or specific? Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 30, 531-549.
Rinck, M. & Becker, E. S. (2005). A comparison of attentional 
biases and memory biases in women with social 
phobia and major depression. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 114, 62-74.
Biased interpretation and memory in children with spider fear
111
6
Schneider, S., Unnewehr, S., Florin, I., & Margraf, J. (2002). 
Priming panic interpretations in children of patients 
with panic disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 16, 
605-624.
Strauss, C. C., & Last, C. G. (1993). Social and simple phobias 
in children. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 7, 141-152.
Watts, S. E., & Weems, C. F. (2006). Associations among 
selective attention, memory bias, cognitive errors 
and symptoms of anxiety in youth. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 34, 841-852.
Weems, C. F., & Watts, S. E. (2005). Cognitive models of 
childhood anxiety. In F. Columbus (Ed.), Progress 
in anxiety disorder research. Hauppauge, NY: Nova 
Science Publishers, Inc.
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. 
(1997). Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 7
Self-reports, Behavior and 
Interpretation Biases in
 Girls with Symptoms of 
Social Anxiety or Spider Fear 
Based on:  Klein, A. M., Flokstra, E., van Niekerk, R. E., Klein, S., Rapee, R. M., Hudson, J. L., Bögels, S. M., 
Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M. (2015). Self-reports, behavior and interpretation biases in girls with symptoms of 
social anxiety or spider fear. Submitted for publication.
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Abstract
This study investigated the role of self-reports and behavior in studying interpretation biases and their 
content-specificity in girls with symptoms of spider fear or social anxiety. In total, 100 selected girls from a 
community sample were asked to finish scenarios that were related to either spider threat or social threat. 
Children also completed self-reports, and they performed two behavioral tasks. Specific interpretation 
biases were found; spider-fearful girls showed more negative interpretations of ambiguous spider 
threat-related scenarios, but not of social threat-related scenarios. Likewise, socially anxious girls showed 
a specific interpretation bias for social threat, but not for spider threat. Furthermore, both interpretation 
bias and self-reported fear predicted unique variance components of behavior. These findings support 
the hypothesis that fearful children display cognitive biases that are specific to fear-relevant stimuli. They 
also emphasize the importance of using behavioral measures besides questionnaires, especially when 
using indirect measures to study automatic aspects of cognitive processes.
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Cognitive theories of fear and anxiety emphasize the importance of cognitive processes in the onset 
and maintenance of anxiety disorders. According to these theories, fearful adults and children have 
anxiety-related schemata that direct processing resources towards threat-relevant information, resulting 
in cognitive biases in attention, interpretation, and memory (e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Muris & Field, 
2008; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). These cognitive biases are believed to be content-
specific; only stimuli that are associated with threat and fear are processed preferentially. Anxious 
individuals should therefore only display biased cognitions for stimuli related to their own anxiety (e.g., 
Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). For instance, children who are socially anxious should only 
interpret stimuli that are related to social situations in a negative way (interpretation bias), but not other 
ambiguous stimuli, such as stimuli related to spiders. Knowing more about the role of content-specificity 
in childhood anxiety could have important implications for the treatment of anxiety in children, as this 
might suggest the importance to focus on disorder specific cognitions.
So far, most studies found that fearful children show a tendency to interpret ambiguous situations 
in a generally negative way (see Muris, 2010; Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). However, it is 
much less clear if anxious children display negative interpretations for their own anxiety only or if they 
respond in a negative way to all anxiety-related stimuli. Some studies failed to find any evidence for 
content-specific interpretations (Dalgleish et al., 2003; In-Albon et al., 2009; Muris et al., 2000) whereas 
other studies found some evidence for the content-specificity of interpretation biases (Bögels et al., 
2003; In-Albon, Klein, Rinck, Becker, & Schneider, 2008; Klein et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b). Several authors 
have indeed expressed the need for more research on content-specificity in interpretation biases in 
childhood anxiety (e.g., Muris, 2010; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). Therefore, the main goal of this study was 
to further explore the content-specificity of interpretation biases.
To date, it is not clear why some studies found evidence for content-specificity and others did 
not. It is possible that these differences are due to different sample characteristics, such as differences 
in age, gender, levels of anxiety, or differences in the focus of anxiety. First, all studies included both 
boys and girls and the age of the children across the studies was very similar. Furthermore, significant 
findings were both found in community samples (Bögels et al., 2003; In-Albon et al., 2008; Klein et al., 
2014, 2015b) and clinical samples (Klein et al., 2015a), so it seems unlikely that gender, age and levels 
of anxiety only were responsible for the differences. However, difference might be due to the focus 
of anxiety. For instance, studies focusing on separation anxiety, social anxiety and/or generalized 
anxiety reported influences of co-morbidity (Bögels et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2015a; Muris et al., 2000). 
Co-morbidity of anxieties is one of the most difficult issues in studying specificity, as the overlap between 
different fears makes it more difficult to study the specificity of the biased interpretations of each 
separate fear. By selecting two relatively independent fears, for instance social anxiety and spider fear, 
this overlap might be reduced. So far, there is only one study that reported on the content-specificity of 
fear of spiders, but the study included another animal (butterflies) as a reference (Klein et al., 2014). We 
therefore decided to include children with symptoms spider fear and/or social anxiety.
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Furthermore, differences in findings could also be due to methodological differences. Anxiety is 
a complex phenomenon, including subjective experience measured by self-reports, specific behavior 
(mainly avoidance behavior), cognitive processes (e.g., interpretation biases) and specific physiological 
reactions (e.g., blushing; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Existing research, at least in children, has mostly 
used self-reports as the “golden standard” to define levels of anxiety, and both cognitive processes and 
avoidance behavior were related to the self-reports (for an overview, see Hadwin & Field, 2010). This 
may be insufficient, however, because there are more aspects of anxiety than only self-reported anxiety. 
Furthermore, self-reports may reflect more controlled processes while cognitive processes are generally 
more automatic, and not open to self-inspection and self-report (see also Bijttebier, Vasey, & Braet, 
2003; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Therefore, research on cognitive biases should define anxiety by both 
self-reports and avoidance behavior, and then relate the biases to both of these measures. In addition, 
to replicate earlier results, one should try to predict behavior by both self-reported fear and cognitive 
bias measures (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Huijding 
& de Jong, 2005, 2006; Klein et al., 2012; Rinck & Becker, 2011; Teachman & Woody, 2003). We therefore 
decided to include a behavioral measure related to spider-fear as well as a behavioral measure related 
to social anxiety in addition to the self-reports, and relate both measures to the interpretation bias task.
The goals of this study were threefold. The first goal was to replicate the study reported by Klein and 
colleagues (2014), and to see if the results concerning interpretation bias in spider-fearful children were 
similar. The second goal was to test whether children with high levels of self-reported social anxiety 
and a high anxiety score during the Social Speech Task would show more negative interpretations of 
ambiguous social threat-related scenarios only, and not of spider threat-related scenarios. The third 
goal was to compare the independent ability of self-reported fear and the interpretation task to predict 
performance during the behavioral tasks. 
First, we expected to replicate the findings of Klein and colleagues (2014) who found evidence for 
a specific interpretation bias in children with spider fear. We had no definitive hypothesis concerning 
the content-specificity of interpretation bias for children with symptoms of social anxiety, because the 
published studies reported mixed findings (e.g., Bögels et al., 2003; Muris et al., 2000). Furthermore, we 
expected self-reported fear (direct measure) and interpretation biases (indirect measures) to have unique 
predictive value for the behavioral measures, because both types of measures tap into distinct processes.
Methods
Participants 
An unselected sample of children was recruited from regular elementary schools in the Netherlands. 
Because boys and girls differ in how much fear they experience, we restricted ourselves to studying girls 
(e.g., Bodden, Bögels, & Muris, 2009). After parental consent had been granted, a total of 349 girls were 
initially screened for their levels of social anxiety and spider fear with the SCARED (Bodden et al., 2009) 
and the SADS-C (Klein, van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & Becker, 2015c). Out of this group of girls, 100 
girls were selected; such that levels of social anxiety and spider fear were normally distributed. The data 
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of 6 participants were excluded from the data set, due to technical problems with recording of their 
responses to the scenarios of the interpretation task (n = 3) or the two behavioral measures (n = 3). As a 
result, the data of 94 girls between 8 and 13 years of age (M = 10.0, SD = 1.1) were used in the analyses. 
This study was part of a large community-based project about childhood anxiety. The current sample 
partly overlapped with the sample in the study to validate the Auditory Interpretation Task (Klein et al., 
2015b). The Ethical Committee of the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands, approved this study.
Materials
Interpretation task. The interpretation task consisted of 16 open-ended scenarios, each scenario 
containing 5 short sentences. All scenarios were ambiguous, such that they could be interpreted in 
a positive, neutral, or negative way. The set of 16 scenarios was adapted and translated into Dutch 
from already existing materials (Bögels et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2014; Muris et al., 2000; Hertel, Brozovich, 
Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008; Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, & Margraf, 2002). The 16 scenarios were divided 
into two categories; 8 spider threat-related scenarios and 8 social threat-related scenarios (see Table 1 
for sample scenarios). 
Table 1. Sample stories and sample endings of the two categories of the interpretation task.
Scenarios Sample ending 
Spider threat-related scenario: “Vacation”
You are free from school and the weather is very nice. You have helped 
your mother in the garden today. It is half past nine and you have to go 
to bed. You brush your teeth and walk into your bedroom. In the corner 
of your room you see a cobweb…
 ‘oh no, it is a huge hairy spider that 
wants to bite me’. 
Social threat-related scenario: “Birthday”
Today is your grandmother’s birthday. It is already busy when you arrive. 
You give your grandmother a present. Everybody is watching when 
grandma opens the present. Then all of a sudden someone laughs really 
loud…
 ‘ everyone thinks the present is stupid.’  
The girls were asked to read aloud two blocks of 8 scenarios on a computer screen and to imagine 
themselves as the central character of each scenario. For each scenario, they were asked to think of 
approximately two sentences to end the story. Their own endings were recorded with a microphone, to 
be transcribed and scored later. They had a short break between the blocks. Scenarios were presented 
in random order, but each block consisted of four scenarios of each category.  
The first author and the fourth author, blind to the girls’ level of fear, coded the interpretations. The 
endings were scored on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 = positive, 2 = slightly positive, 3 = neutral, 4 = slightly 
negative, to 5 = very negative. The higher the score, the more the child tended to interpret the scenario 
as negative. In case a scenario ending was unclassifiable, for instance due to unclear recording, the raters 
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scored the scenario as missing value. First, 10% of the scenarios were coded by both raters independently 
of each other, resulting in an inter-rater reliability of .83. Next, the first author coded all remaining scenarios. 
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein et al., 2015c). The SADS-C is a self-report 
questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-related statements on a 5-point scale. The four 
statements address fear of spiders, physical reactions, avoidance, and disgust. Internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability are satisfactory (α = .88, r = .91; Klein et al., 2015c). In this study, internal consistency 
was excellent (α = .92).
Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED; Bodden et al., 2009). The SCARED is a self-
report questionnaire that measures responses to 71 statements on a 3-point scale with ‘almost never’, 
‘sometimes’ and ‘often’. The SCARED measures DSM-IV symptoms of anxiety, including Social Phobia 
(SP). We used only the Social Phobia subscale, consisting of 9 items. Internal consistency of the original 
SP subscale (α = .85) was satisfactory (Bodden et al., 2009). In this study, internal consistency was also 
satisfactory (α = .90).
Behavior Avoidance Task (BAT). This task was used to assess the girls’ avoidance behavior when 
confronted with a tarantula skin, which they believed to be a real, living spider. The task was identical to 
the BAT described by Klein and colleagues (2011). BAT performance was scored on a scale ranging from 
zero (no approach) to 8 (touching the spider). 
Social Speech Task (SST). The SST was used to get an indication of the girls’ socially anxious behavior. 
As the literature is inconclusive as to whether socially anxious individuals behave differently from non-
anxious individuals during anxiety-provoking situations (e.g., Cartwright-Hatton, Hodges, & Porter, 2003), 
we decided to measure state anxiety (see also Dodd et al., 2011). The child was asked to indicate state 
anxiety on a 0- to 10-point Likert scale ranging from “not anxious at all” to “very anxious”, right before 
the instructions of the SST, when the child was relaxed and unaware of having to perform the SST. The 
child was asked to indicate state anxiety again directly following the SST (see also In-Albon et al., 2008; 
In-Albon et al., 2009). 
The SST itself consisted of a two-minute impromptu speech in front of a camera. The girls were told 
that their speech would be recorded and that adults would rate their video afterwards. The girls were 
asked to tell something about any topic they wanted, and the research assistant gave a few examples of 
subjects to talk about. After the instructions, the child was asked to stand straight up facing the camera, 
and the assistant took place on a chair behind the child. When the child fell silent for more than 10 
seconds, the assistant gave a standardized prompt. There was a maximum of three prompts, each of 
which was given after 10 seconds of silence. Two girls indicated that they did not want to proceed with 
the task, and the task was terminated immediately.
Procedure
The testing was divided into two sessions in which the girls performed the tasks and filled in the 
questionnaires individually, accompanied by a trained research assistant. In the first session, the girls 
performed the spider BAT. In the second session, the girls first performed the interpretation task followed 
by the Social Speech task. Finally, they filled in the questionnaires.
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Results
Descriptives 
The mean sum score on the SADS-C was 13.0 (SD = 5.3) and the mean sum score on the social subscale 
of the SCARED was 6.9 (SD = 4.8). The mean score on the interpretation task was 3.0 (SD = 0.5) for spider 
threat-related scenarios, and 3.1 (SD = 0.5) for social threat-related scenarios. The mean score on the 
spider-BAT was 5.3 (SD = 2.4; min = 0, max = 8). Finally, the mean scores on the State anxiety scale of 
the Social Speech Task (SST) were .79 (SD = 1.1) before the instructions of the SST, and 1.3 (SD = 1.7) 
after the SST. Next, a difference score was calculated by subtracting the pre-state anxiety measurement 
from the post-state anxiety measurement (Social SST score), which resulted in a mean score of .5 
(SD = 1.1), indicating that the girls experienced more anxiety directly following the SST than before they 
were aware of having to perform the SST, t(93) = 4.9, p < .001.
Correlations
All correlations were controlled for age. As expected, the correlation between SADS-C scores and BAT 
scores was significant, r = -.49 (p < .001): Girls who reported more fear of spiders avoided the spider 
more. Likewise, the correlation between the SCARED social phobia subscale and the social SST score 
was also significant, r = .32 (p = .002): Girls who reported a higher level of social anxiety on the SCARED 
also reported higher state anxiety on the Social Speech Task. Self-reported social anxiety was unrelated 
to self-reported spider fear (r = .13, p > .1) 
As expected, the spider-interpretation bias scores correlated significantly with self-reported 
spider fear (r = .34, p = .001), and with behavioral avoidance on the BAT (r = -.31, p = .003). The spider-
interpretation bias scores correlated neither with self-reported social anxiety (r = -.10 p > .1), nor with 
the social SST score (r = .06, p > .1). The social-interpretation bias scores correlated only marginally 
significantly with self-reported social anxiety (r = .20, p = .051), but significantly with the social SST score 
(r = .29, p = .006). As expected, the social-interpretation bias scores correlated neither with self-reported 
spider fear (r = .03, p > .1), nor with behavioral avoidance on the BAT (r = .04, p > .1). This indicates that 
girls with self-reported symptoms of spider fear and a high behavioral avoidance of spiders on the BAT 
displayed negative interpretation biases only for materials related to spider threat. Likewise, girls with 
self-reported symptoms of social anxiety, and a high social SST score displayed negative interpretation 
biases only for social threat.
Regression analysis
In order to predict spider fear-related behavior measured by the BAT, we used a hierarchical regression 
analysis with BAT scores as the criterion. SADS-C scores, SCARED-social anxiety scores, spider-
interpretation bias scores and social-interpretation bias scores were used as predictors. We also included 
age in step 1 of the regression, in order to control for this variable. The model with age was only 
marginally significant, F(1,92) = 3.65, p = .059, and explained 3.8 % of the variance in BAT behavior. After 
the second step, the model reached significance, F(5,88) = 8.05, p < .001, and explained 31.4 % of the 
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variance  in BAT behavior. This model was significantly better than the first model, F(4,88) = 8.84, p < .001. 
For this second regression, age, SADS-C scores, and spider-interpretation bias were significant predictors 
(see Table 2). Thus, age, self-reported spider fear and spider-interpretation bias scores predicted unique 
variance in fear-related behavior on the BAT. Interpretation bias related to spiders was thus able to predict 
unique variance above and beyond the variance predicted by self-reported spider fear. Furthermore, the 
measures related to social anxiety were all non-significant, indicating content-specificity. 
In order to predict social fear-related state anxiety during the SST, we repeated the regression 
analysis, but now included the social SST scores as the criterion. The model with age did not reach 
statistical significance (p > .1). After the second step, the model was significant, F(5,88) = 4.00, p = .003, 
and explained 18.5 % of the variance in social SST scores. This model was significantly better than the first 
model, F(4,88) = 4.89, p = .001. For this second regression, SCARED-social scores and social-interpretation 
bias scores were significant predictors. Thus, self-reported social anxiety, and social-interpretation bias 
scores predicted unique variance of in social SST scores. Interpretation bias related to social situations 
was thus able to predict unique variance above and beyond the variance explained by self-reported 
social anxiety. Furthermore, the measures related to spider fear were all non-significant, indicating 
content-specificity (see Table 2).
Table 2. Hierarchical regression analyses predicting BAT and social SST scores from age, questionnaire scores, and 
interpretation bias scores.
Criterion variable Step R² R² change Predictor β
BAT-score 1 .04 .06
Age .06
2 .31 .30**
Age .27*
SADS-C -.41**
SCARED-social -.09
Spider-interpretation bias -.22*
Social-interpretation bias .15
Criterion variable Step R² R² change Predictor β
SST-score 1 < .01 < .01
Age -.06
2 .19 .18*
Age -.08
SADS-C .18
SCARED-social .24*
Spider-interpretation bias -.05
Social-interpretation bias .25*
* p < .05, ** p < .001, standardized β coefficients are reported. 
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Discussion
We investigated whether girls with symptoms of spider fear and/or social anxiety display interpretation 
biases, and whether these biases are specific to anxiety-related materials. Furthermore, we compared 
the independent ability of self-reported fear and the interpretation task to predict performance during 
behavioral tasks. The first goal was to compare the findings of the current study to an earlier study 
reported by Klein and colleagues (2014). Consistent with our hypothesis and earlier results, we found 
that girls with self-reported spider fear and avoidance behavior on the BAT displayed an interpretation 
bias for spider threat-related stimuli only. This indicates that spider-fearful girls display an interpretation 
bias for content-specific materials only, and not for other ambiguous materials. The second goal was to 
test whether children with high levels of self-reported social anxiety and a high anxiety score during 
the Social Speech Task would show more negative interpretations of ambiguous social threat-related 
scenarios only, and not of spider threat-related scenarios. As expected, girls with a higher state anxiety 
on the Social Speech Task displayed interpretation bias for social threat-related stimuli only. However, 
self-reported social anxiety only correlated marginally significant (p = .051) with social-threat related 
interpretation bias. 
The third goal of this study was to compare the independent ability of self-reported fear and the 
interpretation task to predict performance during the behavioral tasks. We found that the self-reports 
and the interpretation task predicted unique variance in fear-related behavior. This was true for both 
spider-fear related behavior as well as state social anxiety during a speech task. This means that 
both direct and indirect measures were necessary for an optimal prediction of fear-related behavior 
in children. This also means that the inclusion of the interpretation task, besides the questionnaire, 
predicted even more variance in fear-related behavior. These findings underline the importance of both 
controlled processes (questionnaire) and automatic processes (interpretation task) in explaining fearful 
behavior. Furthermore, we found this relation to be specific to each anxiety; self-reported spider fear 
and spider-threat related interpretation bias were the only significant predictors in explaining avoidance 
behavior towards a spider, and self-reported social anxiety and social-threat related interpretation bias 
were the only significant predictors in explaining state anxiety during the Social Speech Task. Hence, 
this strengthens the evidence for the existence of content-specificity of interpretation processes in 
childhood anxiety.
The current results support our hypothesis that children with higher levels of fear would make more 
negative interpretations of ambiguous scenarios only if they were related to their own fear. Furthermore, 
they also support our hypothesis that self-reported fear (direct measure) and the interpretation task 
(indirect measures) to have unique predictive value for the behavioral measures, because both types of 
measures tap into distinct processes. These results are also in line with the results reported by several 
other studies on the content-specificity of interpretation biases for threatening information in children 
with anxiety (e.g., Bögels et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2014, 2015a). These results are also consistent with 
findings from the broader childhood anxiety literature, supporting cognitive-specificity models in 
children and adolescents when examining automatic thoughts (e.g., Epkins, 2000; Jolly & Dykman, 1994; 
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Schniering & Rapee, 2004) and with dual processing models (e.g. Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In addition, 
there is a notable similarity between the results of the present study and those demonstrating specificity 
in interpretation biases in anxious adults (e.g., Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993). Taken 
together, the data suggest continuity in content-specificity across the course of development, in line 
with cognitive theories of psychopathology. It may be that patterns of cognitive functioning associated 
with emotional states are established at a relatively early age, and tend to continue into adolescence 
and adulthood. 
This study has several limitations, which need to be considered. First, this study was limited to girls 
with symptoms of spider phobia and social anxiety disorder; therefore we recommend studying children 
of both genders with other types of fears and phobias, and also clinically anxious children. Second, we 
did not include a diagnostic interview to find out whether some of the children experienced an anxiety 
disorder. Finally, because the published results are inconclusive as to whether socially anxious individuals 
behave differently from non-anxious individuals during anxiety-provoking situations (e.g., Cartwright-
Hatton et al., 2003; Cartwright-Hatton, Tschernitz, & Gomersall, 2005; Spence, Donovan, & Brechman-
Toussaint, 1999), we decided to measure self-reported state anxiety before and after the Social Speech 
Task, instead of a measuring actual behavior. Although the children were confronted with a real life 
phobic stimulus, and were not only asked to think about how they would feel in such a situation, but 
had to actively participate in this anxiety-provoking situation, it would be worthwhile to include more 
behavioral aspects of social anxiety in future studies. 
The mixed results in the literature regarding the content-specificity of interpretation biases related 
to social anxiety warrant further discussion. While we have found evidence for the content-specificity 
of interpretation biases in girls with symptoms of social anxiety (in line with Bögels et al., 2003; Klein et 
al., 2015a), there are also a few studies that failed to find evidence of content-specific interpretations in 
children with social anxiety (In-Albon et al., 2009; Muris et al., 2000). It is difficult to compare the studies 
because of the differences in the characteristics of the children that were studied. The study by Muris 
and colleagues (2000) for instance, studied an analogue sample, while two other studies investigated 
clinically anxious samples (In-Albon et al., Klein et al., 2015a). Another difficulty in comparing the studies 
is the different measures that were used to study interpretation bias. In-Albon and colleagues (2009), for 
instance, used an indirect measure, whereas two other studies used relatively direct measures (Bögels 
et al., 2003; Muris et al., 2000) including different stimuli, such as pictures, words, or scenarios (see also 
Campbell & Rapee, 1994). 
One of the explanations of our finding of content-specificity might be that we compared a physical 
threat (spider fear) to a social threat (speech fear). A few studies in both adults and children have found 
evidence suggesting that feared outcomes are organized into two major dimensions; namely, concerns 
about physical threat or harm, versus concerns about social threat or negative evaluations (e.g., Campbell 
& Rapee, 1994; Lovibond & Rapee, 1993). This would mean that the specificity of interpretation biases 
is not organized around the different anxiety disorders, but that anxiety disorders can be clustered 
into domains of fear, i.e. physical threat versus social threat. Note that there may exist more than two 
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dimensions of fear, for example separation fear may be a different domain of fear, in children as well as 
in adults. However, the point we want to make is that studying specificity of interpretation bias around 
classifications of anxiety disorders may not be optimal, as for example generalized anxiety disorder is 
characterized by worries about physical as well as social threats. In line, levels of social anxiety and spider 
fear did not correlate significantly with each other in our study. Another possible explanation of our 
findings is that we used behavioral measures in addition to self-reports. In this study, we found that 
self-reported social anxiety and the social-threat related items of the interpretation task only correlated 
marginally significantly, whereas the interpretation task correlated significantly with the Social Speech 
Task. Clearly more research is needed into the specificity of interpretation biases that addresses the 
issues raised above. Future studies, should, for instance, compare analogue samples to clinically anxious 
children, using different formats of studying interpretation biases at the same time, include behavioral 
measures, and also focus on possible differences between physically orientated and socially orientated 
anxiety disorders. 
In summation, we found that the interpretation task can be a useful instrument for assessing the 
specificity of cognitive processes in girls with symptoms of spider phobia and social anxiety. Based on 
our results, we recommend studying the specificity of biases in children, as it seems that children with 
high levels of fear, assessed with self-reports and behavioral measures, do indeed show specific fear-
related interpretations at a young age. Future research of childhood anxiety should therefore assess the 
specificity of other potential biases in children, for instance in attention and memory processes. It would 
be worthwhile for future studies to also use behavioral measures besides questionnaires, especially when 
using indirect measures to study automatic aspects of cognitive processes. Furthermore, the present 
results support cognitive models in youth that argue for the specificity of cognitive content associated 
with different disorders (Beck, 1976). The results are consistent with current classification systems for 
childhood mental disorders (e.g., DSM-V, APA, 2013) as well as with the two-dimensional factor model 
(e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). Clinically, this insight into the presence of 
interpretation biases in anxiety disorders might be used to improve treatments for anxious children by 
targeting content-specific interpretation biases related to individual disorders.
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Abstract
Cognitive theories suggest that cognitive biases may be related and together influence the anxiety 
response. However, little is known about the interrelations of cognitive bias tasks and whether they allow 
for an improved prediction of fear-related behavior in addition to self-reports. This study simultaneously 
addressed several types of cognitive biases in children, to investigate attention bias, interpretation bias, 
memory bias and fear-related associations, their interrelations and the prediction of behavior. Eighty-
one selected children varying in their levels of spider fear completed the Spider Anxiety and Disgust 
Screening for Children (SADS-C) and performed two Emotional Stroop tasks, a Free Recall task, an 
interpretation task including size and distance indication, an Affective Priming Task, and a Behavioral 
Assessment Test (BAT). We found an attention bias, an interpretation bias, and fear-related associations, 
but no evidence for a memory bias. The biases showed little overlap. Attention bias, interpretation bias, 
and fear-related associations predicted unique variance in avoidance of spiders. Interpretation bias and 
fear-related associations remained significant predictors, even when self-reported fear was included as 
a predictor. To our knowledge, this is the first study to find evidence that attention bias, interpretation 
bias, and fear-related associations each predict unique variance in avoidance behavior. It is also the first 
study in which we found evidence for a relation between fear of spiders and size and distance indication. 
We showed that this bias is distinct from other cognitive biases. This suggests that this variation of 
measuring interpretation bias, which is also referred to as a visual perceptual bias, is a unique bias in 
explaining avoidance behavior. Furthermore, the Emotional Stroop Task, and the Affective Priming Task 
allowed for an improved prediction of fear-related avoidance behavior in addition to self-reported fear. 
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Cognitive theories of fear and anxiety emphasize the importance of cognitive processes in the onset and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders. According to these theories, fearful adults and children have anxiety-
related associations and schemata that direct processing resources towards threat-relevant information, 
resulting in cognitive biases in attention, interpretation, and memory (e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). These fear-related associations, attention, interpretation and 
memory processes are believed to be related to each other (Williams et al., 1997), and some theoretical 
models suggest that they also influence each other in order to elicit an anxiety response (e.g., Daleiden 
& Vasey, 1997; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; Weems & Watts, 2005). There are indeed numerous studies 
reported that support the existence of biases of attention and interpretation in childhood anxiety, but 
the evidence for memory biases and fear-related associations in childhood anxiety is mixed (for an 
overview see, Hadwin & Field, 2008). However, there are few studies that addressed different biases 
simultaneously in children, and the evidence for the significant overlap is rather weak and inconsistent 
(e.g., Klein, et al., 2012, 2014; Richards, French, Nash, Hadwin, & Donnellly, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006). 
Furthermore, some of these studies found some evidence for the ability of the different cognitive biases 
to predict unique variance in fear, indicating that the different biases might measure separate aspects 
of fear (e.g., Klein et al., 2012, 2014, 2015a; Watts & Weems, 2006). Several authors have expressed the 
need for more research on the relation between cognitive biases (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2006; Weems & 
Watts, 2005). Knowing more about how cognitive biases persist and interact with each other could have 
important implications for the identification, prevention, and treatment of anxiety in children. 
Therefore, the main goal of this study was to investigate attention, interpretation and memory 
biases and fear-related associations, their relation, and their ability to uniquely predict spider fear in 
a sample of children with varying levels of spider fear. We chose to study fear of spiders for several 
reasons. First, specific fears such as fear of spiders are highly prevalent in children (Strauss & Last, 1993). 
Second, normative fears such as fear of spiders are often used as a model for studying the development 
of other fears, because several studies suggest that the underlying processes of fear are similar (Williams 
et al., 1997). Third, unlike other fears and anxieties, there are good behavioral tasks designed to measure 
behavior related to fear of spiders. Finally, we wanted this study to be comparable to the studies by 
Klein and colleagues (2011, 2012) for the purposes of replication. Both studies (Klein et al., 2011, 2012) 
explored attention bias in children with varying levels of spider fear, and Klein and colleagues (2012) 
also included an Affective Priming Task to study fear-related associations. Both studies found evidence 
for an attention bias, and Klein and colleagues (2012) also found evidence for fear-related associations. 
Furthermore, the indirect measures used in both studies were able to explain unique variance in fear-
related behavior. 
Based on theoretical conceptualization and previous findings, we hypothesized that children with 
high levels of spider fear on the self-report and behavioral measures would display biases in attention 
interpretation, and memory in addition to strong fear-related associations. Furthermore, based on 
existing empirical evidence, we expected the different measures of bias to show weak but positive 
relationships. Finally, based on previous results (Klein et al., 2012, 2014, 2015a; Weems & Watts, 2005), 
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we expected that the different cognitive biases would not only predict unique variance in spider fear-
related behavior but would also predict variance above and beyond self-reported spider fear.
Methods
Participants 
An unselected sample of children was recruited from regular elementary schools in the Netherlands. 
After parental consent had been granted, a total of 95 children participated in this study. The data of 
14 participants were excluded from the dataset, due to technical problems with the recording of the 
responses on the different tasks. As a result, the data of 81 children (26 boys; 32 %) between the ages of 
8 and 13 (M = 10.2, SD = 1.1) were used in the analyses. 
Materials
Emotional Stroop Task (EST). Two different versions of the EST were used in this study; a pictorial version 
and a word version. The pictorial version was identical to the task used by Klein and colleagues (2011). 
The word version consisted of four different categories with each category including four words related 
to spiders (e.g. hairy), social situations (e.g. shame), happiness (e.g. happy), or general fear (e.g. worry). 
The procedure of the word version was identical to the pictorial version. 
Affective priming task (APT). The APT used in this study was very similar to the APT used by Klein and 
colleagues (2012). The APT is a task in which associations between prime stimuli and target stimuli are 
examined. The target stimuli were pictures of six faces of children (three boys, three girls) who looked 
either happy or fearful. The prime words (three per category) were related to four different categories: 
negative feelings, happiness, spiders, and general fear words. Two sets of words were created, and each 
child was assigned to one of the sets (see Appendix A for all stimulus words). All four prime categories were 
fully combined with the two target categories, yielding 8 combinations, each of which was presented 
18 times. In total, the children categorized 144 faces, which were divided into three blocks of 48 trials 
each. The children took self-paced breaks between the blocks. Internal consistency for the different 
categories in this study ranged between alpha .57 and .82. Test-retest reliability for the Reaction Times 
between the three blocks was good (block 1 versus block 2: r = .77, p < .001; block 1 versus block 3: r = .76, 
p < .001; block 2 versus block 3: r = .90, p < .001). Test-retest reliability for the priming scores were near 
zero and non-significant (rs = -.10 to.19). Directly following the 144 trials, the children were asked to recall 
as many prime words as they could remember. The total number of correctly recalled words related to 
spiders versus the happiness related words was used as an indication of memory bias. 
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C; Klein, Van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & 
Becker, 2015b). The SADS-C is a self-report questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-
related statements on a 5-point scale. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability are strong 
(α = .88, r = .91; Klein et al., 2015b). In this study, internal consistency was excellent (α = .90).
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Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT). This task was used to assess the children’s avoidance behavior was 
identical to the BAT described by Klein and colleagues (2011). Right before the child was asked to approach 
the spider, the child was asked to indicate the size of the spider and the distance towards the spider as 
an indication of interpretation bias (see also Vasey et al., 2012). Interpretation bias is often measured 
by means of a questionnaire or an ambiguous scenarios paradigm (see Muris, 2010). Disadvantages of 
these measurements are that they are sensitive to experimenter demand and social desirability, and 
that they are sometimes time consuming. We therefore decided to follow a new procedure used by 
Vasey and colleagues (2012), in which they simply asked spider phobic adults to indicate the size of the 
spider from the tips of its front legs to the tips of its back legs. The children in this study were asked to 
point the estimated size on a ruler of 30 cm. The spider skin itself was approximately 12 centimeter long. 
Additionally, we also asked the child to estimate the distance between themselves and the spider with 
the means of a white cord with small red tapes for every 50 cm and a big red tap for every meter. The 
child was of course unaware of the fact that he/she was exactly three meters away from the spider. The 
experimenter was unaware of the child’s level of spider fear during administration of the BAT.
Procedure
The testing was divided into two sessions. In the first session, the children performed the word version 
of the EST followed by the APT and the spider BAT individually, accompanied by a trained research 
assistant. In the second session, the children performed the pictorial version of the EST followed by the 
SADS-C individually, again accompanied by the trained research assistant. We chose this order because 
of the necessity to measure reliable reaction times during the EST and the APT, given a limited attention 
span in children. The children were free to refuse the tasks and could stop at any time. The children 
received a certificate for participating. 
This study was part of a large community-based project on childhood anxiety. The current sample 
partly overlapped with the sample in the study to validate the Auditory Interpretation Task (Klein et al., 
2015c), and a study on the specificity of interpretation biases (Klein et al., 2015a). The Ethical Committee 
of the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, approved this 
study.
Results
Descriptives 
Emotional Stroop tasks (EST). The overall number of mistakes was low, for both the EST-picture (0.8 %) 
and the EST-word (0.5 %). From the EST-picture card RTs and the EST-word card RTs, two relative scores 
related to spiders were computed; that is, the EST-picture score (RT-Spider minus RT-Neutral) and the 
EST-word score (RT-Spider minus RT-Neutral). Higher scores indicate larger interference by the spider 
category. Two one-sample t-tests revealed that children did not show significant interference specifically 
related to spiders in the word version, t(80) = 1.7, p > .1, or the pictorial version, although the latter 
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approached significance, t(80) = 1.9, p = .064. There were no significant correlations between age and 
Stroop scores (EST-picture: r = .04, p > .1; EST-word: r = -.14, p > .1), nore were there effects of gender 
(EST-picture: F(1,79) < 0.1, p > .1; EST-word: F(1,79) = 0.35, p > .1).
Size and distance estimation. The mean estimated size of the spider was 10.4 cm (SD = 3.4; min = 3.0 cm, 
max = 21 cm). The mean estimated distance from the spider was 2.9 meters (SD = 0.75; min = 1.8 m, max 
= 5.0 m). Bivariate correlations indicated that there was neither a significant correlation between age and 
estimated spider size (r = .07, p > .1) nor was there a significant correlation between age and estimated 
distance (r = .06, p > .1). There was a significant gender difference for the estimated spider size, F(1,79) = 4.79, 
p = .032, girls (M = 10.9; SD = 3.4) estimated the spider as being larger than boys did (M = 9.2; SD = 3.2). 
There was no gender difference for the estimated distance from the spider, F(1,79) = 0.95, p > .1. 
Memory task. From the number of remembered items, a relative memory score related to spiders 
was calculated for each child: the mean number of remembered spider-related words was subtracted 
from the mean positive-related remembered words. A one-sample t-test revealed that children did 
remember significantly more spider-related words than positive-related words, t(80) = 3.42, p = .001. 
There was neither a significant correlation between age and the number of remembered items (r = -.01, 
p > .1), nor was there an effect of gender, F(1,79) = 1.24, p > .1.
Affective priming task (APT). The average number of mistakes was 4.2 %. From the RTs, a relative 
priming score related to spiders was calculated for each child: The mean negative target RT was 
subtracted from the mean positive target RT. Positive scores indicate that the spider primes pre-activate 
fearful faces more than smiling faces, and vice versa for negative scores. A one-sample t-test revealed 
that the spider priming score did not differ significantly from zero, t(80) = 1.18, p > .1. Thus, on average, 
the children did not show negative associations related to spider words. There was neither a significant 
correlation between age and the priming score (r = -.0,1 p > .1), nor was there an effect of gender, F(1,79) 
= 2.66, p > .1. 
SADS-C questionnaire. The mean score on the SADS-C was 2.5 (SD = 1.1; min = 1, max = 4.4). There 
was neither a significant correlation between age and self-reported spider fear (r = .07, p >.1), nor was 
there an effect of gender, F(1,79) < .1, p > .1.
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT). The children’s mean BAT score was 5.6 (SD = 2.1; min = 0, max = 8). 
There was neither a significant correlation between age and BAT score (r = .15, p > .1), nor was there an 
effect of gender, F(1,79) < 0.1, p > .1.
Correlations
Table 1 represents all correlations. As expected, children who reported more fear of spiders approached 
the spider less closely. We also found an attention bias; both the EST-picture score and the EST-word 
score correlated significantly with self-reported fear of spiders and with the BAT. We also found evidence 
for an interpretation bias; children who estimated the spider as being larger reported higher levels of 
spider fear, but they did not approach the spider less closely than children who estimated the spider as 
being smaller. On the other hand, children who estimated the spider as being closer, avoided the spider 
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more on the BAT, but these children did not report more fear of spiders. There was no evidence for a 
memory bias; the number of relative recalled items related to spiders was unrelated to SADS-C scores or 
BAT. Finally, children with stronger fear-related spider associations avoided the spider significantly more, 
but they did not report more fear of spiders than children with more positive spider-associations.  
Next, we correlated all bias scores with each other. As expected, children with a high spider 
interference score on the EST-picture also had a higher score on the EST-word. The EST-picture also 
correlated significantly with fear-related associations, indicating that children with more interference 
on the pictorial version of the Stroop also displayed more fear-related associations on the APT. 
Furthermore, the EST-word correlated significantly with the spider-size estimation, meaning that 
children with an attention bias, also estimated the spider as being larger. Finally, the word version of the 
EST also correlated marginally significant with spider-distance estimation, suggesting that children who 
displayed an attention bias had the tendency to estimate the spider as being closer by. All other scores 
were unrelated to each other. 
Table 1. Correlations between SADS-C, BAT, and bias measures, controlled for gender (n = 81).
SADS-C BAT EST-pic EST-word Size Distance APT
SADS-C
BAT -.45**
EST-pic .24* -.23*
EST-word .31* -.26* .46**
Size .38** -.07 -.07 .26*
Distance .01 .30* -.11 -.18+ .04
APT .13 -.28* .34* .01 .09 -.09
Memory .12 -.05 .12 .10 .13 < .01 .07
+ p < .01, one tailed, * p < .05, one tailed, ** p < .001, one-tailed.
Note. SADS-C = Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children, BAT = Behavioral Assessment Test, EST-pic = pictorial 
version of the Emotional Stroop Task, EST-word = word version of the Emotional Stroop Task, Size = estimation of the 
size of the spider, Distance = Estimated distance towards the spider, APT = Affective Priming Task
Regression Analysis
To test whether the different cognitive biases explained unique variance in fear-related behavior 
measured by the BAT, we performed a regression analysis with BAT scores as the criterion. The bias scores 
were entered as predictors; APT spider scores, size estimations, distance estimations and recall scores. 
Furthermore, we also included a weighted z-score based on the EST-picture score and the EST-word 
score to avoid collinearity. The model was significant F(5,75) = 3.52, p = .007. APT spider priming scores, 
spider attention bias scores, and spider distance scores were significant predictors. Thus, fear-related 
spider associations, attention bias, and interpretation bias (distance estimation) predicted unique 
variance in fear-related behavior on the BAT (see Table 2). 
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Next, we repeated this analysis, but we now included SADS-C scores in the first step, before entering 
all bias scores in the second step. After the first step, the model was significant F(1,79) = 19.60, p < .001. 
After the second step F(6,74) = 6.56, p < .001, the model also reached significance. This second model 
was also significantly better than the first model F(5,74) = 3.36, p = .009. For this second model, SADS-C 
scores, APT spider scores, and spider distance estimates were significant predictors. Thus, fear-related 
spider-associations and interpretation bias (distance estimation) each predicted unique variance in fear-
related behavior on the BAT, above and beyond self-reported fear (see Table 2).
Table 2. Hierarchical regression analyses predicting BAT scores (n = 81). 
Regression 1 with bias measures only
Criterion variable R² Predictor β
BAT-score
.19*
EST -.20*
Size -.02
Distance .25*
APT -.21*
Memory .01
Regression 2 with self-reported fear and bias measures
Criterion variable Step R² R² change Predictor β
BAT-score
1 .20**
SADS-C -.45**
2 .35** .15*
SADS-C -.45**
EST -.07
Size .14
Distance .28*
APT
Memory
-.19*
.01
* p < .05, one-tailed, ** p < .001, one-tailed, standardized β coefficients are reported.
Note. SADS-C = Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children, BAT = Behavioral Assessment Test, EST = combined 
score for pictorial and word version of the Emotional Stroop Task, Size = estimation of the size of the spider, Distance 
= Estimated distance towards the spider, APT = Affective Priming Task, Memory = Memory bias task
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Discussion
This study is the first to combine attention bias, interpretation bias, memory bias, and fear-related 
associations, to examine their inter-relations and to test the independent ability of these biases to 
predict avoidance of spiders in children. The first goal of this study was to replicate the findings of the 
current study to earlier studies by Klein and colleagues (2011, 2012). Consistent with our earlier results, 
we found that spider-fearful children displayed both attention bias and fear-related associations and 
that these biases predicted unique variance in behavioral avoidance of spiders. Furthermore, in line with 
findings from the broader childhood anxiety literature, spider-fearful children, just like children with 
other anxieties, show an interpretation bias for threatening information (e.g., Muris, 2010). These findings 
support the importance of attention biases, interpretation biases and fear-related associations in anxiety 
(for an overview see, Hadwin & Field, 2010).  To our knowledge, this is the first study in which we found 
evidence for a relation between fear of spiders and size and distance estimation; spider fearful children 
indicated the spider as being larger and closer by than non-fearful children. Furthermore, we also 
showed that this bias is distinct from other cognitive processes. Spider distance estimation predicted 
unique variance in behavioral avoidance above and beyond the variance predicted by other cognitive 
bias measures and self-reported fear. This suggests that this variation of measuring interpretation bias, 
which is also referred to as a visual perceptual bias, is a unique bias in explaining fearful behavior. This 
result is in line with the findings in adult anxiety (Vasey et al., 2012), namely that spider-fearful adults 
have a tendency to overestimate the size of a spider. The children in this study also underestimated 
their distance from the spider, which is in line with results found in height phobia where a link between 
overestimation of heights and fear of heights was observed (e.g., Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, 
& Proffitt, 2008). Aside from finding attention, interpretation, and association biases, we did not find 
support for a memory bias. We found that all children remembered more spider-related words compared 
to positive-related words and this memory effect was not related to spider fear. This non-significant 
correlation between memory bias and fear is in line with most studies (see, Coles & Heimberg, 2002), 
although there are also a few studies that have found evidence for a memory bias (e.g., Klein et al., 2014). 
The second goal of this study was to explore relations between different biases and to explore 
the ability of these biases to predict spider fear behavior, above and beyond self-reported fear. The 
results showed that the different biases correlated only weakly with each other, but that attention, 
interpretation and fear-related associations predicted unique variance in fear-related behavior in the 
BAT. These results indicate that, despite their minimal overlap, attention and interpretation biases and 
fear-related associations are all important processes in explaining fearful behavior. Furthermore, when 
we included self-reported fear as a predictor in the regression model, both interpretation bias and fear-
related associations remained significant predictors of avoidance behavior. These results are in line 
with our hypotheses and with previous studies of child and adult anxiety anxiety (Klein et al., 2011, 
2012; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006) and supports cognitive models of childhood anxiety 
(Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Weems & Watts, 2005). Our finding suggests that both these cognitive biases are 
useful for predicting fear-related behavior in children, independently of each other, and over and above 
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the predictive power achieved by self-reports. The findings underline the importance of automatic 
processes in fear-related behavior and support the use of indirect measures in research settings.
Interestingly, we did not find significant correlations between some of the indirect measures and 
self-reported fear in the SADS-C or with behavioral avoidance in the BAT. For example, priming effects in 
the APT correlated significantly with behavioral avoidance, but not with self-reported fear. Correlations 
between direct and indirect measures have indeed been found in previous (adult) research (e.g., 
Teachman & Woody, 2003), but results similar to ours have also been reported (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 
2002; Klein et al., 2012). The lack of relation between direct and indirect measures may explain why some 
earlier studies did not find stronger fear-related associations in children with high levels of self-reported 
fear. This result might indicate that self-reports and indirect tasks measure different processes, which are 
not necessarily closely related to each other (see also Klein et al., 2011). 
Another finding that needs clarification is the fact that some of the indirect measures did and some 
of the measures did not correlate significantly with each other. For example, fear-related associations 
in the word-based APT correlated significantly with attention bias in the picture-version of the EST, but 
not in the word-version, although the latter employed partly the same words as the APT. We could not 
find a specific pattern in the correlations of the different measures, except for the significant correlation 
between the pictorial version and the word version of the EST, which are similar tasks measuring 
the same construct. Although the different tasks supposedly tap distinct automatic processes, these 
processes are thought to interact at certain points. It is therefore expected that the measures will not 
correlate highly with each other, but should show some overlap. This null finding is in line with several 
other studies that failed to find significant correlations between different cognitive biases (Klein et al., 
2012, 2014, 2015a; Watts & Weems, 2006). There are also several studies in adult anxiety that only found 
limited evidence for the overlap of different cognitive biases (e.g., van Bockstaele et al., 2011). The lack of 
correlations between indirect measures might be explained by insufficient reliability of these measures 
(Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Brown et al., 2014). Furthermore, different task characteristics of 
the APT, the EST, and the interpretation task may also be a reason why the tasks did not correlate with 
each other (e.g., words versus pictures and reaction times versus free response; see also De Houwer, 
2003). Alternatively, one might speculate that fear-related associations, threat interference and biased 
perception are simply not as closely related to each other as one might expect (see also van Bockstaele 
et al., 2011; Watts & Weems, 2006). Clearly new theory and research on this topic is needed, using more 
reliable tasks, and different samples including children with different fears and anxieties.
Regarding the relation between fear-related associations and fear-related behavior, in the present 
study we found the expected priming effect: The more children avoided the spider during the BAT, the 
more quickly they responded to fear-congruent compared to fear-incongruent trials of the Affective 
Priming Task. This result is in line with adult studies (e.g., Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010) but contrasts 
with the only other study that has found fear-related associations in children with the Affective Priming 
Task, because that study found a reversed priming effect (Klein et al., 2012). These differences might be 
due to low reliability of the priming scores of the APT in this study, which is often found in Reaction Time 
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paradigms in children (see also Brown et al., 2014). Clearly, more research is needed to further explore 
the reliability of the Affective Priming Task in child samples and the interaction between priming effects, 
anxiety, and avoidant behavior in children.
Based on our findings, we recommend using both direct and indirect measures in research settings, 
because they seem to tap into distinct processes which complement each other in the prediction of 
fearful behavior. Moreover, both types of measures have specific advantages and disadvantages. Direct 
measures are usually fast, easy and reliable, but also more sensitive to experimenter demand, social 
desirability, and limited self-awareness (e.g., Bijttebier, Vasey, & Braet, 2003). Indirect measures may 
provide a clearer picture of the underlying cognitive processes, but they are frequently less reliable than 
direct measures because they usually require the measurement of reaction times. This measurement 
may be especially difficult in child samples because young children are generally more easily distracted 
and have relatively short attention spans, which may render the measurement of reaction times less 
reliable (Huijding, Wiers, & Field, 2010). This is one of the reasons for our choice of “card” versions of the 
EST, rather than a version in which latencies of reactions to single stimuli are measured (see also Klein 
et al., 2011).
We further recommend the simultaneous use of different indirect measures, as it seems that fearful 
children differ from other children with respect to several cognitive processes (see also Watts & Weems, 
2006; Weems & Watts, 2005). Here, we found evidence of differences in attention, interpretation and 
associations. This study was limited to fear of spiders, and we recommend the study of other types of 
fears and anxieties as well.
In summation, we found that the current versions of the EST (attention bias), the estimation 
of distance from a spider (interpretation bias), and the APT (fear-related associations) were able to 
independently predict fear-related behavior. The current version of the distance estimation task and 
the APT were even able to independently predict fear-related behavior, over and above the variance 
explained by self-reported fear. Therefore, using these tasks in addition to self-reports allowed an 
improved prediction of fear-related avoidance. These results are theoretically supported by recent dual 
process models (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Beck & Clark, 1997). To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study to find evidence that attention bias, interpretation bias, and fear-related association 
each predict unique variance in spider fear-related behavior. This unique insight can be used to further 
conceptualize theoretical models of childhood anxiety.
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Appendix A. English translations of the Dutch prime words used in the Affective Priming Task.
Version 1 Version 2
negative feelings abuse shame
embarrassed bullying
softy stupid
happiness fantastic happy
nice pleasant
fun cheerful
spiders tarantula spider
cobweb cross spider
spiders spider web
general fear anxious anxious
afraid afraid
horror horror
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Abstract
Cognitive theories of anxiety suggest that fearful children should show a content specific bias 
in interpretation processes, but empirical studies report mixed results. Therefore, we examined 
interpretation bias and its content-specificity in children symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD). In an Auditory Interpretation Task, two words (positive, GAD-relevant, other fears-relevant, or 
neutral) that differed by one phoneme were blended so that one would hear only one of the words. 
Multiple-choice or open-ended responses were collected from 688 nonclinical children between 7 and 
13 years of age. Children with symptoms of GAD showed significantly more negative interpretations of 
ambiguous GAD-related blends in the multiple-choice version (not in the open-ended version) than 
non-fearful children, and not when interpreting other ambiguous blends. This finding supports the 
specificity of GAD as an entity of fear, and the idea that fearful children display cognitive biases specific 
to fear-relevant stimuli.
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It is widely recognized that fearful children interpret the world as more threatening than their non-fearful 
peers. Cognitive theories of fear and anxiety suggest this interpretation bias should be content-specific: 
Fearful children should only negatively interpret materials specifically related to the content of their 
fear (e.g., Williams, Watts, Macleod, & Mathews, 1997; for a schema-based theory of childhood anxiety, 
see Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). So far, there are only a few studies available that report on this postulated 
content-specificity of interpretation processes in childhood anxiety and the results of these studies are 
conflicting. Knowing more about the content-specificity of cognitive biases in children is even more 
important because this could help us to improve the identification of children at risk, thereby improving 
prevention and treatment programs for anxious children. Several authors have indeed expressed the 
need for more research on content-specificity in interpretation biases in childhood anxiety (e.g., Muris, 
2010). Therefore, the main goal of this study was to investigate the content-specificity of interpretation 
processes in a sample of children with varying levels of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms. 
Research in fearful children has provided evidence of biased interpretation processes related to fear 
(for reviews, see Muris, 2010; Muris & Field, 2008). Interpretation bias refers to the phenomenon that 
fearful individuals have the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening. Interpretation 
biases are commonly assessed using direct measures, such as the Children’s Negative Cognitive Error 
Questionnaire (NCEQ; Leitenberg, Leonard, & Carroll-Wilson, 1986). In direct measures, participants 
are directly asked about their feelings and opinions towards different situations. Advantages of these 
measures are that they are fast and easy to administer and that they are reliable in the sense that 
measurement errors are small. However, direct measures are limited by the fact that they rely on insight 
and honesty. As a result, answers may be biased by social desirability, limitations of introspection, or 
experimenter demands (e.g., Bijttebier, Vasey, & Braet, 2003). Therefore, direct measures cannot reliably 
capture cognitive processes that are fast and automatic in nature. In order to capture specific automatic 
cognitive processes more purely, indirect measures can be used. Examples of indirect measures include 
reaction time tasks such as the Affective Priming Task (APT; De Houwer, 2003), the Approach Avoidance 
Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007), and the Emotional Expression Task (e.g., Richards, French, Nash, Hadwin, 
& Donnelly 2007). It should be kept in mind, however, that reaction-based paradigms are usually less 
reliable than direct measures. This might especially be true in child samples because children are 
generally more easily distracted and have relatively short attention spans (Huijding, Wiers, & Field, 2010). 
To provide a compromise between these positions, many studies of interpretation bias make use of 
variations of an “ambiguous scenario” paradigm. In this paradigm, children are asked to finish scenarios 
(short texts) about everyday situations. Commonly, responses to these scenarios involve a multiple-
choice format in that children choose their ending from a number of provided possibilities. Alternatively, 
responses to scenarios can be open-ended in that children are asked to produce their own ending to 
the scenarios. Although these tasks are not able to capture automatic aspects of cognitive processes 
as clearly as reaction time based paradigms, they rely less on insight than questionnaires or interviews. 
So far, most studies using ambiguous scenarios have found that fearful children show a tendency to 
interpret ambiguous situations in a generally negative way (for reviews, see Muris, 2010; Muris & Field, 
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2008). Some of these studies have also explored whether interpretation biases are specific to one or more 
fears. Here, the results are less consistent; while some studies have found evidence for the specificity of 
interpretation biases within fears (e.g., Bögels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003; Klein et al., 2014), at least one study 
did not report a content-specific bias (Muris et al., 2000).
Although the “ambiguous scenario” paradigm and its different variations can be seen as more 
indirect than questionnaires or interviews, this paradigm is still sensitive to experimenter demand and 
social desirability (e.g., Muris, 2010). Therefore, the development of more indirect measures may provide 
a clearer picture of biased interpretation processes that play a role in childhood anxiety. Examples of 
tasks that can be used to explore interpretation biases in children in a more indirect way without using 
reaction times include the homophone task (Hadwin, Frost, French, & Richards, 1997; Taghavi, Moradi, 
Neshat-Doost, Yule & Dalgleish, 2000) and the Auditory Interpretation Task (AIT; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; 
Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002). In the homophone task, words with two different meanings 
are presented auditorily; the word has both a neutral meaning and a threatening meaning (e.g., pain 
versus pane). The child’s task is to select a response (e.g., picture or sentence) that bests represents the 
meaning of the word. Two studies using this paradigm found that fearful children have a tendency to 
select homophones with a threatening meaning significantly more often than control children (Hadwin 
et al., 1997; Taghavi et al., 2000). A disadvantage of the task is that in most languages other than English, 
it is close-to-impossible to find homophones with a neutral and a fearful meaning.
In the AIT, two words that differ by only one phoneme (e.g., “threat” and “thread”) are presented 
acoustically at the same time. Due to the fact that phoneme perception is categorical (e.g., Eimas & 
Corbit, 1973), listeners do not hear a blend of phonemes, but either one phoneme or the other. As 
a result, they will hear only one of the two words, usually without being aware of the fact that there 
might be a second possible interpretation of the perceived sound stream. When using this task to assess 
threat interpretation, one of the words is related to fear, while the other word has a neutral valence. The 
children’s task is to simply listen to the words and report what they hear. The potential advantages of 
the AIT are manifold: The task is probably less sensitive to experimenter demand and social desirability 
than questionnaires and ambiguous scenarios, it is more versatile than the homophone task, and that 
it is possible to choose all kinds of different words. This task might therefore be a better alternative than 
the homophone task or the “ambiguous scenarios” paradigm. 
To the best of our knowledge, only Dearing and Gotlib (2008) have used an auditory interpretation 
paradigm to study interpretation bias in children. In their study, daughters of mothers with a history 
of at least two depressive episodes or daughters of healthy mothers were asked to listen to 50 word 
pairs and choose the word they thought they heard. The test words were either related to depression, 
social situations, or positive situations. The two groups did not differ on current depression symptoms. 
Children of mothers with a history of depression identified significantly more depression-related words 
than the control group, but there was no difference in words related to social situations. The children 
of mothers with a history of depression also chose the positive words significantly less often than the 
control group.
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The present study was based on the study by Dearing and Gotlib (2008), and was designed to 
investigate whether children with varying levels of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms display 
a negative interpretation bias, and whether this bias is specific to GAD-related materials. We created two 
different versions of the AIT; a multiple-choice version in which children were asked to choose from four 
different options, and an open-ended version in which children were asked to simply write down the 
word they heard. We used a multiple-choice version that included four options instead of two options 
to reduce the effect of a possible response bias. 
Based on earlier studies on interpretation bias in fearful children, we hypothesized that children with 
higher levels of GAD symptoms would interpret negative-neutral word blends as negative more often 
than children without symptoms of GAD. In line with the content-specificity hypothesis, we expected 
that children with a high level of GAD would display an interpretation bias for GAD-related stimuli only, 
and not for other fears-neutral word blends or positive-neutral word blends.
Methods
Participants 
An unselected sample of children was recruited from regular elementary schools in the Netherlands. 
After parental consent had been granted, a total of 688 children participated in this study. Due to 
incomplete data sets, the data of 22 participants were excluded. As a result, the data of 666 children 
(338 boys) between 7 and 13 years of age (M = 10.0, SD = 1.2) were used. In total, 370 children (189 boys) 
with a mean age of 10.0 years (SD = 1.2) performed the AIT multiple-choice version, and 295 children 
(149 boys) with a mean age of 9.9 years (SD = 1.3) performed the AIT open-ended version. The Ethical 
Commission of the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 
approved this study. 
Materials
Auditory Interpretation Task (AIT). Children listened to 56 word pairs presented in a random order. These 
words involved blends of two words that differed by only one phoneme, and had different meanings. 
Each blend was the combination of a positive and a neutral word, or a negative and a neutral word. In 
total, the children listened to 35 GAD-related word blends including the three topics most relevant in GAD 
(Muris, Bodden, Hale, Birmaher, & Mayer, 2007), namely, health, school, and social situations (e.g., zorgen-
morgen; worry-tomorrow). We included 11 other-fears-related words to test for the content-specificity 
of the interpretation bias (e.g., spinnen-spitten; spiders-digging). We also included 10 positive words to 
make a distinction between the expected disorder-specific interpretation bias and a general bias for 
emotional information (e.g., lach-zag; smile-saw; verb). Internal consistency of the three AIT categories 
were moderate (GAD-related words: α = .79; other-fears-related words: α = .76; positive words α = .58).
Two different versions were created, a multiple-choice version and an open-ended version. In the 
multiple-choice version, the children were asked to choose their answer out of four possible answers; 
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1) the neutral word, 2) the emotional word or the positive word, 3) a word physically similar to both 
words, or, 4) a word with a related meaning to the neutral word. In the open-ended version, the children 
were asked to write down the word they heard. The children were randomly assigned to either the 
multiple-choice version or the open-ended version of the AIT. 
The second author audio-taped the words in a music studio located at Radboud University Nijmegen. 
The word blends were created with sound-editing software Adobe Audition 3.0. Every word-pair was 
created by averaging the distinct waveforms of each component word. The resulting waveforms were 
combined into a single audio output to achieve each final ambiguous word blend. In a pilot study, 230 
ambiguous stimuli were presented to 33 elementary school children. This resulted in 76 word blends 
in which both words were chosen at least 25 % of the time. In order to reduce the length of the task to 
approximately 15 minutes, only 56 word blends were chosen randomly for the final task.
Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED; Bodden, Bögels, & Muris, 2009). The 
SCARED is a self-report questionnaire that measures responses to 71 statements on a 3-point scale with 
‘almost never’, ‘sometimes’ and ‘often’. The SCARED measures DSM-IV symptoms of anxiety, including 
Separation Anxiety Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Panic Disorder, Social Phobia, Specific 
Phobia, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and School Phobia. Due to time 
constraints, we used only the GAD subscale, consisting of 9 items. Internal consistency as well as test-
retest reliability of the original GAD subscale (α = .80, r = .68) were satisfactory (Muris et al., 2007), and 
the scale validly identified children with the diagnosis GAD (Bodden et al., 2009). In this study, internal 
consistency was also satisfactory (α = .82).
Procedure
The children first performed the AIT as a group in their regular classroom environment. In each class, 
the experimenter read the instructions aloud, depending on the version of the AIT. Next, the children 
listened to the 56 word blends that were presented on a laptop with external sound speakers, so that all 
children were able to hear the words clearly. Directly following the AIT, the children filled out the GAD 
subscale of the SCARED.
Results
Descriptives 
There were no significant group differences in age t(663) = 0.15, p > .1, or gender c2 (1, n = 666) = .03, 
p > .1 on the two versions of the AIT.
Auditory Interpretation Task. We summed up the number of cases in which children wrote down the 
emotional words from each category, separately for the AIT-multiple-choice version and the AIT-open 
ended version. The higher the score, the more often children chose the emotional words (see Table 1, 
for sums per category). 
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Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED). The mean score on the GAD subscale 
of the SCARED was 1.46 (SD = 0.40; min = 1, max = 2.89). To map possible influences of gender on the 
GAD subscale we calculated an ANOVA with the GAD subscale as dependent variable and Gender as 
independent variable. There was an effect of gender, F(1,662) = 37.90, p < .001, because girls (M = 1.55) 
scored significantly higher than boys (M = 1.37). To map possible influences of age, we calculated a 
correlation between age and the GAD subscale, but we did not find a significant correlation (r = -.014, 
p > .1).
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of all categories of the Auditory Interpretation Task (AIT) separately for the 
multiple-choice version and the open-ended version.
AIT Multiple-choice AIT Open-ended
Mean* SD Mean* SD
GAD words (max 35) 19.0 2.7 17.4 3.6
Other fears words (max 11) 7.0 1.3 4.7 1.4
Positive words (max 10) 4.5 1.5 2.7 1.5
Mean number of emotional words (max 56) 30.5 3.3 24.8 4.6
* The higher the score, the more often the emotional words were chosen. 
Correlations
Correlations between the GAD subscale of the SCARED and the AIT responses were computed separately 
for each version of the AIT. All correlations were controlled for gender, because of the effects of gender 
on the GAD subscale of the SCARED. 
AIT multiple-choice version. As expected, the mean score on the GAD-related words of the AIT 
correlated significantly with the SCARED-GAD subscale, r = .16, p = .002. Children with a higher level 
of self-reported level of GAD symptoms significantly more often chose the GAD-related words than 
children with lower levels of GAD symptoms. As expected, the SCARED-GAD subscale did not correlate 
significantly with the other emotional categories of the AIT (other-fears-related words: r = -.05, n.s.; 
positive words: r = .07, n.s.). Thus, children with symptoms of GAD did not choose the other-fears-related 
words of the AIT more often, nor did they have a general tendency to always choose the neutral words. 
This indicates that the negative interpretation of children with a higher GAD score on the self-reports 
was exclusive to GAD-related words.
AIT open-ended version. The mean score on the GAD-related words of the AIT did not correlate 
significantly with the SCARED-GAD subscale (r = -.09, n.s.). Children who reported higher levels of GAD 
did not significantly more often write down the GAD-related words than children with lower levels 
of GAD symptoms. The SCARED-GAD subscale did not correlate with the other-fears-related words, 
(r = -.07, n.s.) or the positive words of the AIT (r = -.04, n.s.). This indicates that children with a high GAD 
score did not more often report hearing the emotional words on GAD-related or other-fears-related 
words of the AIT, nor did they have a general tendency to always write down neutral words. 
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether children with higher levels of Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD) symptoms display an interpretation bias for fear-related words, using a novel sound word-
blend task, and whether this bias is specific to GAD-related materials. The results suggest that children 
with a higher level of GAD symptoms who performed the multiple-choice version of the AIT showed 
an interpretation bias for GAD-related stimuli only. This indicates that children with GAD symptoms 
display an interpretation bias for content-specific materials only, and not for other ambiguous materials. 
Moreover, this result was not found with the open-ended version, suggesting that the results depend 
on the research method that is used to assess interpretation bias in the AIT. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide some support for the content-
specificity of the interpretation bias in children with varying levels of GAD symptoms. As the validity 
and reliability of the GAD diagnosis in children is often questioned (e.g., Andrews et al., 2010), it is even 
more remarkable that we have found some evidence for a specific interpretation bias in children with 
varying levels of GAD symptoms. This study therefore supports the specificity of GAD as an entity of 
fear. Our results also confirm those reported by Dearing and Gotlib (2008), who found that children 
of mothers with a history of depression “heard” significantly more depression-related words than the 
control group, but there were no difference in words related to social situations. They concluded that 
the multiple-choice version of the AIT can be used to measure interpretation biases in children, and our 
results corroborate this conclusion. These findings support the use of the multiple-choice version of the 
AIT, in both research and clinical settings. In clinical settings, for example, the AIT might be used after 
cognitive therapy for GAD, to assess changes in interpretation bias.
Interestingly, self-reported fear did not correlate significantly with the open-ended version of the 
AIT. Also, the significant correlation between the GAD items in the multiple-choice version of the AIT 
and self-reported fear was rather modest. An explanation of the weak link between interpretation bias 
and self-reported fear is that the children in this sample varied in their level of GAD, but did not display 
an anxiety disorder. The anxiety-related schemata of the fearful children studied here might not be as 
chronically active as in children with an anxiety disorder. Therefore, interpretation biases might be less 
visible in fearful children than in clinically anxious children. There are indeed other studies that also 
report moderate effects between interpretation and self-reports in nonclinical children (e.g., Klein et al., 
2014; Muris et al., 2000; Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, & Margraf, 2002). Schneider and colleagues (2002) 
for instance, only found biases in fearful children after these children were primed with a video about 
their mothers’ anxiety. This might also be a reason for the difference between the multiple-choice version 
and the open-ended version. In the open-ended versions, children were asked to simply write down the 
word they heard, whereas in the multiple-choice version, children were prompted with four possible 
endings. This might be seen as some sort of priming, because children read anxiety related words on 
their answering sheet which could have activated their anxiety network. However, it should be noted 
that these prompts could also have resulted in a response bias, instead of a priming procedure. Future 
research in children varying in their level of fear could therefore focus on (other) priming techniques 
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to activate anxiety-related schemata. Moreover, studying children with an anxiety disorder might also 
clarify the role of close-ended versus open-ended measures of interpretation biases in GAD. 
Another, related explanation for the lack of bias measured with the open-ended AIT version 
concerns the initial, evolutionary-based bias for threat that all humans have because it is important 
for survival (e.g., Möller, Majdandzic, de Vente & Bögels, 2013). Most likely, healthy children will be 
better at modifying such an initial bias for threat than children with GAD. Perhaps the multiple-choice 
version measures the correction of the initial bias, as one has to choose between different possibilities, 
whereas the open-ended version is more likely to measure the first initial bias for threat. Future studies 
should shed more light on automatic and initial versus controlled and modified cognitive processes in 
anxiety. This should be done by setting up paradigms to measure initial versus subsequent, corrected or 
weighted interpretations of ambiguous stimuli. 
Another possible explanation for the weak link between interpretation bias and anxiety is the 
indirect method we have used. The AIT is a more indirect measure than self-reports of fear, and both 
measures tap into different aspects of biased cognitions. While self-reports (direct measure) tap into 
more controlled processes related to anxiety, the indirect measure taps into more automatic processes 
(e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004). As a result, one would not expect these two measures to correlate highly 
with one another. A similar result was reported by Klein, Rinck and Becker (2011), who did not find 
significant correlations between direct and indirect measures of spider fear at all. In their study, however, 
both direct and indirect measures correlated significantly with a behavioral measure of spider approach. 
In future studies, the addition of a behavioral measure could test the usability of the AIT.
In conclusion, we found that the multiple-choice version of the Auditory Interpretation Task can be 
a useful instrument for assessing biased interpretation processes in children with varying levels of GAD 
symptoms. Furthermore, we also found some evidence for this bias to be content-specific. Advantages 
of the AIT include that it measures interpretation bias more indirectly than questionnaires and the 
“ambiguous scenario” paradigm, and it does not rely on reaction times. Moreover, the AIT is not limited 
to children; it is also a promising task for studies of adult interpretation biases.
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Content-Specific Interpretation Biases 
in Clinically Anxious Children 
Based on: Klein, A. M., Rapee, R. M., Hudson, J. F., Morris, T. M., Schneider, S. C., Schniering, C. A., Becker, 
E. S., & Rinck, M. (2015). Content-specific interpretation biases in clinically anxious children. Invited to revise 
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Abstract
Cognitive theories of anxiety suggest that anxious children should interpret negatively only materials 
specifically related to the content of their anxiety. So far, there are few studies available that report on 
this postulated content-specificity of interpretation processes in childhood anxiety, with mixed results. 
Therefore, we examined interpretation bias and its content-specificity in a group of clinically anxious 
children, using an “ambiguous scenarios” paradigm. Children were asked to finish scenarios that were 
related to either social threat, general threat, or separation threat. In total, 105 clinically anxious children, 
21 control children and their mothers were assessed with the ADIS-C/P and the Spence Children’s 
Anxiety Scale. The clinically anxious children provided more negative endings to the scenarios than 
the control children. Within the clinically anxious group, specific interpretation biases were found: 
Interpretation of scenarios related to social threat, general threat, and separation threat were only 
predicted by the children’s self-reported levels of social phobia, generalized anxiety, and separation 
anxiety, respectively. These findings support the content-specificity hypothesis as clinically anxious 
children display interpretation biases that are specific to fear-relevant stimuli.
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It is widely recognized that children with an anxiety disorder interpret the world as more threatening 
than their non-anxious peers. Cognitive theories of fear and anxiety emphasize the importance of 
cognitive processes in the onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985; for a review, see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). According to these theories, anxious adults and 
children have anxiety-related schemata that direct processing resources towards threat-relevant 
information, resulting in cognitive biases (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; for a schema-
based theory of childhood anxiety, see Kendall, 1985; Kendall & Ronan, 1990). This leads to an attention 
bias at an early stage of information processing. At later stages of information processing, the ‘anxiety 
schema’ leads to an interpretation bias and a memory bias (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Muris & Field, 2008). 
These cognitive biases are believed to be content-specific; only stimuli that are associated with threat 
and fear are processed preferentially. Anxious individuals should therefore only display biased cognitions 
for stimuli related to their own anxiety (e.g., Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1985). For instance, children who 
are socially anxious should only interpret stimuli that are related to social situations negatively, but not 
other ambiguous stimuli, such as stimuli related to separation anxiety. So far, there are only a few studies 
available that report on this postulated content-specificity of interpretation processes in childhood 
anxiety, and the results of these studies are conflicting. This is infelicitous because knowing more about 
the content-specificity of cognitive biases in children has important implications for the identification, 
prevention and treatment of anxiety in children. Several authors have indeed expressed the need for 
more research on content-specificity in interpretation biases in childhood anxiety (e.g., Muris, 2010). 
Therefore, the main goal of this study was to investigate the content-specificity of interpretation biases 
in a sample of clinically anxious children. 
Research with anxious children has provided evidence of interpretation biases related to fear and 
threat (for reviews, see Muris, 2010; Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). Interpretation bias refers 
to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as 
threatening. Most studies of interpretation bias make use of variations of an “ambiguous scenario” 
paradigm. In this paradigm, children are asked to finish scenarios (short texts) about everyday situations. 
So far, most studies using ambiguous scenarios have found that anxious children show a tendency to 
interpret ambiguous situations in a generally negative way (e.g., Bögels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003; Creswell, 
Schniering, & Rapee, 2005; Klein et al., 2014; Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Canterbury, 
1997; Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Muris et al., 2000; Waters, Craske, Bergman, & Treanor, 2008). Some of these 
studies have also explored whether interpretation biases are specific to anxiety, or whether children 
with other disorders, for instance externalizing disorders, also show a negative interpretation bias for 
anxiety-related stimuli. Here, the results are less consistent; while some studies have found evidence 
for the specificity of interpretation biases in anxiety (Bögels & Zigterman, 2000; Dalgleish et al., 1997; 
Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Schniering & Rapee, 2004), a study by Reid, Salmon and Lovibond (2006) found 
an interpretation bias across a broad range of symptoms in youths. There are also a few studies that have 
explored the specificity of interpretation biases within anxiety disorders. Muris and colleagues (2000) 
did not find content-specific interpretations in children varying in their levels of fear. Also, in a study 
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with children with separation anxiety disorder versus social phobia, there was no evidence for content-
specific interpretation biases (In-Albon, Dubi, Rapee, & Schneider, 2009). However, a few other studies 
have reported evidence for the content-specificity hypothesis across a range of different fears in children 
(Bögels et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2014, 2015). 
In conclusion, the studies reported so far support the existence of interpretation biases in childhood 
anxiety, but the evidence for content-specificity of interpretation biases within childhood anxiety is 
very mixed. Furthermore, content-specificity within anxiety disorders has only been found in children 
varying in their levels of fear, but not in clinically anxious children. Therefore the main focus of this study 
was to explore interpretation bias using multiple-choice ambiguous scenarios in a group of clinically 
anxious children, and to explore the content-specificity of the interpretation bias within different 
anxiety disorders. Based on earlier studies on interpretation bias in anxious children, we hypothesized 
that clinically anxious children would make more negative interpretations than control children. In line 
with the content-specificity hypothesis, we expected that clinically anxious children would display an 
interpretation bias only for scenarios related to their anxiety disorder, and not for other anxiety-related 
materials.
Methods
Participants 
Participants in this study were 116 children (65 girls) between 6 and 12 years of age (M = 9.2, 
SD = 1.7). These children were divided into two groups: with 105 children who met criteria for a primary 
anxiety disorder according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria in the clinical group, and 21 children who did not meet 
any anxiety disorder in the control group. The data of two clinically anxious children were excluded from 
the dataset, due to technical problems with the interpretation task. As a result, the data of 103 clinically 
anxious children (49 girls; M = 9.3, SD = 1.7) and 21 control children (16 girls; M = 9.0, SD = 1.4) were used 
(see Table 1 for demographic characteristics of both groups). Anxiety disorders were assessed using the 
“Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, Child and Parent Versions” (ADIS-IV-C/P; Silverman 
& Albano, 1996). In the clinically anxious group, 93 children (90.3 %) fulfilled criteria for generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD), 71 children (68.9 %) fulfilled criteria for social phobia (SP), and 45 children 
(43.7 %) fulfilled criteria for separation anxiety disorder (SAD). Most children had more than one disorder 
(M = 4.1, SD = 1.9, min = 1 max = 10). Exclusion criteria were mental retardation and psychoses. The 
Ethics Review Committee of Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, approved this study.
Materials
Interpretation Task. The interpretation task consisted of 45 multiple-choice scenarios, each scenario 
contained 4 short sentences. All scenarios were ambiguous, such that they could be interpreted in a 
positive, neutral or negative way. The set of 45 scenarios was adapted and translated into English from 
Content-specific interpretation biases in clinically anxious children 
159
10
existing materials (Bögels et al., 2003; Creswell et al., 2005; Muris et al., 2000; Klein et al., 2014; Schneider, 
Unnewehr, Florin, & Margraf, 2002) or created by the authors. These 45 scenarios were then used to 
create three sets of 15 scenarios each. The 15 scenarios of each set were divided into four categories; 
5 social threat scenarios, 5 general threat scenarios, 3 separation threat scenarios and 2 scenarios that 
were placed into the ‘other anxiety’ category (e.g., fear of heights or animals). The three sets were created 
to make sure that the specificity of the interpretation bias did not rely on the specific scenarios that 
were chosen. Therefore, the children were randomly assigned to the three sets. For each scenario, four 
possible endings were created; a clearly positive ending, a slightly positive ending, a slightly negative 
ending, and a clearly negative ending (see Table 2 for sample scenarios and possible endings). 
The children were asked to read aloud the 15 scenarios that were presented on a computer screen 
and to imagine themselves as the central character of each scenario. For each scenario, they were asked 
to choose the ending that they thought would best fit the scenario. The scenarios were presented in a 
pseudo-randomized order, with the restriction that no more than two scenarios of the same category 
followed each other. 
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV-C/P; Silverman & Albano, 1996). All children and 
parents were interviewed separately using the ADIS-IV-C/P. Diagnoses and severity ratings (on a scale of 
0-8) were assigned by graduate students in clinical psychology based on a composite parent and child 
report. The “or” rule was used, that is, a diagnosis was assigned when it was reported by either parent or 
child. Qualified clinical psychologists supervised the students.
Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale, Child and Parent Versions (SCAS-C and SCAS-P; Spence, 1998). The SCAS 
was used to assess child- and mother-reported anxiety symptoms in their children. The SCAS is a self-
report questionnaire that measures responses to 38 statements on a 4-point scale. A total score is 
computed from the 38 items (from 0 to 114). Internal consistency and retest reliability are good (Nauta, 
Scholing, Rapee, Abbott, Spence, & Waters, 2004; Spence, 1998). The measure is able to distinguish 
clinically anxious from non-anxious children (Nauta et al., 2004), and has adequate convergent and 
discriminant validity (Spence, 1998). In this study, internal consistencies were also good (child report α 
= .93; mother report α = .92).
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the clinically anxious group and the control group.
Clinically anxious group Control group
N 103 (49 girls) 21 (16 girls)
Two parent family 96.4 % 90.5 %
English as main language 96.4 % 100  %
Education of mother ≥ postgraduate 26.5 % 47.6 % 
Family income ≥ AUS$ 83.200 (annually) 71.1 % 85.0 %
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Table 2. Sample scenarios with the four possible endings for each category of the interpretation task.
General threat scenario
“To the beach”
In a few days you will be going on 
holidays. You are going to the beach with 
your family. There is still a lot to be done. 
You are walking restlessly through the 
house...
negative: 
You are worried about what can go wrong, 'what if we forget something?'
slightly negative: 
You hope it is not going to rain.
slightly positive: 
You look forward to it, but cannot find your favorite toy.
positive: 
You are so excited to go on holidays, that you cannot wait to go.
Social threat scenario
“Birthday” 
Today it is your grandmother's birthday. 
You give your grandmother a present. 
Everybody is watching when grandma 
opens the present. Then all of a sudden 
someone laughs really loud...
negative: 
Everybody thinks the present is stupid.
slightly negative: 
You hope it is not your present they are laughing about.
slightly positive: 
Your uncle is making jokes with your cousin.
positive: 
You have a funny present and everyone likes it.
Separation threat scenario
“Neighbors”  
Your parents are away for the evening. 
You are eating at your neighbors’.
While you are eating, you get a strange 
feeling in your stomach...
negative: 
You want to call your parents right away to find out whether they are 
okay.
slightly negative: 
You hope that your parents will get home safely.
slightly positive: 
You probably ate too fast, you drink some water.
positive: 
You are excited, because you will watch your favorite TV show later on.
Procedure
Parents of anxious children contacted the Emotional Health Clinic seeking help for their child and 
were briefly screened over the telephone. Those whose children appeared to have anxiety-related 
difficulties were invited to the clinic for a detailed assessment. Control parents contacted a research 
assistant in response to advertisements placed on noticeboards, newspapers, and websites. Children 
and their parents completed several self-report measures presented electronically, including the SCAS 
at home. Next, the children and their parents were assessed with the ADIS-C/P. Children who met 
criteria for inclusion were asked to participate in the study. All children performed the interpretation task 
individually in a separate room at the EHC, together with their parent and a trained research assistant. 
The control children and their parents received 40 Australian dollars for participation in the study, the 
clinically anxious children received a keychain and proceeded to a treatment program.
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Results
Descriptives
Demographics and clinical characteristics of the clinically anxious group and the control group are 
presented in Table 1 There was no significant group difference in age (p  > .1), however there were 
relatively more girls in the control group than in the clinically anxious group (p = .017). Furthermore, 
there were no significant differences in family income, education level of mother, the main language 
spoken at home, and the type of family setting the children lived in (all p’s  > .1). As expected, clinically 
anxious children reported significantly more fear (M = 31.9, SD = 16.6) on the Spence Children’s Anxiety 
Scale (SCAS) than control children (M = 14.1, SD = 10.5), F(1,122) = 22.36,  p < .001, η2  = .16. Similarly, 
mothers of clinically anxious children reported significantly more fear in their children (M = 34.3, 
SD = 14.2) than mothers of control children (M = 7.9, SD = 4.1), F(1,120) = 67.75, p < .001, η2  = .36.
Clinically anxious children versus control children on interpretation
The number of slightly negative and clearly negative endings were combined and counted across the 
15 scenarios, yielding a total “negative score” with a maximum of 15. The higher the score, the more 
often children chose negative endings. Gender, age, and scenario set were initially included in the 
computed analyses, but these variables failed to yield any significant main effect or interaction effects, 
so they were excluded from later analyses. The mean “negative score” on the interpretation task was 
5.55 (SD = 2.96), for the clinically anxious children, which was significantly higher, F(1,118) = 7.00, 
p = .009, η2 = .06, than the control children’s mean score of 3.71 (SD = 2.51): Clinically anxious children 
chose the negative endings more often than control children.
Correlations
As expected, the correlation between the mothers’ reports on the SCAS-p and children’s self-reports 
on the SCAS was significant r = .59 (p < .001). Moreover, the ‘negative score’ of the interpretation task 
correlated significantly with both the SCAS, r = .44 (p < .001), and the SCAS-p, r = .23 (p = .01): Children 
who reported more fear on the self-report or whose mothers reported that they were more fearful, 
chose negative interpretations more often. 
Next, we calculated three separate, disorder-specific negative scores by counting the number of 
times children chose the ‘slightly negative’ endings and the ‘clearly negative’ endings separately for the 
general threat scenarios, the social threat scenarios, and the separation threat scenarios. We calculated 
correlations between these three scores and the GAD-subscale, the SP-subscale and the SAD-subscale 
of the SCAS, separately for the SCAS and the SCAS-p. We found significant correlations between each 
category of the interpretation task and the corresponding subscales of the SCAS and SCAS-p. This 
indicates that children who, for instance, had a negative interpretation bias on the general threat 
scenarios of the interpretation task also reported more fear on the GAD subscale of the SCAS. Table 
3 illustrates that these disorder-specific correlations were the highest ones found between negativity 
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scores and SCAS subscales. In addition, some of the categories of the interpretation task correlated more 
weakly, but significantly with other subscales of the SCAS child-version and the SCAS mother-version. 
This indicates that there is some overlap between the different categories of the interpretation task and 
the non-corresponding subscales of the SCAS child-version and the SCAS mother-version (see Table 3 
for all correlations).
Table 3. Correlations for all interpretation task categories x SCAS subcategories, separately for the SCAS and the 
SCAS-p.
Interpretation task SCAS
SCAS GAD SCAS SP SCAS SAD
GAD-score .42** .24* .28*
SP-score .28* .39** .12
SAD-score .32** .23* .35**
SCAS-p GAD SCAS-p SP SCAS-p SAD
GAD-score .25* .12 .24*
SP-score .20* .31* .12
SAD-score .17 .04 .25*
* p < .05, ** p < .001.
Specificity of the interpretation bias for the clinically anxious children
Regression Analysis
In order to predict the specificity of the interpretation bias, we calculated 2 (SCAS child-report/SCAS 
mother-report) x 3 (general threat scenarios / social threat scenarios/ separation threat scenarios) 
regression analyses. We included the GAD-subscale scores, SP-subscale scores, and SAD-subscale scores 
from the SCAS as predictors in the first three analyses, and the GAD-subscale scores, SP-subscale scores, 
and SAD-subscale scores from the SCAS-p in the last three analyses.
SCAS self-report. In the first analysis, the negative score of the general threat scenarios, served as 
the dependent variable. The regression model was significant, F(3,97) = 5.51, p = .002, and explained 
14.6 % of the variance in general threat interpretation scores. The GAD-subscale was the only significant 
predictor in the model (p = .007, B = .35), indicating that only the GAD-subscale of the SCAS was helpful 
to predict general threat interpretation scores of the interpretation task.
Next, the negative score of the social threat scenarios served as the dependent variable. The 
regression model was significant again, F(3,97) = 5.95, p = .001, and it explained 15.5 % of the variance 
in social threat interpretation scores. The SP-subscale score was the only significant predictor in the 
model (p = .002, B = .36). Thus, only the SP-subscale of the SCAS was helpful to predict the social threat 
interpretation scores of the interpretation task.
Finally, in the last analysis, the negative score of the separation threat scenarios served as the 
dependent variable. The regression model was significant again, F(3,97) = 5.07, p = .003, and it explained 
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13.5 % of the variance in separation threat interpretation scores. The SAD-subscale score was the only 
significant predictor in the model (p = .013, B = .30), suggesting that only the SAD-subscale of the SCAS 
was helpful to predict the separation threat interpretation scores of the interpretation task.
SCAS-p mother-report. In the first analysis, the negative score of the general threat scenarios, served 
as the dependent variable. The regression model was not significant, F(3,96) = 0.96, p > .1; none of the 
predictors explained significant variance in general threat interpretation scores. 
Next, in the social threat scenarios model, the negative score of the social threat scenarios served as 
the dependent variable. The regression model was significant, F(3,96) = 4.27, p = .007, and it explained 
9.7 % of the variance in social threat interpretation scores. The SP-subscale score was the only significant 
predictor in the model (p = .001, B = .36). 
Finally, in the last analysis, the negative score of the separation threat scenarios served as the 
dependent variable. The regression model was not significant, F(3,96) = 1.55, p > .1; none of the predictors 
explained significant variance in separation threat interpretation scores. Thus, only the SP-subscale of 
the SCAS-p was helpful to predict the social threat interpretation scores of the interpretation task.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate whether clinically anxious children display an interpretation bias 
and whether this bias is specific to content related to the child’s anxiety disorder. The results showed 
that clinically anxious children did indeed choose the negative endings of ambiguous scenarios more 
often than control children. Within the clinically anxious group, specific interpretation biases were found: 
Interpretation of scenarios related to social threat, general threat, and separation threat was predicted 
only by the children’s self-reported level of social phobia, generalized anxiety, and separation anxiety, 
respectively. As the validity and reliability of anxiety diagnoses in children is often questioned (e.g., 
Andrews et al. 2010), it is even more remarkable that we found a specific interpretation bias in clinically 
anxious children. This study supports the specificity of social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, and 
separation anxiety disorder as an entity of fear. Moreover, these findings support the importance of 
interpretation biases in anxiety (e.g., Muris, 2010) and the existence of content-specificity, namely that 
anxious children display interpretation biases that are specific to fear-relevant stimuli (Beck et al., 1985). 
These results are consistent with a broader body of research that has shown support for cognitive-
specificity models in children and adolescents when examining automatic thoughts (e.g., Epkins, 2000; 
Jolly & Dykman, 1994; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). In addition, there is a notable similarity between the 
results of the present study and those demonstrating specificity in interpretation biases in anxious 
adults (e.g., Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993). Taken together, the data indicate likely 
continuity in cognitive-specificity across the course of development, in line with cognitive theories of 
psychopathology. It may be that patterns of cognitive functioning associated with emotional states are 
established at a relatively early age, and tend to continue into adolescence, and adulthood. 
Although the different categories of the interpretation task correlated significantly with the 
corresponding subscales of the child and mother self-report, the categories of the interpretation task 
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also correlated significantly with some of the other subscales of the self-report. This could be due to the 
fact that the different anxiety disorders share a common concern about threat in general. There is some 
degree of specificity, but there is also a considerable degree of commonality. For instance, the original 
SCAS data reported by Spence (1998) show that the subscales of the SCAS all load onto a common, 
higher-order factor. As a result, the correlations between the specific categories of the interpretation task 
and the subscales of the SCAS overlapped. 
While we have found that clinically anxious children chose the negative endings of the scenarios 
more often than control children, it should be noted that overall, both groups chose the positive answers 
more often than the negative answers. Even the mean score of 5.55 for the clinically anxious children is 
approximately only a third of the maximum negative score that could be obtained. It might be the case 
that clinically anxious children do not display very negative interpretations in all ambiguous situations. 
There are indeed several other studies that found similar results (e.g., Creswell et al., 2005; Muris et al., 
2000). Another explanation might be that the interpretation task used in this study can be seen as a sort 
of self-report (see also Muris, 2010). Although this task is relatively fast, easy and reliable, it might also be 
more sensitive to experimenter demand, social desirability, and limited self-awareness (e.g., Bijttebier, 
Vasey, & Braet, 2003). Using more indirect measures to study interpretation bias may provide additional 
evidence towards a clearer picture of the underlying cognitive processes (In-Albon, Klein, Rinck, Becker, 
& Schneider, 2008).
Based on our findings, we recommend studying the specificity of biases in children, as it seems that 
anxious children do indeed show content-specific interpretation biases related to their specific fears. 
Future research of childhood anxiety should therefore assess the specificity of other potential biases, for 
instance in attention and memory processes. It would be worthwhile for future studies to also address 
the content-specificity of biases for predicting treatment success and relapse probability in anxious 
children. This study was limited to clinically anxious children with GAD, SP and SAD with a high co-
morbidity, therefore we recommend studying children with one diagnosis only, as well as children with 
other types of fears and phobias.
In conclusion, we found that the interpretation task is able to differentiate between clinically anxious 
children and non-anxious children and that it is a useful instrument for assessing content-specific 
interpretation biases. Thus, specific fear-related interpretations can already be present at a young age. 
The present results support cognitive models in youth that argue for specificity of cognitive content 
associated with different disorders (Beck, 1976) and are consistent with current classification systems for 
childhood mental disorders (e.g., DSM-IV, APA, 1994). Clinically, this unique insight into the presence of 
interpretation biases in anxiety disorders might be used to improve treatments for anxious children by 
targeting specific cognitive biases related to individual disorders.
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Interpretation Modification 
Training Reduces Social Anxiety
 in Clinically Anxious Children 
Klein, A. M., Rapee, R. M., Hudson, J. L., Schniering, C. A., Wuthrich, V. M., Kangas, M., Lyneham, H. J., Souren, 
P. M., & Rinck, M. (2015). Interpretation modification training reduces interpretation bias and anxiety in 
clinically anxious children. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 75, 78-84.
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Abstract
The present study was designed to examine the effects of training in positive interpretations in clinically 
anxious children. A total of 87 children between 7 and 12 years of age were randomly assigned to either 
a positive cognitive bias modification training for interpretation (CMB-I) or a neutral training. Training 
included 15 sessions in a two-week period. Children with an interpretation bias prior to training in 
the positive training group showed a significant reduction in interpretation bias on the social threat 
scenarios after training, but not children in the neutral training group. No effects on interpretation biases 
were found for the general threat scenarios or the non-threat scenarios. Furthermore, children in the 
positive training did not self-report lower anxiety than children in the neutral training group. However, 
mothers and fathers reported a significant reduction in social anxiety in their children after positive 
training, but not after neutral training. This study demonstrated that clinically anxious children with a 
prior interpretation bias can be trained away from negative social interpretation biases and there is some 
evidence that this corresponds to reductions in social anxiety. This study also highlights the importance 
of using specific training stimuli.
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Internalizing disorders such as anxiety are estimated to occur in 5-10% of school-aged children, making 
them the most prevalent type of psychological disorders experienced by this population (Kashani & 
Orvaschel, 1990; Rapee, Schniering, & Hudson, 2009). Anxiety disorders in children are associated with 
significant life interference and increased risk of psychosocial implications, including poor physical 
health, academic difficulties, high levels of depression, substance use, poor social and interpersonal 
adjustment, and impaired self-competence (Strauss, Frame, & Forehand, 1987). Childhood anxiety 
disorders do not necessarily remit with age and if left untreated, can persist into adolescence and 
adulthood. They are associated with increased risk of later depression and substance abuse (Keller et al., 
1992). Although treatments for child anxiety have shown good efficacy, they have clear limitations. At 
least 40% of children continue to have a diagnosis following treatment (James, James, Cowdery, Solar, 
& Choke, 2013). Attempts to increase effects through minor variations such as group versus individual 
delivery, inclusion of parents, or targeting of parent anxiety have failed to produce marked differences in 
outcome (Rapee et al., 2009). Therefore, it is important to find theoretical and practical innovations that 
might take these treatments into new directions. 
According to cognitive theories of anxiety, anxious children and adults have anxiety-related schemata 
that direct processing resources towards threat-relevant information, resulting in cognitive biases (e.g., 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; for a schema-based theory of childhood anxiety, see Kendall, 
1985; Kendall & Ronan, 1990). This leads to an attention bias at an early stage of information processing. 
At later stages of information processing, the ‘anxiety schema’ leads to interpretation and eventually 
memory biases (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Muris & Field, 2008). These cognitive biases are believed to be 
content-specific; only stimuli that are associated with threat and fear are processed preferentially (e.g., 
Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). Recently, researchers have begun 
to test the causal status of these biases by manipulating attention and interpretive biases and showing 
resultant changes in adult anxiety (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, Holker, 2002; Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 2000). Based on these encouraging initial results, the experimental paradigms have been 
adapted successfully to reduce existing cognitive biases in highly anxious adolescents and adults as well 
as clinical populations with anxiety disorders (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Amir, Taylor, & Donohue, 2011; Fu, Du, 
Au, & Lau, 2013; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2009; See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009; Sportel, de Hullu, de 
Jong, & Nauta, 2013; Teachman & Addison, 2008). There are now several published studies that underline 
the efficacy of different cognitive bias modification (CBM) training formats with varying numbers of 
training sessions in samples with different characteristics (for reviews, see Hertel & Mathews, 2011; 
Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 2014). Amir and colleagues (2011), for instance, have found that ethnicity as 
well as the level of attention bias prior to CBM attention training predicted clinical treatment response. 
In sum, studies using CBM procedures have begun to demonstrate effects that might have promising 
implications for treatment. If we can affect the immediate cause of anxious emotion, then we may 
have a unique direction for treatment that addresses a mechanism, which is not targeted by traditional 
treatment strategies. 
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Although CBM for interpretations (CBM-I) has now been well demonstrated to reduce negative 
interpretations in adults (Hertel & Andrews, 2011; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), and there is also some 
evidence in adolescents (e.g., Chan, Lau, & Reynolds, 2014; Fu et al., 2013; Lau, Belli, & Chopra, 2012; 
Lau, Molyneaux, Telman, & Belli, 2011; Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, & Lau, 2011; Telman, Holmes, & Lau, 
2013; Salemink & Wiers, 2011; Sportel et al., 2013), there are only a few published studies that evaluated 
this technique with pre-adolescent children (Lester, Field, & Muris, 2011a, 2011b; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, 
& Hameetman, 2008; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, & Vreden, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, 
& Prantzalou, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Blackwell, Moberly, & Karahaliou, 2012). In two studies, Muris and 
colleagues (2008, 2009) allocated non-clinical children aged around 11 years to receive training in either 
positive or negative interpretations. They developed the “space odyssey paradigm” in which children 
were asked to imagine themselves and their parents to be astronauts who travel through space. During 
the task, children faced 30 ambiguous scenarios with two possible endings – a positive or a negative 
conclusion. Children had to choose an appropriate ending as rapidly as possible and were reinforced 
for a correct response. Half of the children were reinforced for providing negative endings and half for 
positive endings. Both studies found that children in the negative training group chose the negative 
endings on a later ambiguous vignettes paradigm more often than children in the positive training 
group. Muris and colleagues (2009) also found that negatively trained children showed an increase in 
avoidance behavior. They noted, however, that the effect sizes were fairly small, and that the hypothetical 
“space world” might not have generalized to daily life. 
Lester and colleagues (2011a, 2011b) adapted the space odyssey paradigm to real life situations 
to study the effect of CBM-I training on interpretation bias, anxiety symptoms, behavioral avoidance, 
and physiological arousal. Children were assigned to receive training in either positive or negative 
interpretations about novel animals or social situations. For younger children (aged less than 11 years), 
the expected differences were found on bias change scores only in response to novel animals (Lester 
et al., 2011a, 2011b). For older children, expected differences were found on interpretations relevant 
to both novel animals and social situations (Lester et al., 2011a). Importantly, children in the negative 
group took significantly longer to approach this novel animal than children in the positive group (Lester 
et al., 2011b). However, this effect was not replicated in another study by Lester and colleagues (2011a), 
and was not found for avoidance of social situations (Lester et al., 2011a). Despite the demonstrated 
differences in interpretations and behavior, no significant differences between groups were shown in 
either study in anxiety or heart rate. Hence, these studies point to the potential to modify interpretation 
biases in children, but it does not appear that such modifications have a subsequent influence on 
anxiety. 
In contrast to these results, one study has indicated that it may be possible to alter both interpretation 
biases and anxiety in children with symptoms of social anxiety (Vassilopoulos et al., 2009). In this study, 
half the children received training intended to induce positive interpretation biases while the other 
half did not receive any training. During three training sessions, children faced 15 ambiguous scenarios 
per session with two possible endings, a positive and a negative ending. Children had to choose an 
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appropriate ending and were reinforced for choosing the positive option. Before training and three 
days after training, the children completed anxiety questionnaires, performed an “ambiguous stories” 
paradigm with 8 stories, and took part in an anticipation test in which they were asked to indicate 
how they would feel in an upcoming social situation. Children in the positive training group showed 
reduced negative interpretations, reported less anxiety, and anticipated lower levels of anxiety in an 
upcoming social situation than control children. Unfortunately, the lack of an appropriate control group 
that received some sort of control training makes it difficult to attribute these effects to the CBM-I.
In summation, the few studies reported so far suggest that children can be trained to alter 
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios in much the same way as adults. Whether these alterations have 
subsequent effects on anxiety is much less clear. Several limitations in the research temper conclusions 
that can be drawn. Most importantly, none of the studies in pre-adolescent children used a clinically 
anxious population. Given that non-clinical children have lower levels of anxiety, it is not surprising that 
training in positive interpretations has limited effect. Nonetheless, training in negative interpretations 
should increase anxiety, and this has not yet been demonstrated. In addition, clinically anxious children 
may have more rigid or extreme interpretations, which may be harder to modify. Hence, the effects 
of CBM-I need to be replicated in clinical samples, if clinical relevance is to be demonstrated. More 
specific methodological limitations can be found among the existing research. Some studies involve 
training (and testing) related to a hypothetical “other world”, while other work utilized novel (unknown) 
animals. Interpretations of hypothetical or unknown stimuli may be more malleable than interpretations 
of stimuli of which children have existing knowledge. Hence, these factors limit generalization to daily 
life and might produce stronger effects than would be found with previously formed interpretations. 
Furthermore, all studies used only children’s self-report as an indication of anxiety. Finally, in the only 
study that demonstrated reductions in both interpretation bias and anxiety, there was no “control 
training” condition, limiting the extent to which the effects could be attributed to positive training. 
Therefore, the aim of the current study was to further examine the effects of training in positive 
interpretations among pre-adolescent children while addressing some of the earlier limitations. First, 
we used a sample of clinically anxious children who were seeking treatment for their anxiety disorder. 
Second, training and testing utilized hypothetical scenarios that described regular daily activities that 
the children would have previously encountered and would continue to encounter. Third, we included 
a structured clinical interview administered with the child, mother and father, and also included mother 
and father reported anxiety of their child. Fourth, we included a neutral-training control condition. 
Based on earlier CBM-I studies in anxious children, we hypothesized that children in the positive training 
group would show significant reduction in interpretation biases and self-reported anxiety after training, 
which we did not expect for children in the neutral group. Furthermore, we also expected that parents 
of children in the positive group would report significantly less anxiety in their children if their child 
completed the positive training, which we did not expect for children in the neutral training.
Chapter 11
174
Methods
Participants 
Children were included in the study if they had a primary (most interfering) anxiety disorder, and were 
aged 7-12 years. Children were excluded from participation if they exhibited life-threatening suicidal 
ideation, were in physically or sexually abusive environments, were under current psychological 
treatment elsewhere, were significantly intellectually impaired, or if they had unmanaged psychotic 
symptoms. Children who were actively at risk or unsuitable for any other reason, were referred to an 
appropriate health professional for immediate treatment. Eighty-seven children between 7 and 12 years 
of age (43 girls; age M = 9.2, SD = 1.5) met criteria for any primary anxiety disorder according to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder 4th edition criteria (DSM-IV, APA, 2000). Anxiety 
disorders were assessed using the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, Child and Parent 
versions (ADIS-IV-C/P; Silverman & Albano, 1996). Of these children, 44 were randomized to the positive 
training and 43 children to the neutral training. In total, 4 children in the positive group dropped out of 
the study, due to personal circumstances (see Table 1 for demographic characteristics of both groups). 
Of these 83 children, most children displayed more than one disorder (97.6 %; M = 4.0, SD = 1.7, min = 1, 
max = 10). Of these 83 children, 74 children (89.2 %) fulfilled criteria for generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD) somewhere in their diagnostic profile, 57 children (68.7 %) fulfilled criteria for social phobia (SP), 
and 37 children (44.6 %) fulfilled criteria for separation anxiety disorder (SAD). Some of the children also 
displayed other anxiety disorders (n = 55), mood disorders (n = 12), or behavior disorders (n = 17).
Some of these children also participated in another study to compare differences in interpretation 
biases between clinically anxious children and non-anxious children (Klein et al., 2015). The Human 
Research Ethics Review Committee of Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, approved the study.
Table 1. Demographics and pre-training clinical characteristics of participants.
Positive training group Neutral training group
All children    / High interpretation bias All children   / High interpretation bias
N
% female
40   / 21
45.0   / 57.1
43  / 19
51.2   / 52.6
M       (SD) /  M       (SD) M           (SD)    /  M        (SD)
Age 9.1      (1.6)  / 9.4      (1.6) 9.4      (1.4)  / 9.4      (1.4)
Interpretation bias score 0.39  (0.22)  / 0.54  (0.17) 0.39  (0.17)  / 0.51  (0.11)
Child-reported anxiety 29.7  (18.8)  / 35.0  (19.9) 35.3  (16.3)  / 40.5  (15.5)
Mother-reported anxiety 34.1  (15.3)  / 36.0  (16.2) 35.3  (13.8)  / 36.2  (14.2)
Father-reported anxiety 30.6  (12.4)  / 31.6  (12.1) 26.6  (12.9)  / 25.7  (14.0)
Number of completed sessions 13.8    (2.5)  / 13.6    (2.6) 14.7   (1.5)*  / 14.4    (2.3)
* Children in the neutral group completed significantly more sessions than children in the positive group p < .05.
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Materials
Cognitive Bias Modification training. To modify interpretation bias, children completed a daily training 
program for 14 days, preceded by a practice session (see also Salemink et al., 2009). Each session 
consisted of 10 ambiguous scenarios; each scenario consisted of three short sentences, with the last 
word of the last sentence missing (see Table 2 for a sample positive training scenario and a sample 
neutral training scenario). We created two different versions of the training task, a positive training and 
a neutral training condition. Because we used a clinical sample, it was unethical to include a negative 
training condition, and hence we utilized training to irrelevant information as the control. The first two 
sentences in both versions of the task were identical, only the third sentence differed. In the positive 
training, all final words made the story end positively, in the neutral training condition, all words made 
the story end in a completely irrelevant way. 
A set of 45 scenarios was used. The scenarios of this set were adapted from existing materials 
(Salemink et al. 2009; Creswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005), or created by the authors. All scenarios were 
related to situations that were specific for anxiety disorders (e.g., social situations, GAD-related situations, 
separation situations). All scenarios were shown three times in a fixed order, so that the time between 
appearances of the same scenario was as long as possible. We created 4 different versions to minimize 
the influence of order. Also, within each training session, the scenarios were randomized for all children.
The children were asked to read each scenario and imagine themselves as the central character. 
After reading a scenario, the child pressed a button and the missing last word appeared on the screen 
with one letter missing. The child’s task was to fill in this missing letter as quickly as possible, after which 
they received feedback by reading the correct response. Next, the child was asked to answer ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ to a question that measured comprehension of the story. This comprehension question reinforced 
either the positive or neutral interpretation. 
Table 2. Samples story of a positive training scenario and a negative training scenario.
Positive training scenario Neutral training scenario
You help your friend to study for a class test.
A little later you see him/her coming out of the test. 
Your friend is probably hap_y.
You help your friend to study for a class test. 
A little later you see him/her coming out of the test. 
It is time to go h_me.
Interpretation Task. The interpretation task consisted of 45 multiple-choice scenarios; each scenario 
contained 4 short sentences. All scenarios were ambiguous, such that they could be interpreted in a 
positive, neutral or negative way. The set of 45 scenarios was adapted and translated into English from 
existing materials (Bögels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003; Creswell et al., 2005; Muris et al., 2000; Klein et al., 2014; 
Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, & Margraf, 2002) or created by the authors. These 45 scenarios were divided 
into three categories; 17 social threat scenarios, 16 physical threat scenarios, and 12 non-threat scenarios. 
The non-threat scenarios were chosen in order to control for non-specific changes in interpretation bias. 
These 45 scenarios were then used to randomly create three sets of 15 scenarios each. These three sets 
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were created to make sure that the interpretation bias did not rely on the specific scenarios that were 
chosen. The children were randomly assigned to two out of the three sets. They completed one set 
before training and one set after training. For each scenario, four possible endings were created; two 
positive endings and two negative endings. The children were asked to read aloud the 15 scenarios 
that were presented on a computer screen and to imagine themselves as the central character of each 
scenario. For each scenario, they were asked to choose the ending that they thought would best fit the 
scenario. The scenarios were presented in pseudo-randomized order, with the restriction that no more 
than two scenarios of the same category followed each other. A social threat related example with the 
four possible answers include:
Birthday
Today it is your grandmother’s birthday. 
You give your grandmother a present. 
Everybody is watching when grandma opens the present. 
Then all of a sudden someone laughs really loud.... 
negative: Everybody thinks the present is stupid.
negative: You hope it is not your present they are laughing about.
positive: Your uncle is making jokes with your cousin.
positive: You have a funny present and everyone likes it .
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV-C/P; Silverman & Albano, 1996). All children and 
parents were interviewed separately using the ADIS-IV-C/P. Diagnoses and severity ratings (on a scale of 
0-8) were assigned by graduate students in clinical psychology, based on a composite parent and child 
report. The “or” rule was used, that is, a diagnosis was assigned when it was reported by either parent 
or child. Qualified clinical psychologists supervised the students. Previous work at our clinic has shown 
good inter-rater agreement (Rapee, Abbott, & Lyneham, 2006). 
Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale, Child and Parent Versions (SCAS and SCAS-p; Spence, 1998). The SCAS 
was used to assess child anxiety symptoms and parent-reported anxiety symptoms in their children. The 
SCAS is a self-report questionnaire that measures responses to 38 statements on a 4-point scale. A total 
score is computed from the 38 items (from 0 to 114). Internal consistency and retest reliability are good 
(Nauta et al., 2004; Spence, 1998). The measure is able to distinguish clinically anxious from non-anxious 
children (Nauta et al., 2004) and has adequate convergent and discriminant validity (Spence, 1998). In 
this study, internal consistencies were also strong (child report α = .93; mother report α = .89; father 
report α = .87).
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Procedure
Parents of anxious children who contacted the Centre for Emotional Health clinic seeking help for their 
child were briefly screened over the telephone. Those whose children appeared to have anxiety-related 
difficulties were invited to the clinic for a detailed assessment. Children and their parents completed 
several self-report measures presented electronically, including the SCAS. Next, children and their parents 
were assessed with the ADIS-C/P. The children meeting criteria were randomly assigned to the positive 
or the neutral training, and the children, parents, and researchers were blind to training condition. All 
children performed the interpretation task and the first practice training session individually in a separate 
room at the clinic, together with their parent and a trained research assistant. During this session, the 
research assistant took note of the reading capacities of the children. If needed, the research assistant 
instructed the parent to read the scenarios and the possible answers aloud to the child at home. The 
parents were asked not to influence their child’s answers and to decrease their involvement during the 
training sessions. At the end of the session, the children received a USB stick with the training program 
and a written instruction sheet. The children performed the training sessions electronically at home for 
the following 14 days. It was explicitly mentioned that the children had to perform one training session 
each day. However, when they forgot one session, they were allowed to catch up the following day. 
During the training, the research assistant sent SMS reminders to parents about the training. At the end 
of the second week, the research assistant contacted the parents to explain the interpretation task. On 
the 15th day, the children performed the interpretation task and the SCAS again electronically at home, 
while the parents filled in the SCAS again. The children received a keychain and a $A10 gift card when 
they returned the USB stick and proceeded to a treatment program.
Results
Descriptives
Demographics and clinical characteristics of the positive training group and the neutral training group 
are presented in Table 1. There were no significant group differences in age, gender, pre-training 
interpretation bias, or pre-training anxiety scores, either self-reported by the children, or reported by 
their mothers (n = 82) or fathers (n = 80) (all p’s > .1). However, children in the neutral training group 
(M = 14.7) completed slightly more training sessions than children in the positive training group 
(M = 13.8), F(1,81) = 4.86, p = .03.
Effects of training on interpretation bias
To measure the effect of training on the three categories (social threat/ physical threat/ non-threat) of 
the interpretation task, we computed three repeated-measures ANOVAs with Time (pre-training/post-
training) as a within-subjects factor, and Training Group (positive/neutral) and Scenario Set (1/2/3) as 
between-subjects factors. In the first analysis, the scores of the social threat scenarios served as the 
dependent variable. There was only an irrelevant significant interaction effect of time x set, F(1,68) = 6.95, 
p = .002, η2 = .17, because children had different scores over time depending on the scenario set of the 
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interpretation task. There were no other main effects or interactions. In the second analysis, the scores 
of the general threat scenarios served as the dependent variable. There were no significant main effects 
or interactions. In the third analysis, the scores on the non-threat scenarios served as the dependent 
variable. There was a significant interaction effect of time x set, F(1,68) = 10.34, p < .001, η2 = .23, because 
children had different scores over time depending on the scenario set of the interpretation task. There 
were no other significant main effects or interactions (see Table 3). 
Because a proportion of clinically anxious children did not show interpretation biases at baseline, 
we repeated these analyses for only those children who displayed an interpretation bias prior to training 
(see Table 3; see also, Salemink et al., 2009). Following the procedure of Salemink and colleagues (2009) 
children with an interpretation bias similar or higher to a non-anxious control group were selected 
(48.2 %). This sub-group analysis demonstrated a significant interaction between time x set, F(2,31) = 10.30, 
p < .001, η2 = .40, and also a significant interaction of time x group for the social threat scenarios, 
F(1,30) = 4.29, p = .047, η2 = .12. Additional t-tests revealed a significant reduction in interpretation biases 
for social threat scenarios in the positive group, t(17) = 1.97, p = .033, and no significant reduction in the 
neutral group, t(18) = 0.48, p > .1. This significant interaction was absent for the general threat scenarios 
and the non-threat scenarios (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Means (and Standard Deviations) for all scenario types of the interpretation task before and after training, 
separately for positive training and neutral training, separately for all children and children with an interpretation bias.
Scenario Type Positive training group Neutral training group
Pre-training Post-training Pre-training Post-training
All children
Social threat .36  (.29) .32  (.30) .34  (.25) .38  (.29)
Physical threat .43  (.32) .41  (.29) .48  (.22) .38  (.28)
Non-threat .39  (.27) .34  (.31) .36  (.31) .41  (.29)
High interpretation bias group
Social threat .59  (.21) * .42  (.32) .53  (.16) .49  (.28)
Physical threat .61  (.26) .54  (.25) .58  (.18) .50  (.29)
Non-threat .45  (.28) .37  (.30) .41  (.32) .47  (.29)
* Difference between pre-training and post-training is significant, p < .05.
Effects of training on self-reported anxiety
To analyze the effect of training on children’s social anxiety, separation anxiety, and generalized anxiety 
reported by the children, their mothers and their fathers, we conducted a multivariate multilevel 
regression1. In this analysis, post-training anxiety was the dependent variable and the neutral training 
group served as the reference category. Age and level of anxiety prior to training were included as 
1 Preliminary analyses were conducted for children with high levels of interpretation bias prior to training, yielding similar 
results. Therefore the multilevel analysis was computed for the entire group.
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covariates, in order to control for these variables. There was no significant effect of positive training 
on children’s self-reported social anxiety (β = 0.317, p > .1), generalized anxiety (β = 0.012, p > .1) or 
separation anxiety (β = 0.421, p > .1). However, there was a significant reduction in social anxiety after the 
positive training in both mother-reports and father-reports (mother: β = -1.019, p < .05; father: β = -1.537, 
p < .05). Mothers and fathers of the children in the positive training condition reported less social anxiety 
in their children after training than mothers and fathers of children in the neutral training (see Table 4). 
There were no differences for generalized anxiety (mother: β = 0.502, p >. 1; father: β = -0.623, p > .1) or 
separation anxiety (mother: β = -0.266, p >. 1; father: β = -0.574, p > .1).
Table 4. Overview of the Model Coefficients of the Multivariate Multilevel Regression Analysis separately for the three 
subscales of the SCAS (social anxiety / generalized anxiety / separation anxiety) and separately for child, mother and 
father.
Child
Social Anxiety Generalized Anxiety Separation Anxiety
βCoefficients (SE) βCoefficients (SE) βCoefficients (SE)
Intercept  -1.525  (1.590)  0.412  (1.525)  1.294  (1.899)
Pre anxiety score  0.584  (0.055)**  0.556  (0.052)**  0.655  (0.061)**
age  0.280  (0.169)*  0.177  (0.160)  -0.026  (0.192)
Positive training  0.317  (0.497)  0.012  (0.478)  0.421  (0.574)
Mother
Social Anxiety Generalized Anxiety Separation Anxiety
βCoefficients (SE) βCoefficients (SE) βCoefficients (SE)
Intercept  -2.950  (1.961)  -1.762  (1.400)  -0.425  (1.465)
Pre anxiety score  0.745  (0.069)**  0.587  (0.064)**  0.803  (0.049)**
age  0.477  (0.201)*  0.375  (0.142)*  0.133  (0.146)
Positive training  -1.019  (0.603)*  0.502  (0.428)  -0.266  (0.439)
 Father
Social Anxiety Generalized Anxiety Separation Anxiety
βCoefficients (SE) βCoefficients (SE) βCoefficients (SE)
Intercept  0.198  (1.632)  -1.109  (1.425)  2.157  (1.618)
Pre anxiety score  0.657  (0.059)**  0.625  (0.086)**  0.713  (0.059)*
age  0.238  (0.166)  0.331  (0.146)*  -0.031  (0.166)
Positive training  -1.537  (0.513)*  -0.623  (0.450)  -0.574  (0.528)
* p <  .05, one-tailed, ** p < .001, the reference category: neutral training.
Chapter 11
180
Discussion
The present study was designed to examine the effects of training in positive interpretations in clinically 
anxious pre-adolescent children. Although no significant reductions in interpretation bias were shown 
across the total sample, we found that children with an interpretation bias prior to training in the positive 
training group showed the expected significant reduction in interpretation bias on the social threat 
scenarios, which was not found for children in the neutral group. No effects were found for the general 
threat scenarios or the non-threat scenarios. Furthermore, unexpectedly, children in the positive training 
group did not report less anxiety symptoms after training than children in the control-training group. 
However, both parents reported the expected significant reduction in social anxiety in their children 
after training in the positive group, and not in the neutral group. The current results support those 
reported by previous studies on CBM-I in children (Lester et al., 2011a, 2011b; Muris et al., 2008, 2009; 
Vassilopoulos et al., 2009), in that it is possible to train children away from negative interpretive biases, in 
much the same way as in adults. These findings also support the importance of interpretation processes 
in childhood anxiety (e.g., Muris, 2010).
One of the most intriguing findings of the current study was the apparent difference between 
foci of anxiety. Significant increases in positive interpretations were only shown consistently for social 
scenarios, and reductions in anxiety were only reported in social anxiety. This is the first time that such 
content-specificity effects have been shown in a CBM-I paradigm for children, and they therefore require 
replication and further exploration. It is possible that the effect was a purely methodological one. For 
example, it is somewhat easier to produce ambiguous scenarios for social situations than for physical 
ones. Similarly, more of our participants were concerned about social threat (social anxiety disorder and 
generalized anxiety disorder) than physical threat (separation anxiety disorder). However, it is interesting 
that the only previous demonstration of reductions in anxiety following CBM-I in children was found on 
social anxiety as well (Vassilopoulos et al., 2009). 
If these results are ultimately replicated, it might suggest that CBM-I will be of greater clinical 
benefit to children whose primary focus is on social threat. Clinically, there is indeed a sense in which 
ambiguity is of greater relevance to social than to physical threat. Social situations are often, of their 
nature, ambiguous since most cultures require a superficial politeness that avoids direct social feedback. 
In contrast, most physical threat concerns ultimately result in clear feedback (i.e., one is either injured or 
not). Thus, at a methodological level, altering interpretations of social scenarios may be more believable, 
and at a broader level, CBM-I may well be more applicable to social anxiety. 
Another unexpected result was the lack of training effects on children’s self-reported anxiety. Both 
parents reported lower levels of social anxiety in their child in the positive condition versus the neutral 
condition, but the children themselves did not report these differences. It may be the case that parents 
have guessed the training condition. However, in most cases the training would have been observed 
by the mother and it is unlikely that many fathers were involved. Yet, both parents reported reductions 
in social anxiety. Another explanation could be that children differ in the way they experience fear or 
that children’s reports are less reliable than those of adults. Future studies of CBM-I may therefore also 
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include structured diagnostic interviews to reduce the disadvantages of using self-reports (see also Elder 
et al., 2012; Waters, Pittaway, Mogg, Bradley, & Pine, 2013). Similarly, the addition of behavioral approach 
tests as used by Lester and colleagues (2011b) would further improve conclusions. Another explanation 
might be that in this study, children with various anxiety disorders and with a high comorbidity were 
included. As a result, we were not able to train interpretations using highly specific stimuli related to 
a single, specific anxiety disorder. This might have added noise to our findings. Future studies may 
benefit from a more stimulus-specific approach (see also Elder et al., 2012). Finally, the interpretation 
bias training was conducted at home. Although a therapist had phone contact a few times, this was only 
with the parents, and not with the children, and was mostly a reminder. Effects may have been larger 
if a therapist could have had contact with the children about their training progress (see also Waters et 
al., 2013). We also could not control for how attentive the children were with the task and whether they 
completed the task free from distractions. More control over the training sessions might be important 
for strengthening the effects.
Our study reflects the potency to reduce interpretation bias related to social threat for children with 
an interpretation bias prior to training. Previous studies, just like ours, found that not all children with 
an anxiety disorder display an interpretation bias (for reviews, see Muris, 2010; Muris & Field, 2008). This 
present study was designed before many studies on CBM were published that report on differences 
between levels of biases before enrollment in the training (see also Amir et al., 2011). From a theoretical 
point of view, it is debatable to include only the children with an interpretation bias versus all children. In 
this study, we only found an effect of training on interpretation bias for the children with an interpretation 
bias prior training. It is possible that this effect was due a floor effect; children with a low bias score prior 
to training were not able to score lower after training. These results might be due to task characteristics: 
the ambiguous scenarios paradigm may have not been sensitive enough to measure subtle effects with 
only a few different stories per anxiety disorder. Furthermore, although the interpretation task used in 
this study can be seen as more indirect than questionnaires or interviews, this paradigm is still sensitive 
to experimenter demand and social desirability (e.g., Muris, 2010), which might have suppressed the 
actual levels of interpretation bias. Clearly more research is needed that addresses the possible influence 
of levels of interpretation bias prior to training, and how these levels should be tested.
In conclusion, this is the first study to demonstrate that clinically anxious pre-adolescent children 
who demonstrate biases in interpretation of ambiguous scenarios can have these biases trained toward 
less negative interpretations in much the same way as has been shown with adults. More importantly, it 
is the first study to use a clinical population who were seeking treatment for their anxiety disorder and 
to demonstrate that interpretation re-training can result in decreases in anxiety, at least in one form of 
anxiety (social) reported by parents. This study also highlights the importance of using specific training 
stimuli, as it seems that interpretation biases are specific to fear-relevant stimuli. In the long run, the 
possibility to reduce anxiety symptoms via CBM-I might be used to improve the treatment of anxious 
children.
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The main purpose of this dissertation was to learn more about different cognitive processes that play a 
role in childhood anxiety. To achieve this main goal, three specific goals were formulated. These goals 
were investigated in a systematic manner with ten (10) highly interrelated studies that build on each 
other.
The first goal was to test whether fearful children display cognitive biases and show fear-related 
associations, and whether these biases and associations are specific to threat-related materials related 
to the content of an anxiety, should they exist. In order to be able to achieve this first goal, indirect 
measures that were originally developed for adults were adapted to study cognitive biases and fear-
related associations in children. Chapters 3 to 11 describe measures that originate from the adult 
literature, but were adapted for children. Moreover, measures contained stimuli to test for the content-
specificity of the cognitive biases. 
The second goal of this dissertation was to study the relationships between different cognitive biases, 
and to study the independent ability of direct and indirect measures to predict fear-related behavior. 
More specifically, it is of great interest to study the ability of indirect measures to predict independently 
of each other fear-related behavior in children, over and above the predictive power achieved by self-
reports. This will underline the importance of automatic processes in fear-related behavior and support 
the use of indirect measures in research settings. Chapters 5, 6 and 8 contained more than one indirect 
measure to study different cognitive biases at the same time. The studies described in Chapters 2 to 8 
included a behavioral task related to fear and each chapter included self-reports.
The third research goal was to further examine the effects of training in positive interpretations 
among children, while addressing some of the limitations of earlier studies. A child-friendly interpretation 
training was developed in Chapter 11. This training included hypothetical scenarios describing regular 
daily activities that children would have previously encountered and would continue to encounter.
The present chapter gives an overview of the major findings reported in Chapters 2 to 11. Furthermore, 
it provides an integration of the findings, resulting in the development of a new information-processing 
model describing the role of cognitive process in the maintenance of childhood anxiety. Finally, this 
chapter provides general limitations of the studies and directions for future research followed by the 
final conclusions.
Summary of the empirical chapters
Chapter 2 described the development of a short screening to assess fear and disgust of spiders, the 
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). The development of this screening was 
important because it served as the direct measure in Chapters 3 to 8. Results showed that the SADS-C 
is a valid and reliable questionnaire for assessing spider fear and disgust in children. Due to the small 
number of items and the child-friendly phrasing, this screening instrument helps to identify spider-
fearful children much more easily than before.
Chapter 3 described a task designed to study the automatic fear-related approach and avoidance 
tendencies elicited by spiders, the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007). The exploration 
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of the AAT was important because this task taps into more automatic aspects of avoidance tendencies, 
compared to the Behavioral Assessment Task (BAT) that measures more controlled aspects of avoidance 
behavior related to spiders. The AAT might therefore be useful to assess fear-related avoidance behavior 
in Chapters 4 to 8 in addition to the BAT (see also Huijding & de Jong, 2006). The main purpose of this 
study was to evaluate the usefulness of the AAT in children varying in their level of spider fear. The 
first goal was to test whether spider-fearful children show automatic avoidance tendencies in response 
to spider stimuli. The second goal was to investigate whether avoidance is specific to spider-related 
materials, or whether spider-fearful children also show avoidance of other stimuli. All children displayed 
a significant avoidance tendency in response to pictures of spiders, but not to control images or butterfly 
images. This tendency was only found for the first block of the AAT and not for the other five blocks. 
When looking at the relation between reported fear of spiders and the AAT scores for Block 1 in girls, 
significant correlations were found between the spider AAT scores, the Spider Phobia Questionnaire for 
Children (SPQ-C; Kindt, Brosschot, & Muris, 1997), the SADS-C, and the BAT. These significant relationships 
were absent in the subsequent blocks, indicating that the avoidance response to threatening stimuli is 
initially present in girls, but becomes more difficult to measure with extended duration of the AAT. Boys 
reported less spider fear on the questionnaires and behaved more “bravely” in the BAT than girls. As a 
result of a lower mean and smaller variance, there were only very few boys who showed a high level of 
fear on the questionnaires and a high avoidance reaction on the BAT. When looking at the correlation 
within medium-to-highly fearful boys, the same pattern was found as in girls. In conclusion, based 
on this single study, there is not enough evidence that this task is suitable for measuring fear-related 
approach-avoidance tendencies in children, at least in boys. The AAT was therefore not included as a 
measure of automatic fear-related avoidance tendencies in Chapters 4 to 8. 
Chapter 4 described a task designed to study attention bias in children with varying levels of spider 
fear: the Emotional Stroop Task (EST; Mathews & Macleod, 1985). The first aim of this study was to test 
whether spider-fearful children display an attention bias. The second aim of this study was to investigate 
whether an indirect measure, the EST, and direct measures, the SADS-C and SPQ-C (Kindt et al., 1997), 
were useful for predicting unique variance in fearful avoidance behavior in children. The results showed 
that children with a low approach score on the BAT displayed an attention bias related to spider stimuli 
but not to neutral stimuli. The EST and the self-reports showed independent significant correlations with 
the BAT, irrespectively of gender and age. Thus, despite the use of two self-reports, the EST was still able 
to predict unique variance in fear-related avoidance behavior measured with the BAT. This showed that 
the prediction of children’s spider-fearful avoidance behavior was improved by using both direct and 
indirect measures. Interestingly, self-reported fear and EST interference did not correlate significantly 
with each other. This finding might explain earlier failures to find different levels of EST interference in 
children with high versus low levels of self-reported fear (for a review see Nightingale, Field, & Kindt, 
2010). 
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Chapter 5 followed up on Chapter 4, and described an additional task (next to the EST) designed 
to study fear-related associations to spiders, the Affective Priming Task (APT; de Houwer, 2003). The first 
goal of this study was to replicate the findings described in Chapter 4. The second goal was to include 
the APT as a measure of fear-related associations, next to the SADS-C and the EST, and to compare their 
independent ability to predict performance during the BAT. The results of Chapter 4 were replicated 
and showed that spider-fearful children displayed an attention bias related to spider stimuli but not to 
neutral stimuli. Also, self-reported fear in SADS-C, fear-related associations in the APT, and fear-related 
interference in the EST showed significant and independent correlations with avoidance behavior in 
the BAT. Most importantly, the three measures predicted unique variance components of avoidance 
behavior assessed with the BAT. This means that both direct and indirect measures were necessary for 
an optimal prediction of spider fear-related avoidance behavior in children. The APT and the EST did 
not correlate significantly with each other. This result might be explained by the fact that the used 
techniques were not optimal, as indirect measures are generally less reliable than direct measures (see 
also Huijding, Wiers, & Field, 2010). Another explanation could be that different cognitive biases are 
simply not closely related because they tap into separate underlying processes. Furthermore, the SADS-C 
neither correlated significantly with priming effects in the APT nor with interference in the EST. This 
finding might explain earlier failures to find different levels of EST interference and APT-scores in children 
with high versus low levels of self-reported fear (for reviews see Huijding et al., 2010; Nightingale, Field, 
& Kindt, 2010). 
Chapter 6 described a task designed to study interpretation bias, recall bias and source memory 
bias in children varying in their level of spider fear (see also Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008). 
The first goal of this study was to test whether spider-fearful children display an interpretation bias, a 
recall bias and a source memory bias, and whether these biases are specific to threat-related materials. 
The second goal was to compare the independent ability of the interpretation and memory task to 
predict fear. The results showed that spider-fearful children displayed an interpretation bias, and a source 
memory bias. These biases were only found for spider-related stimuli, indicating that spider-fearful 
children display an interpretation bias and source memory bias to content-specific materials only and 
not for other ambiguous materials. Only limited support was found for the existence of a memory bias 
when memory was scored in a traditional way (recall bias). Self-reported fear correlated only marginally 
significantly with the number of recalled items on the memory task, and not significantly with avoidance 
behavior. Most importantly, both the interpretation task and the memory task predicted unique variance 
components of fear-related avoidance behavior assessed with the BAT as well as with self-reported fear 
in the SADS-C. This means that both the interpretation task and the memory task were necessary for an 
optimal prediction of spider fear-related avoidance behavior and self-reported fear in children. However, 
it should be noted that when the SADS-C was included as a predictor, next to the bias tasks, in explaining 
the BAT, only the SADS-C was a significant predictor. The interpretation task and the memory recall task 
did not correlate significantly with each other, and there was only a very weak and not significant link 
between the interpretation task and the source memory task, even though the observed intrusions did 
originate from children’s negative interpretations.
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Chapter 7 followed up on Chapter 6 and described a study that was designed to investigate the 
specificity of interpretation biases in a sample of girls with symptoms of spider fear or social anxiety. The 
first purpose of this study was to replicate the findings of Chapter 6 concerning the interpretation bias 
related to spider threat. The second purpose was to study the specificity of interpretation biases related 
to social anxiety and spider fear. The third goal was to compare the independent ability of self-reported 
fear and the interpretation task to predict performance during the behavioral tasks. The results showed 
that spider-fearful girls displayed an interpretation bias for spider threat-related stimuli only, and not for 
other stimuli. This result was a replication of the findings of Chapter 6. The results also showed that girls 
with self-reported symptoms of social anxiety as measured with the social anxiety subscale of the Screen 
for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED; Bodden, Bögels, & Muris, 2009) and a higher 
state anxiety on the Social Speech Task displayed an interpretation bias for social threat-related stimuli 
only. This indicates that socially anxious girls display an interpretation bias for content-specific materials 
only, and not for other ambiguous materials. Finally, the questionnaire and the interpretation task related 
to social anxiety and spider fear predicted unique variance in fear-related behavior to social anxiety and 
spider fear respectively. This means that both direct and indirect measures related to a specific anxiety 
were necessary for an optimal prediction of fear-related behavior in girls. These results are in line with 
the results of Chapters 4 and 5, and address the importance of adding a behavioral measure to study the 
relation between direct and indirect measures. Furthermore, these results highlight the importance of 
the use of content-specific materials.
Chapter 8 followed up on Chapters 4 to 7, and was designed to measure fear-related associations, 
attention bias, interpretation bias and memory bias in children with varying levels of spider fear. The first 
purpose of this study was to replicate the findings concerning spider attention bias reported in Chapters 
4 and 5 and spider fear-related associations reported in Chapter 5. The second goal of this study was to 
study the correlations between the different measures and to study the ability of the different tasks to 
predict independently of each other spider fear-related behavior. The results showed that spider-fearful 
children displayed an attention bias, an interpretation bias and fear-related associations, but there was 
no evidence for a memory bias. These findings are similar to the results reported in Chapters 3 to 7, and 
they replicated the results of Chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study in which evidence was found for a significant correlation of spider fear with size and distance 
estimation in children. Moreover, spider distance estimation predicted unique variance in behavioral 
avoidance above and beyond the variance predicted by other cognitive bias measures and self-reported 
fear. This suggests that this variation of interpretation bias, which is also referred to as visual perceptual 
bias, is a unique cognitive bias that predicts fearful avoidance behavior. Second, the different biases 
correlated only weakly with each other. Most importantly, attention, interpretation and fear-related 
associations predicted unique variance in fear-related avoidance behavior assessed with the BAT. This 
result is in line with the findings reported in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Finally, when self-reported fear was 
included as a predictor in the regression model, both interpretation bias and fear-related associations 
remained significant predictors. The current results are in line with the findings reported in Chapters 
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3 and 4, and they indicate that these indirect measures are useful for predicting spider fear-related 
avoidance behavior in children, over and above the predictive power achieved by self-reports. 
Chapter 9 described the assessment of interpretation bias by means of an Auditory Interpretation 
Task (AIT; see also Dearing & Gotlib, 2009) in children with varying levels of Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD). The first purpose of this study was to test whether children with a high level of GAD display an 
interpretation bias. The second goal was to investigate whether this bias was specific to GAD-related 
materials or whether children with symptoms of GAD also show an interpretation bias for other stimuli. 
The results suggested that children with a higher level of self-reported GAD showed an interpretation 
bias for GAD-related stimuli only, and not for other ambiguous materials. Moreover, this result was not 
found with the open-ended version of the AIT, suggesting that the results depend on the research 
method that is used to assess interpretation bias in the AIT. To the best of our knowledge, this study is 
the first to provide some support for the content-specificity of the interpretation bias in children with 
varying levels of GAD symptoms. 
Chapter 10 followed up on Chapters 6, 7, and 9, and described the assessment of interpretation 
biases in children with a diagnosed anxiety disorder. The first purpose of this study was to test whether 
clinically anxious children display an interpretation bias. The second goal was to test whether these 
biases are specific to threat-related materials. The results showed that clinically anxious children did 
indeed choose the negative endings of ambiguous scenarios significantly more often than control 
children. Within the clinically anxious group, specific interpretation biases were found: The interpretation 
of scenarios related to social-threat, general-threat, and separation-threat was predicted only by the 
children’s self-reported level of social phobia, generalized anxiety, and separation anxiety, respectively. 
Moreover, these findings are similar to the results reported in Chapters 6, 7, and 9, and they support the 
importance of interpretation biases in anxiety.
Chapter 11 described the final empirical study. This study was designed to train benign interpretations 
in clinically anxious children by the means of Cognitive Bias Modification training for interpretation 
(CBM-I). The main goal of this study was to examine the effects of the training on interpretation bias and 
self-reported anxiety. Unexpectedly, children in the positive training group did not report less anxiety 
symptoms after training than children in the control-training group. However, both parents reported the 
expected significant reduction in social anxiety in their children after training in the positive group, and 
not in the neutral group. This result is probably not due to expectancy effects because parents did not 
know their child’s training condition. Furthermore, children with an interpretation bias prior to training 
in the positive training group showed the expected significant reduction in interpretation bias on the 
social threat scenarios, which was not found for children in the neutral condition. No effects were found 
for the children without an interpretation bias prior to training.
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Discussion of the three research goals
1. The role of cognitive biases in the processing of anxiety-related stimuli
Compared to the adult literature, relatively few studies in children explored indirect measures to study 
cognitive biases and the content-specificity of these biases. So far, research in anxious children provided 
evidence for the existence of interpretation biases related to threat. Mixed results were found for the 
existence of attention biases and memory biases related to threat, and no evidence was found for the 
existence of fear-related associations. The few studies reported on content-specificity of these biases 
provide evidence for the content-specificity of attention biases. Inconsistent findings were found for the 
existence of content-specificity of interpretation biases, and no evidence was found for the existence 
of content-specificity of memory biases and fear-related associations (for an overview, see Hadwin & 
Field, 2010). Clearly more research is needed to explore different cognitive biases, and more specifically, 
fear-related associations and memory biases. Furthermore, research is needed to explore the content-
specificity of these biases, should they exist. Therefore, my first goal was to study cognitive biases and to 
explore the specificity of these biases in anxious children.
The results of the studies described in this dissertation showed that fearful children display fear-
related associations and biases in attention, interpretation and source memory. Limited evidence 
was found for the existence of a recall bias. The effect sizes of the relations between these biases and 
direct and indirect measures were small to moderate. These findings are in line with the findings in 
both child and adult literature (see also Hadwin and Field, 2010; Williams, Watts, Macleod, & Mathews, 
1997). They support the leading cognitive theories and models stating that anxious children, just as 
anxious adults, display several cognitive biases, and they support the importance of cognitive biases 
in childhood anxiety (e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Kendall, 1985; for an overview, see Hadwin & Field, 
2010). The studies in this dissertation also explored interpretation bias in more detail by adapting and 
developing more indirect tasks in addition to the commonly used questionnaires and variations of an 
Ambiguous Story Telling Paradigm. In this thesis, evidence was found for an auditory as well as a visual 
interpretation bias, which is also referred to as a perceptual bias. These results suggest that interpretation 
biases include both controlled and automatic aspects.
The results of the studies described in this dissertation showed that these cognitive biases and 
fear-related associations are content-specific. For example, children with fear of spiders showed 
cognitive biases and fear-related associations towards spider-related stimuli, but not stimuli related 
to other animals, social situations, and neutral or positive situations. In this dissertation, evidence was 
found for the specificity of biases in spider phobia, social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, and 
separation anxiety disorder. The present results support cognitive theories that argue for specificity of 
cognitive content associated with different disorders (e.g., Beck, 1976) and are consistent with current 
classification systems for childhood mental disorders (e.g., DSM-5, APA, 2013). Furthermore, these results 
are consistent with a broader body of research that has shown support for cognitive-specificity models 
in children and adolescents when examining automatic thoughts (e.g., Epkins, 2000; Jolly & Dykman, 
1994; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). In addition, there is a notable similarity between the results of the 
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studies in this dissertation and those demonstrating specificity in cognitive biases in anxious adults (e.g., 
Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993).
Finally, these findings give an indication that indirect measures such as the Affective Priming Task, 
the Emotional Stroop Task, and the Auditory Interpretation Task are suitable for children. The findings 
also highlight the importance of adding indirect measures to study more automatic aspects of cognitive 
biases. The tasks used in this dissertation were adapted for children and included child-friendly phrasing 
and pictures where possible. The tasks were also shorter than the tasks designed for adults.
In summary, the findings in this dissertation are in line with the leading cognitive theories and 
models stating that anxious children, just as anxious adults, display several cognitive biases, and they 
support the importance of cognitive biases in childhood anxiety (e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Kendall, 
1985; for an overview, see Hadwin & Field, 2010). Furthermore, the present results support cognitive 
models that argue for specificity of cognitive content associated with different disorders (e.g., Beck, 
1976) and are consistent with current classification systems for childhood mental disorders (e.g., DSM-5, 
APA, 2013). The data indicate likely continuity in cognitive-specificity across the course of development, 
in line with cognitive theories of psychopathology. It may be that patterns of cognitive functioning 
associated with emotional states are established at a relatively early age, and tend to continue into 
adolescence and adulthood. 
2.  The relationship between cognitive processes and the prediction of behavior
Several cognitive models of anxiety disorders propose that different cognitive biases work together to 
influence anxiety (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Weems & Watts, 2005; Williams et al., 1997). These models 
predict that different cognitive biases will be related to each other, and that each bias, to some extent, 
will have a unique relation with anxiety. However, there are only a few child studies that report on the 
combination of different cognitive biases (e.g., Broeren, Muris, Bouwmeester, Field, & Voerman, 2011; 
Brown et al., 2014; Watts & Weems, 2006). Furthermore, there are no published studies that relate both 
direct and indirect measures to fear-related behavior in childhood anxiety. Based on adult studies, it 
seems worthwhile to include a behavioral measure in combination with direct and indirect measures 
(e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Huijding & de Jong, 2005, 
2006; Teachman & Woody, 2003). Clearly more research is needed in this area. Therefore, my second goal 
was to study the relationship between different cognitive biases, and to study the independent ability 
of direct and indirect measures to predict self-reported fear and fear-related behavior.
The findings in this dissertation are not in line with the expected positive correlations between 
different cognitive biases and fear-related associations, as stated by cognitive models of anxiety disorders. 
Weak correlations were found between the different biases, and when the correlations were significant, 
the patterns were inconsistent across the different chapters. These results are in line with the findings 
reported by other studies that examined the relation between different biases in childhood anxiety (e.g., 
Broeren et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2014; Richards, French, Nash, Hadwin, & Donnelly, 2007; Weems, Costa, 
Watts, Taylor, & Cannon, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006). While some of the studies found some evidence 
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for a relationship between different cognitive biases (Richards et al., 2007; Weems et al., 2007), other 
studies did not (Broeren et al., 2011; Brown et al., (2014). Just as in this dissertation, the patterns across 
different studies are inconsistent. These results are also in line with the adult literature: There are only a 
few studies that studied the relation between different cognitive biases in adults, and the patterns across 
different studies are inconsistent (see also Hirsch, Clark & Mathews, 2006). While some studies found 
some evidence for a relationship between different cognitive biases (e.g., Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & 
Gotlib, 2008), others did not (e.g., Mansell & Clark, 1999; van Bockstaele et al., 2011). 
The findings in this dissertation showed that almost all direct and indirect measures correlated 
significantly with relatively controlled fear-related behavior as measured with the BAT or the Social 
Speech Task. These results indicate that these biases are important cognitive processes in explaining 
fearful behavior, despite of the low correlation between the different cognitive biases. Additionally, the 
studies described in Chapters 5, 6, and 8 included more than one indirect measure and found evidence 
that the indirect measures were each and independently of one another able to explain unique variation 
in fear-related behavior. In Chapters 5 and 8, there was evidence that the indirect tasks measuring fear-
related associations and attention bias or interpretation bias were able to explain unique variance in fear-
related behavior, in addition to the variance explained by the direct measures. These findings suggest 
that these cognitive biases are necessary for predicting fear-related behavior in children, independently 
of each other, and over and above the predictive power achieved by self-reports. The findings underline 
the importance of automatic processes in fear-related behavior, and they support the use of indirect 
measures in research settings. These studies are among the first to indicate that biased automatic 
processes exist in childhood anxiety, and that these processes are distinct from controlled processes that 
are measured with self-reports. The results are in line with the fundamental ideas proposed by one of the 
first cognitive theories of childhood anxiety formulated by Kendall (1985), who stated that researchers 
should not only focus on controlled processes as measured by self-reports, but should also develop 
measures that tap into more automatic aspects of childhood anxiety. Furthermore, the findings are in 
line with adult studies of anxiety in which evidence was found for the importance of automatic and 
controlled processes in the prediction of fear-related behavior (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Huijding & 
de Jong, 2005; 2006; Rinck & Becker, 2007; van Bockstaele et al., 2011; Teachman & Woody, 2003) 
Additionally, the measurement of fear-related behavior yielded evidence for the validity of cognitive 
biases. Both cognitive biases and self-reported anxiety predicted fear-related behavior even when they 
did not correlate with each other. While the current information-processing models do not provide a 
clear explanation for these findings, these differences could be explained by recently developed dual-
process models that make a clear distinction between controlled and automatic processes (e.g., Beck 
& Clark, 1997; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Strack and Deutsch (2004), for example, proposed a reflective-
impulsive model in which both controlled processes (reflective system) and automatic processes 
(impulsive system) operate in parallel to control behavior. In the reflective system, behavior is initiated 
as a consequence of a conscious decision process, while in the impulsive system, behavior may be 
initiated without intention or goal, and be biased towards highly relevant stimuli. The reflective and 
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impulsive systems are thought to interact at various stages of processing; it is the mutual activation of 
both systems that controls behavior. It is therefore expected that direct and indirect measures do show 
some overlap, but are not correlated highly with each other. 
In summary, the results described in this dissertation do not fully support the proposed correlation 
between different cognitive biases. Moreover, the current thesis highlights the importance of adding 
a behavioral measure, besides the use of direct and indirect measures. The findings in this dissertation 
show that direct and indirect measures both have incremental predictive validity for behavior with 
respect to each other, and that direct and indirect measures are not always correlated. Instead of casting 
doubt on the validity of the techniques that are used, or simply stating that cognitive biases are not 
present in fearful children, these results indicate that self-reports and indirect tasks measure different 
constructs, which are not necessarily closely related to each other. This finding might explain earlier 
failures to find cognitive differences in children reporting high versus low fear (see also Hadwin & Field, 
2010). These results support dual-process models (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Cognitive models in childhood anxiety might benefit from these dual-process models in explaining the 
role of controlled versus automatic processes in more detail.
3. The effects of training in positive interpretations among children
Compared to the adult literature, relatively few studies explored CBM-I techniques to reduce existing 
biases in children. So far, research in children provided some evidence that existing biases can be trained, 
but there are still several limitations in the research that prevent strong conclusions (Lester, Field, & 
Muris, 2011a, 2011b; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, & Hameetman, 2008; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, 
& Vreden, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prantzalou, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Blackwell, Moberly, & 
Karahaliou, 2012). For example, in the only study that demonstrated reductions in both interpretation 
bias and anxiety, there was no control training condition. Clearly more research is needed to address 
the limitations described above. Therefore, my third research goal was to further examine the effects of 
training in positive interpretations among children. 
The study described in Chapter 11 reports the first Cognitive Bias Modification of Interpretation 
(CBM-I) study in clinically anxious pre-adolescent children. Although no significant reductions in 
interpretation bias were shown across the total sample, children with an interpretation bias prior to 
training in the positive training group showed the expected significant reduction in interpretation bias 
on the social threat scenarios, which was not found for children in the neutral group. No effects were 
found for the general threat scenarios or the non-threat scenarios. Furthermore, unexpectedly, children 
in the positive training group did not report less anxiety symptoms after training than children in the 
control-training group. However, both parents reported the expected significant reduction in social 
anxiety in their children after training in the positive group, and not in the neutral group. The current 
results partly support those reported by previous studies on CBM-I in children (Lester et al., 2011a; 
2011b; Muris et al., 2008, 2009; Vassilopoulos et al., 2009), in that it is possible to train children away 
from negative interpretation biases, possibly in the same way as in adults (for reviews of CBM-I studies 
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in adults, see Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 2014). These findings also support the 
importance of interpretation processes in childhood anxiety (e.g., Muris, 2010). 
One of the most intriguing findings of Chapter 11 was the apparent difference between foci of 
anxiety. Significant increases in positive interpretations were only found consistently for social scenarios, 
and reductions in anxiety were most consistently reported in social anxiety. This is the first time that such 
content-specific effects have been shown, and they therefore require replication and further exploration. 
However, it is interesting that the only previous demonstration of reductions in anxiety following CBM-I 
in children was found on social anxiety as well (Vassilopoulos et al., 2009). If these results are ultimately 
replicated, it might suggest that CBM-I will be of greater clinical benefit to children whose primary focus 
is on social threat. Clinically, there is a sense in which ambiguity is of greater relevance to social than to 
physical threat. Social situations are often, in their nature, ambiguous, for example, most cultures require 
a superficial politeness that avoids direct social feedback. In contrast, most physical threat concerns 
ultimately result in clear feedback (i.e., one is either injured or not). Thus, at a methodological level, 
altering interpretations of social scenarios may be more believable, and at a broader level, CBM-I may well 
be more applicable to social anxiety. This result confirms the content-specificity of interpretation bias 
as proposed by several cognitive theories (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Schniering & Rapee, 2004).
In summary, the study described in Chapter 11 is the first to demonstrate that clinically anxious pre-
adolescent children can be trained away from negative interpretation biases related to social situations 
and that levels of social anxiety could be reduced accordingly. This result was only found for children 
with an interpretation bias prior to training, and in the levels of self-reported social anxiety as reported 
by parents. Moreover, it is the first study that included more than one anxiety disorder, demonstrating 
the importance of using specific training stimuli, as it seems that interpretation biases are specific to 
fear-relevant stimuli. In the long run, the possibility to reduce anxiety symptoms via CBM-I might be 
used to improve the treatment of anxious children.
Toward a more detailed information-processing model of childhood anxiety
The three research goals of this dissertation were based on two leading information-processing models 
of childhood anxiety developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and Field (2008). Daleiden 
and Vasey (1997) combined Kendall’s (1985) cognitive theory with the social information-processing 
perspective developed by Crick and Dodge (1994). The information-processing model developed 
by Daleiden and Vasey (1997) consists of six stages showing information processed through several 
different stages; the encoding stage, the interpretation stage, the goal clarification or selection stage, 
the response access or construction stage, the response selection stage and finally the enactment stage. 
More recently, Muris and Field (2008) addressed the encoding and interpretation stage and visualized 
this part of the information-processing model to summarize and evaluate the role of attention, 
interpretation and memory biases in childhood anxiety (see Figure 1). Even though my research goals 
were based on the models developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and Field (2008), the 
findings could not be easily explained with these models due to three different reasons. 
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First, the models developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and Field (2008) underline 
the importance of cognitive biases and the possibility of these biases to be content-specific, but the 
models do not specify the possible role of content-specificity in detail (e.g., Beck, 1976). This dissertation 
provides evidence for the existence of cognitive biases as well as for the content-specificity of these 
biases, and shows the importance of including content-specific stimuli. For example, in the CBM-I study 
described in Chapter 11, the only significant effect was found for changes in interpretation bias related 
to social threat and self-reported social anxiety, but not for biases and anxiety related to separation 
anxiety and generalized anxiety. It seems worthwhile to further specifiy the role of content-specificty of 
cognitive biases.
Attention 
bias
Interpretation 
bias
Memory 
bias
Encoding
Interpretation
Situation
Anxiety
Overactivity of 
vulnerability and 
danger schemas
Figure 1. Information-processing model developed by Muris and Field (p. 398, 2008). This model highlights the 
influence of cognitive biases in the processing of threat-related information.
Note. Copyright © 2008 (Routledge Taylor & Francis group). www.tandfonline.com
Second, the models developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and Field (2008) propose that 
both controlled and automatic aspects play an important role in information processing of potential 
threatening stimuli, and that both types of processes may occur at all stages of the information processing 
sequence. Controlled processes are generally described as processes that are deliberate, strategic, slow 
and available to conscious awareness. Automatic processes are processes that are unintentional, fast 
and possibly occurring outside of awareness. However, the models do not explicitly specify the role 
of controlled and automatic processes in the different stages (encoding and interpretation) and how 
these processes are related. The studies in this dissertation provide evidence for the importance of both 
controlled and automatic aspects in explaining fear-related behavior, and show that these automatic 
and controlled aspects are not always correlated. For example, in the study described in Chapter 8, 
not all indirect measures correlated significantly with self-reported anxiety, but these then correlated 
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significantly with the behavioral measure related to anxiety. Instead of casting doubt on the validity of 
the techniques that were used to assess cognitive biases in children, or simply stating that cognitive 
biases are not present in fearful children, these results might indicate that direct and indirect measures 
assess different constructs, which are not necessarily closely related. It would be helpful if the role of 
controlled and automatic information processing would be described in more detail. 
Finally, the models developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and Field (2008), state 
that attention bias plays a role in the encoding stage and that interpretation bias and memory bias 
play a role in the interpretation stage, implying that interpretation processes do not play a role in the 
encoding stage, and that attention processes do not influence the interpretation stage. It is uncertain 
whether a clear distinction between these two stages could be made, because it might well be that 
more automatic aspects of different cognitive biases are more prevalent in the encoding stage and that 
more controlled aspects of biases are more prevalent in the interpretation stage. This dissertation does 
not provide empirical evidence of which cognitive bias belongs to which stage, but it does provide 
evidence for the fact that cognitive biases themselves consist of both controlled and automatic aspects. 
For example, interpretation bias measured with an Ambiguous Story Telling Paradigm taps into more 
controlled aspects of an interpretation bias, which might be more prevalent in the interpretation stage. 
On the other hand, the indication of size and distance (also referred to as a visual perceptual bias), taps 
into more automatic aspects that may already be of importance in the encoding stage. Therefore, one 
could at least argue that the different biases may play a role in both the encoding and interpretation 
stage.
Based on these three reasons, I decided to develop a new cognitive model that is based on the 
models developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and Field (2008). Developing a new more 
detailed information-processing model has several advantages. First, a more specific model can help 
to explore the role of cognitive biases in childhood anxiety in more detail. For example, it could help 
to understand controlled and automatic aspects of cognitive biases and better explain the anxiety 
response. Second, it could help to develop and utilize more specific assessment tools. For example, 
interpretation bias is often described as interpreting ambiguous information in a negative way without 
making notice that controlled aspects of interpretation bias might be different from automatic aspects 
of interpretation bias. As a result, many different tasks to measure interpretation bias are reported in the 
literature, yielding inconsistent findings and possible discussion as to which extent interpretation bias 
plays a role in childhood anxiety. Identifying both automatic and controlled aspects of each cognitive 
bias could help us to improve assessment tools (see also Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). Finally, a more specific 
model could support the development of intervention tools. For example, by further specifying the 
role of content-specificity in the processing of potentially threatening information, materials that match 
the child’s anxiety could be included in intervention methods, possibly making them more effective. 
Another example is that intervention tools could be developed based on automatic or controlled 
processes, such as CBM versus CBT, or a mix of both.
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Before introducing the new information-processing model in the next paragraph, I would like to 
explain why I chose to develop a new model instead of using or adapting other cognitive models. 
There are other models than the models developed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997), and Muris and Field 
(2008) that describe biased information processing in children and adults, but these models have one 
or more disadvantages when it comes to explaining the data in this dissertation. For example, there are 
a few models that do not explicitly make a distinction between controlled and automatic processes 
(e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Weems & Watts, 2005), an aspect that is highly relevant in explaining 
the empirical data of this dissertation. A number of other models do include these different aspects, 
but leave little room for cognitive biases to consist of both controlled and automatic aspects, but only 
one or the other (e.g., Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Some models only 
focus on one cognitive bias (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1997), whereas this 
dissertation includes measures related to biases in attention, interpretation and memory and highlights 
the importance of combining different cognitive biases in explaining fear-related behavior (see also 
Hirsch et al., 2006). Finally, there are models designed to explain normal instead of abnormal behavior 
(e.g., Bower, 1981; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and models related to one specific anxiety (disorder; for an 
overview see Mathews & Macleod, 2005), whereas the studies in this dissertation address several anxiety 
disorders.
Introduction of a new information-processing model
The new information-processing model of childhood anxiety that I would like to present is centered on 
the different cognitive biases as explained by the model developed by Muris and Field (2008); attention 
bias, interpretation bias and memory bias. Figure 2 visualizes this new model. In the following paragraphs 
I will explain the new model using this figure. 
Similar to the model developed by Muris and Field (2008), the first stage in the model is the experience 
of a stimulus or situation that requires processing. However, during information processing, not all stimuli 
will be processed further. In Figure 2, this is represented by a filter between the encounter of a situation 
and the role of cognitive biases in the processing of a stimulus. This filter derives from cognitive theories 
that highlight the role of content-specificity in more detail (e.g., Beck, 1976; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). 
The filter is different for every child and is based on personality characteristics and previous experiences. 
In Figure 2, this is represented by the box “Child Factors” displayed below the filter. Please note that I 
decided to only include child factors that are relevant for explaining the findings of this dissertation. 
There certainly are other child factors that could be included in the model that influence the filter such 
as parenting and evolution. If a stimulus is highly relevant for a child, there is a higher chance that the 
stimulus will pass the filter and will be processed further, than when the stimulus is not relevant. In this 
cognitive model related to anxiety, stimuli that are content-specific for a child’s anxiety disorder have the 
highest chance to be processed further, followed by stimuli that are generally anxiety-related. Stimuli 
that are not related to anxiety only have a low chance to be processed further. The more anxious the 
child, the more sensitive the filter is for stimuli related to the child’s anxiety. 
Chapter 12
202
Anxiety Response 
Physiology
Behavior
Subjective fear
Attention bias
Fear-related   
associations
Interpretation 
bias
Memory bias
Maladaptive cognitive 
schemas
Situation
Child factors 
Personality Trait 
anxiety Specific 
fears
Filter Automatic
Controlled
Specific 
threat
General 
threat
No threat
Figure 2. The newly developed Information-processing model of childhood anxiety describing the role of biased 
cognitive processes in the processing of threat-related information.
The stimuli that pass the filter will be processed further by the cognitive system. Different cognitive biases 
will influence the stimuli, and especially ambiguous stimuli will be highly likely to be biased towards 
danger and threat. The different cognitive biases; attention bias, interpretation bias and memory bias 
are listed in the center of Figure 2. Attention bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have 
the tendency to quickly focus attention on stimuli that are associated with fear and threat, and that they 
find it difficult to disengage attention from these stimuli (Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews & 
Macleod, 1985). Interpretation bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful individuals have the tendency 
to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening. Memory bias refers to the phenomenon that fearful 
individuals have the tendency to selectively recall negative information about oneself, past situations or 
events. As fear-related associations are thought to be the core of cognitive biases, these are added to 
the model (see also, Williams et al., 1997). Fear-related associations refer to the phenomenon that fearful 
children associate certain stimuli with fear.
Furthermore, I decided not to link specific cognitive biases to the encoding or the interpretation 
stage of information processing. In general, it is assumed that processes that play a role in the encoding 
stage are more automatic than the processes that play a role in the interpretation stage. However, it 
is not clear what the specific influences of the cognitive biases are at each stage. Alternatively, I want 
to emphasize the role of controlled and automatic processes in the processing of fear-related stimuli, 
and the possibility that cognitive biases consist of both controlled and automatic aspects. This element 
derives from dual processing models that highlight the role of controlled and automatic processes in 
explaining behavior (e.g., Strack and Deutch, 2004; see the answer to research goal 2). In general, it is 
expected that attention bias consists of relatively more automatic aspects, whereas interpretation bias 
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consists of relatively more controlled aspects. These different aspects of each bias should be measured 
separately and in parallel to each other. The role of both automatic and controlled processes is visualized 
in the cognitive biases column of Figure 2. As the distinction between automatic and controlled aspects 
can be seen as a dimension ranging from automatic to controlled, the column describing the cognitive 
processes ranges from grey to white (see also Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). The grey part of the column 
represents the automatic aspects of each cognitive bias, and the white part represents the controlled 
aspects of each cognitive bias. As attention biases and fear-related associations are often thought to 
consist of more automatic aspects and interpretation and memory biases to consist of more controlled 
aspects, attention bias and fear-related associations can be found in the upper part of the column with 
their names more in the grey area, and interpretation bias and memory bias can be found lower in the 
box with their names more in the white area (see Figure 2). 
Finally, just as in the model developed by Muris and Field (2008), if a situation is identified as 
dangerous, an anxiety response will be elicited. The only difference is that I specified the anxiety 
response into physiological reactions, behavioral expressions of anxiety, and subjective fear experience 
in the figure. As can be seen in Figure 2, cognitive biases point to the anxiety response individually, as 
this dissertation provides evidence that cognitive biases are able to independently predict different 
aspects of the anxiety response, such as avoidance behavior. Just as in the model developed by Muris 
and Field (2008), the anxiety response in turn strengthens the cognitive biases via the maladaptive 
schemas (see also Kendall, 1985). These maladaptive schemas might also influence child factors, such as 
fear of spiders, which is visualized with the dotted line. The dotted line indicates that it is not expected 
that every anxiety response influences the child factors per se, because child factors are thought to be 
more stable factors. 
Now that we have a new information-processing model of childhood anxiety that explains in 
more detail how a threat-related stimulus is processed by the cognitive system, the next step is to 
measure these processes. Therefore, I created Figure 3 in which I zoomed in on the cognitive processes 
and anxiety response column of Figure 2. This new figure includes four different boxes; the left box 
represents the cognitive processes and tasks to measure these processes. The three boxes on the 
right sight each represent tasks to measure one of the aspects of the anxiety response; physiological 
reactions, fear-related behavior, and subjective fear experience. As physiological measures were not 
included in this dissertation, I decided not to specify the block ‘Physiology’ any further (upper right box). 
The tasks that were used in the empirical chapters of this dissertation can be found in the corresponding 
box. As in Figure 2, the grey parts in each box represent more automatic aspects, and the white parts 
in each box represent more controlled aspects. Next, relations between the different measures were 
added based on the results of this dissertation. Dotted lines indicate that the relationship between two 
measures was not consistently found in the different studies of this dissertation. For example, attention 
bias correlated significantly with self-reported fear in Chapter 8, but not in Chapters 4 and 5. Attention 
bias predicted avoidance behavior related to spiders in a consistent way in Chapters 4, 5 and 8. Please 
note that I decided to only include relations based on the empirical evidence of this dissertation to 
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highlight the results of the different studies in this dissertation, clearly more relations can be drawn 
based on the literature.  
Of course the currently existing information-processing models, including this new model, are just 
a simplified presentation of the possible influence of biased cognitive processes in childhood anxiety, 
and clearly more research is needed to test the specifications described above. For example, it is not 
clear to what extent the different biases consist of more controlled and more automatic aspects, and 
how these different aspects interact with each other to elicit an anxiety response. Furthermore, it is not 
clear how the filter works exactly, and how for example previous events or other factors influence this 
filter. Therefore, the next paragraph provides limitations of the current dissertation and also provides 
directions for future research, but first I will give an example to explain the newly developed information-
processing model in more detail.
Attention bias
Fear-related associations
Interpretation bias
Memory bias
Automatic
Controlled
Cognitive Processes
Ambigious 
Story 
Telling
Size and 
Distance 
Estimation
Emotional 
Stroop Task
Affective 
Priming Task
Recall 
Task
Source
Memory
Task
Physiology
Behavior
Subjective Fear
Approach 
Avoidance 
Task
Behavioral 
Assessment 
Test
Social
Speech
Task
Automatic
Controlled
Automatic
Controlled
Automatic
Controlled
ADIS
SADS-C
SCARED
SPQ-C
SCAS
Auditory 
Interpretation 
Task
Figure 3. Tasks and relations between the tasks measuring different cognitive processes and the different aspects of 
the anxiety response; physiology. behavior, and subjective fear. 
Note. The grey part in every box represents more automatic aspects, the white part represents more controlled 
aspects. 
Example explaining the new information-processing model
Anna is a 10-year-old happy girl with lots of friends. The only thing that really bothers her is her fear of 
spiders. The model will be explained using the following situation: Anna walks on the sidewalk chatting 
to a friend when they encounter a classmate from school walking her dog without a leash. The sidewalk 
is quite narrow and one side is planted with bushes. It is autumn, and one of the bushes has a cobweb. 
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This situation includes several stimuli that could be processed, for example, the conversation, the 
dog, the sidewalk, the classmate, and the bush with the cobweb. Which stimuli will pass the filter? When 
looking at Figure 2, stimuli that are related to the content of the child’s fear, in this case fear of spiders, 
have the highest chance to pass the filter, followed by general anxiety stimuli, and non-fear related 
stimuli. In this case, it is expected that the stimulus ‘cobweb’ will pass the filter. As a result, Anna will focus 
her attention on the cobweb and asks herself if that small black dot over there is a spider (attention bias), 
fear-related associations will be activated; such as “spiders are dangerous”. She will assume that there is 
a huge dangerous spider in the cobweb (interpretation bias), as she remembers that there was one in 
a cobweb somewhere along this street a week ago, and it could well be that it was right here, “Yes, it 
certainly was right here” (memory bias). This processing will lead to avoiding to walk any further (fear-
related behavior), her body starts shaking and her heart starts beating faster (physiology), and she starts 
to feel very anxious (subjective fear experience). This anxiety response will lead to the strengthening 
of the maladaptive schemas, which will in turn lead to the maintenance and possible increase of the 
cognitive biases. It seems very reasonable that Anna will only react in an anxious way because of the 
possibility of a spider being in the cobweb and not because of the dog or her classmate, as she is only 
afraid of spiders and not of dogs or her classmate. Strangely enough, there are numerous studies using 
tasks in which the stimuli do not match the content of the child’s specific fear. Of course it could have 
been that Anna was also afraid of dogs or of social situations, as comorbidity of other anxiety disorders 
is often quite high. However, the point I want to make is that from a theoretical point of view, a child 
should only display an anxiety response when the content of the stimulus is relevant to his/her own fear. 
We now know that Anna is likely to process the stimulus ‘cobweb’, that biased cognitive processes 
will influence the processing of this stimulus, and that she is likely to experience fear-related behavior, 
physiological responses and the feeling of being anxious. How can we measure these different aspects? 
Figure 3 shows the measures that could be used to measure the different aspects of her spider fear. We 
could measure aspects of every cognitive bias using different cognitive bias tasks. We could measure 
the strength of Anna’s fear-related associations towards dogs and spiders, for example with an Affective 
Priming Task (indirect measure tapping into more automatic aspects), or by simply asking her to write 
down all words she can come up with when she thinks of spiders (direct measure tapping into more 
controlled aspects). We could measure her attention bias towards spiders by using tasks such as the 
Emotional Stroop Task or a Dot Probe Task. Different aspects of interpretation bias could be measured, 
for example, by asking Anna to indicate how large the spider is, how far she is away from the spider (both 
relatively indirect measures that tap into automatic aspects), and to ask her how she would interpret 
ambiguous situations related to spider threat (a relatively direct measure that taps into more controlled 
aspects). Memory bias can be measured, for example, by asking her to recall as much from the original 
ambiguous situation and her own interpretation of the situation. We can relate the outcomes of these 
bias tasks to each other, to behavioral, physiological and subjective fear tasks. For example, we could use 
the BAT to get an indication of relatively controllable avoidance of spiders, and see if the relatively more 
direct cognitive bias measures correlate more strongly with the BAT than the more indirect cognitive bias 
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measures. We could use eye tracking to get an indication of more automatic fear-related behavior and 
see how eye movements relate to the direct and indirect cognitive bias measures. We could measure 
heartbeat during the BAT (physiology) and we could ask her how afraid she was during the performance 
of the BAT (subjective fear experience), and relate these outcomes to the cognitive bias measures. Finally, 
we could try to decrease her cognitive biases related to spiders and her subjective fear of spiders, by 
for example, giving her a Cognitive Bias Modification training. These are examples of how to study the 
cognitive processes related to anxiety, and many more combinations are possible. 
Limitations and future research
Of course this dissertation has limitations that need to be mentioned. These limitations can be divided 
into three categories. First, there are limitations regarding the measures that were used. Second, there are 
limitations that are related to the characteristics of the samples. Third, there are limitations related to the 
design of the studies. These categories of limitations also include directions for future research. 
Limitations related to the measures 
The studies reported in the different chapters of this dissertation showed low to moderate correlations 
between the cognitive bias measures and self-reports and behavioral measures. Furthermore, the 
studies reported in Chapters 5, 6, and 8 were inconclusive regarding the relationship between the 
different cognitive biases; some of the correlations between the different biases were not significant, 
and the significant ones were somewhat inconsistent across the different chapters. One might speculate 
that different cognitive biases are simply not as closely related to each other and to anxiety as one might 
expect because they tap into separate underlying processes (see also van Bockstaele et al., 2011; Watts & 
Weems, 2006). However, there are other possible explanations of these findings related to the measures 
used, and these could be seen as shortcomings. 
The first alternative explanation for the weak correlations might be the different task characteristics 
(see also de Houwer, 2003). The tasks that were used in this dissertation employed different stimuli, for 
example pictures versus words; the Emotional Stroop Task consisted of pictures of spiders, the Affective 
Priming Task consisted of pictures of boys and girls looking happy or fearful and words related to spiders, 
and the subjective experience measures mostly consisted of questions with a fixed response. These 
different task characteristics might have suppressed the correlations.
Another explanation for the inconsistent findings might be that indirect measures are usually less 
reliable than direct measures. This might be especially true in child samples because children are generally 
more easily distracted and have relatively short attention spans (Huijding et al., 2010). There are relatively 
few studies that focused on the validity and reliability of indirect measures for children (e.g., Brown et al., 
2014). As a result, for some of the tasks that were used in this dissertation, no data are available on their 
validity and reliability. These measures were therefore only used for group comparisons, and they may 
not be suitable for individual assessment. Future studies should therefore focus on the reliability and 
validity of indirect measures. 
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A third explanation for the inconsistent findings might be the nature of cognitive biases. This 
dissertation provides evidence that cognitive biases might consist of both controlled and automatic 
processes. For instance, interpretation bias was measured with a relatively direct measure that tapped 
into more controlled aspects in Chapters 6, 7, 10 and 11, the Ambiguous Story Telling Paradigm, but 
was measured with relatively indirect measures that tapped into more automatic aspects in Chapters 
8 (Auditory Interpretation Task) and 9 (size and distance estimation). It is unclear if cognitive bias tasks 
with different characteristics show significant correlations with each other and with different measures 
of anxiety. I have not systematically studied these different processes and measures. The possibility 
that each cognitive bias includes both controlled and automatic aspects is not addressed in detail in 
the current theoretical models (e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005), 
and it was not studied systematically in this dissertation either. Future studies should therefore include 
different measures tapping into both controlled an automatic aspects of each cognitive bias, and these 
measures should be systematically tested in parallel to each other.
Another shortcoming related to the measures is that the results were inconclusive regarding the 
independent ability of direct and indirect measures to predict fear-related behavior in response to 
spiders. For example, the direct and indirect measure in Chapters 4 and 5 were able to independently 
of each other predict behavioral avoidance, but not in Chapter 6. As mentioned above, this might be 
due to the fact that this dissertation provides evidence that cognitive biases might consist of both 
controlled and automatic processes. It is unclear if cognitive bias tasks with different characteristics have 
the ability to independently predict fear-related behavior. This is not a limitation per se, but I have not 
systematically studied these different processes and measures in this dissertation. In the future, we need 
more research about exactly which aspects of fear-related behavior are predicted best by direct versus 
indirect measures. Furthermore, in addition to studying relatively controlled fear-related behavior as 
measured with the BAT, it is important to also measure more automatic aspects of fear-related behavior, 
for example with eye-tracking techniques or the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT). The study described 
in Chapter 3 employed the AAT to study automatic fear-related approach and avoidance tendencies 
elicited by spiders. Unfortunately, significant results were only found for girls and only in the first part of 
the task. Therefore, clearly more research is needed to develop more reliable measures to study more 
automatic fear-related behavior in children. 
Finally, the last shortcoming related to the measures is that I have focused only on subjective 
experience and fear-related behavior in relation to cognitive biases related to anxiety, and the new 
information-processing model is also centered on these factors. I have not included physiological 
measures in the studies described in this dissertation for practical reasons. As theories of emotion 
suggest that emotions consist of a triad of cognitive, behavioral and physiological aspects (e.g., Lang 
et al., 1997), it is important to include measures of physiology in future studies, and to compare these 
measures to cognitive bias measures, self-reports and behavioral measures. Furthermore, I have not 
studied cognitive biases and fear-related associations in relation to genes, the environment of the child, 
or their interaction, such as parenting, social referencing, influences of peers and the school, and cultural 
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aspects. Future studies should also address these aspects in relation to cognitive biases, and the different 
aspects of the anxiety emotion.
Limitations related to sample characteristics 
There are several shortcomings related to the characteristics of the sample. The first shortcoming is 
that the children who participated in Chapters 2 to 9 varied in their level of fear, but it was unknown if 
children had an anxiety disorder. As it is often stated that anxiety represents a dimensional construct, it 
could be expected that the underlying processes that play a role in elevated anxiety levels versus anxiety 
disorders are similar (MacLeod, 1991; Muris, 2007; Rapee, 2001). Nevertheless, this predisposition should 
be empirically tested. Therefore, I explored interpretation bias in a clinical sample in Chapters 10 and 11, 
finding evidence for specific interpretation biases in children with Social Phobia, Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder, or Separation Anxiety Disorder. Even though these results are in line with the results described 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the studies described in Chapters 10 and 11 only studied interpretation bias, and 
did not include a behavioral measure. It is therefore important to include other cognitive bias measures 
and a behavioral measure in clinical samples with different anxiety disorders. 
The second shortcoming related to the characteristics of the samples is that the children in Chapters 
2 to 6 were unselected children from a community sample. Whereas spider fear is relatively common 
in children, correlations might have suffered from reduced variability in the data. This was clearly the 
case in Chapter 3, but it might have influenced the correlations reported in the other chapters as well. 
For example, the correlations of Block 1 of the AAT with self-reported fear and the BAT in Chapter 3 was 
significant in girls, but not in boys. Boys reported less spider fear on the questionnaires and behaved 
more “bravely” in the BAT than girls. As a result of a lower mean and smaller variance, there were only 
very few boys who showed a high level of fear on the questionnaires and a high avoidance reaction on 
the BAT. When looking at the correlation within medium-to-highly fearful boys, the same pattern was 
found as in girls. 
The third shortcoming related to the characteristics of the sample is that the co-morbidity of anxiety 
disorders of the children who participated in Chapters 10 and 11 was relatively high. It was therefore not 
possible to develop highly specific stimuli related to a single, specific anxiety disorder. This might have 
added noise to the findings. Future studies may benefit from a more stimulus-specific approach (see 
also Elder et al., 2012).
The fourth shortcoming related to the characteristics of the sample is that the children who 
participated in these studies were aged between 6 and 13, and no conclusions can be drawn regarding 
the relationship between cognitive biases and anxiety in younger or older children. Future studies 
should therefore focus on children above the age of 13, and especially below the age of 6, as there are 
currently relatively few published studies that involve this younger age group (see also Hadwin & Field, 
2010). Maybe we have to develop even simpler versions of our tasks to study cognitive biases in children 
of this young age. 
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The fifth shortcoming related to the age of the children is that I have not taken development 
into account in this dissertation. I did control for age where possible, but I did not have sufficiently 
large samples to divide the children into different age groups in order to test the three research goals 
separately for each different age group. The low to moderate correlations and the inconsistent findings 
for the overlap between the different cognitive biases and the prediction of behavior could have been 
caused by the fact that I did not take age into account. There are indeed several cognitive models that 
address the importance of development in more detail, such as moderation models (development 
moderates cognitive biases) or acquisition models (development contributes to acquiring cognitive 
biases that did not previously exist, see Field & Lester, 2010). Future studies should therefore address the 
three research goals of this dissertation separately for different age groups. 
The final shortcoming that relates to the characteristic of the sample is that some of the children 
participated in several studies described in the different chapters. This means that some of the results of 
the studies described in different chapters are not independent. This has to be taken into account when 
interpreting the results. 
Limitations related to the design of the studies
All but one study described in this dissertation were cross-sectional. While evidence was found for the 
existence of fear-related associations and biased attention, interpretation and memory in Chapters 3 to 
10, these findings were correlational, and no conclusions can be drawn with regard to the causality of 
these biases. The first step in conducting research is to test for the relationship between two constructs, 
in this case to test whether cognitive biases are related to subjective fear and fear-related behavior, and 
how they are related to each other. The next step would be to test the direction of these relationships. 
The study described in Chapter 11 was one of the first steps to explore the direction of the effects. 
The children who participated in this study performed an interpretation bias training paradigm to train 
benign interpretations. Clinically anxious children were randomly assigned to either a positive training 
condition or a neutral condition. The results showed that it is possible to train positive interpretations 
and to reduce levels of social anxiety accordingly. However, it should be mentioned that this result was 
only found for children with an interpretation bias prior to training, and levels of self-reported social 
anxiety as reported by parents. Cleary more research is needed to explore the possible causal role of 
cognitive biases in the development of anxiety disorders. We are currently conducting a longitudinal 
study that may shed more light on this question. This longitudinal study follows children of parents 
with an anxiety disorder who do not experience anxiety-related problems at baseline. With the means 
of cognitive bias measures, we intend to predict which of the children will have developed an anxiety 
disorder two years later. 
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Conclusions 
This dissertation provides insights into the role of cognitive processes in childhood anxiety. The results 
suggest that fear-related associations exist in anxious children, just as biases in attention, interpretation 
and memory. These biases are specific to content-related materials, that is, children display biased 
cognitions related to the content of their anxiety disorder only. These findings are in line with the current 
cognitive theories and models stating that anxious children, just like anxious adults, display several 
cognitive biases, and that anxious individuals only display cognitive biases for threat-related stimuli and 
not for other stimuli (e.g., Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1985; Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Kendall, 1985; Kendall & 
Ronan, 1990; Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). This dissertation highlights the importance of 
using both direct and indirect measures to assess fear and anxiety in children, because they seem to 
tap into distinct processes which complement each other in the prediction of fear-related behavior. 
It therefore provides evidence for the importance of adding a behavioral measure to study cognitive 
processes in fear and anxiety. This is a methodological advancement, theoretically supported by dual 
processing models (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Furthermore, this dissertation 
provides the first study to demonstrate that clinically anxious pre-adolescent children can be trained 
away from negative interpretation biases to social-threat and reduce social anxiety accordingly, possibly 
in similar ways as in adults. It is also the first study that demonstrated the importance of using specific 
training stimuli, which is in line with the findings of content-specificity in Chapters 3 to 10. These 
findings are in line with cognitive theories that highlight the role of content-specificity (e.g., Beck, 1976; 
Schniering & Rapee, 2004).
These insights into the role of cognitive processes in childhood anxiety disorders provided the 
basis for the introduction of a new information-processing model of childhood anxiety. This new model 
highlights the role of cognitive biases in the maintenance of anxiety disorders, and it combines this 
with recent dual-process models, such as the one developed by Strack and Deutsch (2004). This new 
model underlines the content-specificity of cognitive biases, and the importance of both automatic and 
controlled processes that play a role in childhood anxiety. Such a model is currently not available in the 
childhood anxiety literature. This new model can be used to further conceptualize the role of cognitive 
biases in the maintenance of anxiety disorders in children. Furthermore, it could be used to provide 
a basis to develop new assessment methods to measure these biases. Finally, this model could be a 
good starting point for the development or adaptation of (new) intervention methods. By identifying 
cognitive biases and fear-related associations, and by developing methods that modify the biases, we 
may have a unique direction for treatments that addresses mechanisms which are not targeted by 
traditional treatment strategies. 
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Tijdens de ontwikkeling krijgt ieder kind te maken met diverse angsten, dit is heel normaal. Jonge 
kinderen hebben soms angsten voor specifieke situaties, zoals de angst om alleen gelaten te worden, 
angst voor het donker of angst voor dieren. Oudere kinderen hebben vaker angsten die te maken 
hebben met sociale situaties (Ollendick, Matson, & Helsel, 1985; Vasey, 1993). Bij de meeste kinderen 
verdwijnen deze angsten vanzelf (Fonseca & Perrin, 2001). Er is een kleine groep kinderen (tussen de 
2-10 procent) waarbij de angsten niet vanzelf overgaan en waarbij angst een grote rol speelt in het 
dagelijks leven (Kashani & Orvaschel, 1990; Rapee, Schniering, & Hudson, 2009). Bij deze kinderen wordt 
gesproken van een angststoornis (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Hoewel Cognitieve Gedragstherapie (CGT) voor kinderen met een angststoornis effectief is, is 
er ruimte voor verbetering (voor een overzicht, zie James, James, Cowdery, Solar, & Choke, 2013). Zo 
concludeerde James en collega’s (2013) bijvoorbeeld dat CGT effectief is in 59 % van de gevallen. Om 
effectievere screeningsmethodes en behandelingen te ontwikkelen, hebben we een beter begrip 
nodig van hoe angst zich ontwikkeld en in stand gehouden wordt. Daarom was het hoofddoel van dit 
proefschrift om verschillende cognitieve processen te bestuderen die een rol spelen bij de ontwikkeling 
en instandhouding van angst bij kinderen. Dit hoofddoel was onderverdeeld in drie subdoelen. 
Het eerste subdoel van het promotieonderzoek was om te onderzoeken of angstige kinderen 
cognitieve vertekeningen en angst-gerelateerde associaties hebben. Een cognitieve vertekening wordt 
ook wel uitgelegd als het hebben van een vertekend beeld van de werkelijkheid. Zo zou het bijvoorbeeld 
kunnen zijn dat iemand met een spinnenangst de gedachte heeft dat alle spinnen gevaarlijk zijn. Bij 
een associatie worden in gedachten twee verschillende concepten met elkaar in verband gebracht. 
Bij angst-gerelateerde associaties zou dit bijvoorbeeld ‘spin’ en ‘gevaar’ kunnen zijn. Daarnaast werd bij 
dit eerste subdoel bekeken of deze vertekeningen en associaties specifiek zijn voor de angst van het 
kind, dus of ze inhoud-specifiek zijn. Een kind met bijvoorbeeld angst voor spinnen zou dan wel een 
cognitieve vertekening laten zien ten opzichte van materiaal gerelateerd aan spinnen, maar niet aan 
materiaal dat gerelateerd is aan sociale situaties. 
Het tweede subdoel van dit promotieonderzoek was om te onderzoeken of de verschillende 
cognitieve vertekeningen en angst-gerelateerde associaties samenhang vertonen. Daarnaast werd bij 
dit subdoel bekeken wat de relatie is tussen bovengenoemde cognitieve processen en angstig gedrag. 
Het derde subdoel van dit proefschrift was om te onderzoeken of het mogelijk is om angst bij 
kinderen te verminderen door het aanleren van niet-angstige beelden die gemakkelijker toegankelijk 
worden dan de cognitieve vertekeningen. Deze drie subdoelen zijn onderzocht met behulp van tien 
samenhangende empirische studies. 
In deze samenvatting zal allereerst een overzicht gegeven worden van de belangrijkste 
onderzoeksbevindingen per subdoel. Op basis van de bevindingen wordt een nieuw informatie-
verwerkingsmodel gepresenteerd, waarna een overzicht volgt van de belangrijkste conclusies. 
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1. Cognitieve vertekeningen en specificiteit
In vergelijking met de volwassenenliteratuur zijn er relatief weinig studies bij kinderen gedaan die 
naast directe metingen ook indirecte metingen gebruiken om cognitieve vertekeningen en de 
inhoud-specificiteit van deze vertekeningen te bestuderen. Een directe meting is een meting waarin 
een kind expliciet gevraagd wordt om zijn gedachten en attitudes te uiten. Bij een indirecte meting 
wordt dit niet direct gevraagd, maar gemeten door bijvoorbeeld het observeren van gedrag tijdens 
een taak. Het gebruik van indirecte metingen naast directe metingen kan voordelen hebben, omdat 
indirecte metingen minder vatbaar zijn voor sociaal wenselijke antwoorden dan directe metingen 
(Bijttebier, Vasey, & Braet, 2003). Een ander voordeel van het gebruik van zowel directe metingen als 
indirecte metingen bij het bestuderen van cognitieve vertekeningen is dat gedragingen en gedachten 
- waaronder cognitieve vertekeningen - bestaan uit zowel gecontroleerde processen als automatische 
processen. Gecontroleerde processen zijn processen die opzettelijk, strategisch, langzaam en bewust 
zijn. Automatische processen daarentegen zijn onopzettelijk, snel en niet altijd bewust. Een voorbeeld: 
als je ’s nachts slaapt word je ineens wakker van een geluid, je voelt je hart bonzen en je voelt je angstig 
(automatische aspecten). Dan herinner je je ineens wat het geluid veroorzaakt kan hebben, je hebt 
namelijk net een nieuwe hond (gecontroleerde aspecten). Cognitieve processen gerelateerd aan 
angst hoeven niet geheel gecontroleerd of automatisch te zijn maar zijn meestal een combinatie van 
beide. Gecontroleerde processen kunnen het best gemeten worden met directe metingen, de meer 
automatische processen kunnen beter gemeten worden met indirecte metingen (bijv. de Houwer, 
2006).
Tot nu toe zijn er verschillende studies die aantonen dat angstige kinderen vertekeningen in de 
interpretatie vertonen. Een vertekening in de interpretatie houdt in dat angstige kinderen de neiging 
hebben om situaties die niet duidelijk negatief of positief zijn, als negatief of bedreigend te interpreteren. 
Wisselende resultaten werden gevonden voor het bestaan van vertekeningen in de aandacht. Een 
vertekening in de aandacht houdt in dat angstige kinderen mogelijk hun aandacht meer richten op 
situaties of stimuli die gerelateerd zijn aan angst. Er werd weinig bewijs gevonden voor het bestaan 
van vertekeningen in het geheugen en voor het bestaan van angst-gerelateerde associaties. Een 
vertekening in het geheugen houdt in dat angstige kinderen materiaal dat gerelateerd is aan angst 
mogelijk beter onthouden dan ander materiaal. Gemengd bewijs werd gevonden voor de specificiteit 
van vertekeningen in interpretatie. Een aantal studies vond bewijs voor de inhoud-specificiteit van de 
vertekeningen in aandacht. Er was geen bewijs voor de specificiteit van vertekeningen in geheugen 
en angst-gerelateerde associaties (voor een overzicht, zie Hadwin & Field, 2010). Er is duidelijk meer 
onderzoek nodig naar de verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen en de inhoud-specificiteit hiervan. 
Het eerste subdoel van dit promotieonderzoek was daarom om deze vertekeningen en de inhoud-
specificiteit van deze vertekeningen te bestuderen bij angstige kinderen.
De resultaten van de studies die beschreven staan in dit proefschrift lieten zien dat angstige 
kinderen vertekeningen tonen die gerelateerd zijn aan aandacht en interpretatie. Daarnaast werd er 
bewijs gevonden voor het bestaan van angst-gerelateerde associaties. Er werd slechts deels bewijs 
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gevonden voor het bestaan van vertekeningen in het geheugen; dit werd wel gevonden met een 
geheugen taak (source memory task) maar niet met een herinneringstaak (recall task). De relaties 
tussen deze cognitieve vertekeningen en directe metingen angst waren allemaal zwak tot matig. Deze 
bevindingen zijn in overeenstemming met de bevindingen in de kinder- en volwassenenliteratuur 
(zie ook Hadwin & Field; Williams, 1997). De studies in dit proefschrift richtten zich meer in detail op 
vertekeningen in interpretatie. Door nieuwe taken te ontwikkelen en taken aan te passen die meer 
indirect waren dan de meest gebruikte methoden, konden ook meer automatische aspecten van 
vertekeningen in interpretatie gemeten worden. Er werd bewijs gevonden voor zowel het bestaan 
van automatisch verlopende visuele vertekeningen als voor auditieve vertekeningen in interpretatie. 
Hiermee werd bewijs gevonden dat vertekeningen in interpretatie zowel uit meer gecontroleerde als 
uit meer automatische aspecten bestaan. 
De resultaten van de studies in dit proefschrift lieten zien dat deze cognitieve vertekeningen specifiek 
zijn voor de angst van het kind. Zo vonden we bijvoorbeeld dat kinderen die bang waren voor spinnen 
wel vertekeningen lieten zien ten opzichte van materiaal dat gerelateerd was aan spinnen, maar niet 
ten opzichte van materiaal dat gerelateerd was aan andere dieren, sociale situaties, neutrale situaties 
of positieve situaties. In dit onderzoek werd bewijs gevonden voor het bestaan van inhoud-specifieke 
vertekeningen met betrekking tot spinnenangst, sociale angst, gegeneraliseerde angst en separatie 
angst. Deze resultaten ondersteunen cognitieve theorieën die het belang van inhoud-specificiteit 
benadrukken (bijv. Beck, 1976). Bovendien komen deze resultaten overeen met classificatie systemen 
voor psychische stoornissen bij kinderen, zoals de DSM-5 (APA, 2013). 
2. Relatie tussen cognitieve vertekeningen en angstig gedrag
Diverse cognitieve modellen voor angststoornissen veronderstellen dat verschillende cognitieve 
vertekeningen samenwerken bij het ontstaan en in stand houden van angst (bijv. Mogg & Bradley; Weems 
& Watts, 2005; Williams et al., 1997). Deze modellen voorspellen dat de verschillende vertekeningen 
gerelateerd zijn aan elkaar, en dat deze vertekeningen tot op een bepaalde hoogte allemaal een unieke 
relatie hebben met angst. Tot nu toe zijn er echter slechts enkele studies gepubliceerd die deze relaties 
bij kinderen onderzochten (bijv. Broeren, Muris, Bouwmeester, Field, & Voerman, 2011; Brown et al., 
2014; Watts & Weems, 2006). Er zijn geen studies beschikbaar die zowel directe als indirecte metingen 
relateren aan angstig gedrag bij kinderen, terwijl uit de volwassenenliteratuur blijkt dat het van belang 
zou kunnen zijn om dit wel te doen (bijv. Egloff & Schmulke, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & 
Banaji, 2009; Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Huijding & de Jong 2006; Teachman & Woody, 2003). Er is duidelijk 
meer onderzoek nodig op dit gebied. Het tweede subdoel bestudeerde de onderlinge samenhang 
tussen de verschillende vertekeningen en angst-gerelateerde associaties en onderzocht daarnaast de 
relatie met gedrag.
De bevindingen in dit promotieondezoek waren niet in overeenkomst met de verwachte samenhang 
tussen de verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen. Er werden slechts zwakke correlaties gevonden tussen 
de verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen, en wanneer deze correlaties significant waren, was het 
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patroon niet eenduidig. Deze resultaten zijn vergelijkbaar met andere studies bij kinderen die de relaties 
tussen verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen bestudeerden (bijv. Broeren, Muris, Bouwmeester, Field 
& Voerman, 2011; Brown et al., 2014; Richards, French, Nash, Hadwin, & Donnelly, 2007; Weems, Costa, 
Watts, Taylor, & Cannon, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006). De resultaten zijn ook vergelijkbaar met studies bij 
volwassenen, waar ook gemixte resultaten gevonden werden (zie ook Hirsch, Clark & Mathews, 2006). 
De resultaten in dit onderzoek lieten zien dat bijna alle directe en indirecte metingen significant 
samenhingen met relatief gecontroleerd gedrag gemeten met de Behavioral Assessment Test en de 
Social Speech Task. De resultaten van deze studies lieten zien dat cognitieve processen belangrijk zijn 
in het voorspellen van angstig gedrag bij kinderen. Daarnaast lieten de resultaten in hoofdstukken 5, 
6 en 8 zien dat verschillende indirecte metingen onafhankelijk van elkaar in staat waren om angstig 
gedrag te voorspellen. In hoofdstuk 5 en 8 voorspelden de indirecte metingen bovendien unieke 
variantie bovenop de variantie die voorspeld werd door de directe meting. Deze resultaten lieten 
zien dat verschillende indirecte metingen belangrijk waren in het voorspellen van angstig gedrag, 
naast het gebruik van directe metingen. Het was dus belangrijk om naast gecontroleerde processen, 
ook automatische processen in kaart te brengen. Daarmee ondersteunen deze resultaten het gebruik 
van indirecte metingen in wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar angst bij kinderen. Deze resultaten zijn in 
overeenstemming met één van de eerste cognitieve theorieën (Kendall, 1985), waarin het belang van 
het bestuderen van automatische processen met behulp van indirecte metingen benadrukt wordt
Tot slot leverden de resultaten in dit proefschrift bewijs voor de validiteit van de verschillende 
metingen. Zowel de directe metingen als de indirecte metingen konden gedrag voorspellen, zelfs 
als de directe en indirecte metingen niet significant met elkaar correleerden. Hoewel de huidige 
informatieverwerkingsmodellen niet direct een verklaring geven voor deze bevindingen, kunnen deze 
bevindingen wel verklaard worden door recent ontwikkelde duale proces modellen (bv., Beck & Clark, 
1997; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Deze modellen maken een duidelijk onderscheid tussen gecontroleerde 
en automatische processen. Deze modellen veronderstellen dat gecontroleerde processen en 
automatische processen afzonderlijke processen zijn die gedeeltelijk parallel aan elkaar verlopen. Op 
sommige punten in het proces overlappen de beide processen. Deze processen beïnvloeden dus zowel 
onafhankelijk van elkaar als samen het gedrag van het kind. Het is van daaruit te verwachten dat directe 
metingen (om gecontroleerde processen te meten) en indirecte metingen (om automatische processen 
te meten) overlap vertonen, maar dat ze geen hoge samenhang laten zien. 
3. Interpretatietraining 
In vergelijking met de volwassenenliteratuur, zijn er relatief weinig studies bij kinderen die onderzoeken 
of angst verminderd kan worden door het afleren van cognitieve vertekeningen. Er is bewijs dat het 
mogelijk is om cognitieve vertekeningen af te leren bij kinderen door middel van training, maar er 
zijn verschillende beperkingen in opzet van de studies waardoor het niet mogelijk is om duidelijke 
conclusies te trekken (Lester, Field, & Muris, 2011a; Lester, Field, & Muris, 2011b; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, 
& Hameetman, 2008; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, & Vreden, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & 
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Prantzalou, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Blackwell, Moberly, & Karahaliou, 2012). Zo is er bijvoorbeeld één studie 
die een afname laat zien in vertekeningen in de interpretatie, maar waar geen controletraining gebruikt 
is. Er is duidelijk meer onderzoek nodig naar de mogelijkheid om vertekeningen af te leren. Het derde 
subdoel van dit proefschrift was daarom om te onderzoeken of het mogelijk is om angst bij kinderen te 
verminderen door het afleren van cognitieve vertekeningen in de interpretatie.
De studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 11 was de eerste studie die een interpretatie training onderzocht 
in een groep van kinderen met een angststoornis. Deze studie liet zien dat het mogelijk is om 
vertekeningen in interpretatie voor sociale situaties weg te trainen bij kinderen die voor de training 
vertekeningen in interpretatiebias lieten zien. Daarnaast rapporteerden ouders een significante afname 
in sociale angst bij hun kind als hun kind de actieve training had gevolgd. De ouders van de kinderen 
die de controle training hadden gevolgd rapporteerden deze afname in sociale angst niet. Kinderen zelf 
rapporteerden geen significante verschillen. Deze resultaten zijn deels in overeenstemming met eerdere 
onderzoeken bij kinderen (Lester et al., 2011a, 2011b; Muris et al., 2008; Muris et al., 2009; Vassilopoulos et 
al., 2009). Onze studie toonde aan dat het mogelijk is om negatieve vertekeningen in interpretatie af te 
leren, mogelijk op dezelfde manier als bij volwassenen (voor review artikelen van trainingsstudies voor 
vertekeningen in interpretatie bij volwassenen, zie Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 
2014). 
Naar een meer gedetailleerd informatieverwerkingsmodel voor angst bij 
kinderen
De drie subdoelen van dit proefschrift werden gebaseerd op één van de belangrijkste 
informatieverwerkingsmodellen voor angst bij kinderen, ontwikkeld door Daleiden en Vasey (1997). In 
2008 werkten Muris en Field (2008) de eerste twee fases verder uit (de coderingsfase en de interpretatie 
fase) om de rol van vertekeningen in aandacht, interpretatie en geheugen bij angstige kinderen te 
bestuderen (zie figuur 1).
Hoewel de drie subdoelen gebaseerd zijn op de modellen die ontwikkeld werden door Daleiden 
en Vasey (1997) en Muris en Field (2008), waren de resultaten niet zo gemakkelijk te verklaren met dit 
model. Dit is de reden dat we ervoor gekozen hebben om een nieuw informatieverwerkingsmodel 
te ontwikkelen. Dit nieuwe model is gebaseerd op bovengenoemde modellen, maar is op een aantal 
punten meer gespecificeerd zodat de resultaten van dit proefschrift beter te interpreteren en te 
integreren zijn in de bestaande literatuur. 
Het nieuwe informatieverwerkingsmodel dat op basis van de resultaten van dit proefschrift werd 
ontwikkeld is opgebouwd rondom de verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen, te weten: aandacht, 
interpretatie en geheugen. Figuur 2 visualiseert dit nieuwe model. Net als in het model van Muris en Field 
(2008) bestaat de eerste fase uit het ervaren van een stimulus die verwerkt moet worden. Echter niet 
alle stimuli worden verwerkt, alleen ‘belangrijke’ informatie wordt verwerkt. Wat belangrijk is, verschilt 
per persoon en is gebaseerd op onder andere persoonlijkheid en eerdere ervaringen. In het model 
wordt dit aangegeven met behulp van een filter. Het concept ‘filter’ komt uit cognitieve theorieën die 
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Figuur 1. Informatieverwerkingsmodel door Muris en Field (2008). Dit model benadrukt de invloed van cognitieve 
vertekeningen in de verwerking van angst-gerelateerde informatie 
Note. Copyright © 2008 (Routledge Taylor & Francis group). www.tandfonline.com
Figuur 2. Het nieuw ontwikkelde informatieverwerkingsmodel voor angst bij kinderen. Dit model beschrijft de rol 
van cognitieve vertekeningen bij het verwerken van angst-gerelateerde informatie
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de rol van inhoud-specificiteit beschrijven (bijv. Beck, 1976; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). Als een stimulus 
belangrijk genoeg is om de filter te passeren, zal de stimulus verder verwerkt worden. Tijdens de verdere 
verwerking van de stimulus zijn er verschillende cognitieve processen die de stimulus beïnvloeden en 
daarmee betekenis geven aan de stimulus. Met name ambigue stimuli (waarvan de betekenis onduidelijk 
is) zijn vatbaar voor de beïnvloeding door verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen. De verschillende 
cognitieve vertekeningen staan in de middelste kolom in figuur 2. We hebben ervoor gekozen om in 
het model geen verschillende fases te onderscheiden bij de diverse cognitieve vertekeningen, zoals in 
de modellen van Daleiden en Vasey (1997) en Muris en Field (2008) wel het geval is. In plaats daarvan 
kozen we ervoor om de rol van gecontroleerde processen en automatische processen te benadrukken, 
en daarmee de mogelijkheid dat cognitieve vertekeningen zowel uit gecontroleerde aspecten als 
automatische aspecten bestaan. Omdat het onderscheid tussen gecontroleerd en automatisch het 
meest gezien wordt als een dimensie verloopt de kleur in de kolom van donkergrijs (automatisch) 
naar lichtgrijs (gecontroleerd). Omdat vertekeningen in de aandacht en angst-gerelateerde associaties 
over het algemeen worden gezien als meer automatisch verlopende processen staan deze meer in het 
donker grijze deel van de kolom en interpretatie en geheugen meer in het lichtgrijze gedeelte.
Uiteindelijk zal de verwerking van een stimulus leiden tot een reactie. Bij een angstig kind zal een 
angst-gerelateerde stimulus leiden tot een angstige reactie. Deze reactie bestaat uit verschillende 
aspecten; fysiologie, gedrag en subjectieve beleving. Net als in het model van Muris en Field (2008) 
versterkt de angstige reactie de maladaptieve cognitieve schema’s en versterkt daarmee indirect de 
cognitieve vertekeningen en in mindere mate ook de kind factoren.
Nu we een nieuw informatieverwerkingsmodel ontwikkeld hebben, is de volgende stap hoe 
de verschillende processen het beste gemeten kunnen worden. In figuur 3 hebben we daarom 
ingezoomd op de ‘cognitieve processen’ kolom en de ‘angstreactie’ kolom. Per cognitieve vertekening en 
angstreactie hebben we de taken verwerkt die gebruikt werden in dit promotieonderzoek. Een gewone 
lijn betekent dat er in dit onderzoek bewijs werd gevonden voor een significante samenhang tussen 
de twee aspecten. Een stippellijn betekent dat er tegenstrijdige samenhang werd gevonden tussen de 
twee aspecten. Zo werd in hoofdstuk 8 een significante samenhang gevonden tussen vertekeningen 
in aandacht en zelf-gerapporteerde angst, maar niet in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 (stippellijn). Daarentegen 
werd in hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 8 een significante samenhang gevonden voor vertekening in de aandacht en 
vermijdend gedrag (doorgetrokken lijn).
Uiteraard zijn de bestaande informatieverwerkingsmodellen, en ook dit nieuwe model, slechts 
een vereenvoudigde weergave van de werkelijkheid. Er is duidelijk meer onderzoek nodig om de 
specificaties te testen, zoals die in het nieuwe model zijn beschreven. Het is bijvoorbeeld niet duidelijk 
voor welk gedeelte cognitieve vertekeningen bestaan uit gecontroleerde en automatische aspecten 
en hoe deze verschillende aspecten samenwerken in het uitlokken van een angstige reactie. Het nieuw 
ontwikkelde informatieverwerkingsmodel wordt hierna toegelicht met behulp van een voorbeeld 
waarna een overzicht volgt van de belangrijkste conclusies van dit proefschrift.
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Figuur 3 Taken en de relatie tussen de taken die verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen meten en taken die de 
verschillende aspecten meten van de angst reactie; fysiologie, gedrag en subjectieve beleving. 
Notitie. Het donkergrijze gedeelte in iedere kolom vertegenwoordigd de meer automatische aspecten, het lichtgrijze 
gedeelte in iedere kolom vertegenwoordigd de meer gecontroleerde aspecten
Voorbeeld 
Anna is een gelukkig 10-jarig meisje met een heleboel vriendinnetjes. Het enige dat ze echt vervelend 
vindt is haar angst voor spinnen. Anna loopt op de stoep samen met een vriendinnetje als ze een 
klasgenootje tegenkomt samen met haar hond. De stoep is best smal en aan één kant van de stoep 
staan allemaal struiken. Het is herfst en in een van de struiken hangt een spinnenweb. 
Bovengenoemde situatie bestaat uit verschillende stimuli die verwerkt zouden kunnen worden. 
Voorbeelden zijn: het gesprek, de hond, het klasgenootje, de struik en het spinnenweb. Welke stimuli 
zullen door de filter heen gaan en verder verwerkt worden? Als gekeken wordt naar figuur 2, dan is 
de kans het grootst dat de stimuli die gerelateerd zijn aan de angst van het kind de filter passeren. In 
dit geval is dat de stimulus ‘spinnenweb’. Als gevolg hiervan zal Anna haar aandacht richten op het 
spinnenweb en zichzelf afvragen of dat kleine zwarte rondje een spin is (vertekening in aandacht), 
angst-gerelateerde associaties zullen geactiveerd worden, zoals ‘spinnen zijn gevaarlijk’. Anna zal ervan 
uitgaan dat het een grote gevaarlijke spin is in het spinnenweb (vertekening in interpretatie), want ze 
herinnert zich dat er eerder een soortgelijke spin in een spinnenweb zat, en het zou best kunnen dat het 
precies hier was, ‘ja, het was echt hier’ (vertekening in geheugen). Deze informatieverwerking zal ervoor 
zorgen dat Anna niet meer verder loopt (angstig gedrag), dat haar lijf helemaal gaat trillen (fysiologie) 
en dat ze zich heel angstig voelt (subjectieve beleving). Deze angstige reactie zal ervoor zorgen dat 
de maladaptieve schema’s sterker worden, waardoor de verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen zullen 
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blijven bestaan of misschien zelfs sterker worden. Het lijkt aannemelijk dat Anna alleen angstig zal 
reageren vanwege de mogelijkheid dat er een spin in het spinnenweb zit en niet vanwege de hond of 
haar klasgenootje, omdat ze niet bang is voor honden of sociale situaties. Natuurlijk zou het kunnen dat 
Anna ook bang is voor honden of sociale situaties, omdat de co-morbiditeit tussen angststoornissen 
vaak hoog is. Echter, vanuit een theoretisch perspectief is te verwachten dat een kind alleen angstig 
reageert wanneer de stimulus relevant is voor zijn eigen angst.
We weten nu dat de kans groot is, dat 1) Anna de stimulus ‘spinnenweb’ zal verwerken, 
2) vertekeningen in de cognitieve processen deze verwerking zullen beïnvloeden en 3) de kans groot is 
dat Anna angstig zal reageren. In figuur 3 staan de verschillende manieren waarop deze verschillende 
aspecten gemeten zouden kunnen worden. We kunnen de sterkte van Anna’s angst-gerelateerde 
associaties bijvoorbeeld meten met een Affectieve Priming Task (een indirecte meting die zich richt 
op de automatische aspecten), of door haar te vragen waar ze aan denkt als ze aan spinnen denkt 
(directe meting die zich richt op de gecontroleerde aspecten). We kunnen haar vertekening in aandacht 
meten door taken te gebruiken zoals de Emotional Stroop Task of de Dot Probe Task. Verschillende 
aspecten van vertekeningen in interpretatie kunnen we meten door Anna bijvoorbeeld te vragen of ze 
de grootte van een spin zou willen inschatten en hoe ver weg ze is van de spin (beide relatief indirecte 
metingen) of haar te vragen hoe ze ambigue situaties zou interpreteren die gerelateerd zijn aan 
spinnen (relatief directe meting). Vertekeningen in geheugen kunnen bijvoorbeeld gemeten worden 
door haar te vragen of ze zich de ambigue situatie nog kan herinneren. We kunnen de uitkomsten van 
deze taken met elkaar vergelijken, met gedragsmetingen, fysiologische metingen en vragenlijsten die 
subjectieve ervaringen meten. We kunnen bijvoorbeeld de Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT) gebruiken 
om een indicatie te krijgen van haar relatief gecontroleerde gedrag ten opzichte van spinnen. Tijdens 
de BAT kunnen we Anna vragen om steeds een stapje dichterbij een bak te komen waar een spin in 
zit. Oogbewegingen kunnen gemeten worden om meer automatische gedragingen te bestuderen. 
Tijdens de BAT kunnen we haar hartslag meten (fysiologie) en we kunnen haar vragen hoe bang ze was 
tijdens de BAT (subjectieve angst). Tot slot kunnen we proberen om Anna haar angst voor spinnen te 
verminderen door haar een training te geven die haar vertekening in interpretatie wegneemt. Dit zijn 
slechts voorbeelden van manieren waarop we de verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen en angstige 
reacties zouden kunnen meten; veel meer andere combinaties zijn denkbaar. 
Conclusies
De onderzoeksbevindingen van de studies in dit proefschrift geven meer inzicht in de verschillende 
cognitieve processen die een rol spelen bij kinderen met angst. Dit onderzoek geeft aanwijzingen 
voor het bestaan van 1) gecontroleerd en automatisch toenaderings- en vermijdingsgedrag, 2) angst-
gerelateerde associaties, en 3) vertekeningen in aandacht, interpretatie en geheugen. Daarnaast vonden 
we dat deze cognitieve vertekeningen en associaties inhoud-specifiek waren. Dit betekent dat kinderen 
met angst alleen cognitieve vertekeningen vertonen voor materiaal dat gerelateerd is aan hun eigen 
angst. Deze bevindingen komen overeen met de huidige cognitieve theorieën en modellen die ervan 
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uitgaan dat angstige kinderen, net als angstige volwassenen, verschillende cognitieve vertekeningen 
hebben die gerelateerd zijn aan de inhoud van de angst (bijv. Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1985; Kendall, 1985; 
Kendall & Ronan, 1990; Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005; Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). Het onderzoek 
beschreven in dit proefschrift geeft ook het belang weer van het gebruik van zowel directe als indirecte 
meetinstrumenten om angst bij kinderen te onderzoeken, omdat er aanwijzingen zijn dat beide soorten 
instrumenten verschillende processen meten die belangrijk zijn in het voorspellen van angstig gedrag. 
Mede hierdoor benadrukt dit onderzoek het belang van het toevoegen van een gedragsmeting om 
cognitieve vertekeningen te onderzoeken bij kinderen met angst. Dit wordt theoretisch onderbouwd 
door recent ontwikkelde ‘dubbele proces modellen’ (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Beck & Clark, 1997). 
Daarnaast bevat dit proefschrift de eerste studie die laat zien dat kinderen met een angststoornis 
mogelijk baat hebben bij een training die vertekeningen in interpretatie wegneemt. 
Deze inzichten in de rol van cognitieve processen bij angstige kinderen was de basis voor het 
ontwikkelen van een nieuw informatieverwerkingsmodel voor angst bij kinderen. Dit nieuwe model 
benadrukt de rol van cognitieve processen bij de instandhouding van angststoornissen en combineert 
dit met recente ‘duale proces modellen’ zoals die ontwikkeld zijn door onder andere Strack en Deutsch 
(2004). Dit nieuwe model benadrukt daarnaast het belang van inhoud-specificiteit en het bestaan van 
zowel automatische als gecontroleerde processen die een rol spelen bij angstige kinderen. Zo’n model 
is momenteel niet beschikbaar in de wetenschappelijk literatuur over angst bij kinderen. Dit model 
kan gebruikt worden om de rol van cognitieve processen verder uit te werken. Dit model kan ook 
gebruikt worden om nieuwe methoden te ontwikkelen om cognitieve vertekeningen te meten. Tot 
slot zou dit model ook een beginpunt kunnen vormen voor het ontwikkelen of aanpassen van (nieuwe) 
interventies. Door methoden te ontwikkelen om cognitieve vertekeningen beter te onderkennen en 
te veranderen, zetten we een unieke stap richting de ontwikkeling van interventies die gebaseerd zijn 
op in standhoudende mechanismen die nu door traditionele interventies niet aangesproken worden. 
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Ap
Fear-related associations
Affective Priming Task 
The Affective Priming Task (APT; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) is a task in which target 
stimuli have to be categorized, for example, assigning photos of a smiling child and a fearful looking child 
to a happy versus a fear category. Each target stimulus is preceded by a prime stimulus that does not 
require a response, for example, words related to spiders or butterflies. This prime stimulus is supposed 
to facilitate or impede the targets’ categorization. The child’s task is to categorize the target stimuli as 
quickly as possible by pressing a corresponding button that represents the category. The main idea of 
this task is that children are expected to respond faster to trials in which the target-prime combination 
is associated in memory (congruent) than to stimulus combinations that are not associated in memory 
(incongruent). For example, when a child is afraid of spiders, it is expected that this child responds 
faster to the photo of the fearful child (congruent), than to the photo of the smiling child (incongruent). 
Usually, the difference in performance between the congruent and incongruent trials is referred to as 
the APT effect, and is an indication of the relative strength of the association between the target and the 
prime. A disadvantage of this task is that there are no published studies in childhood anxiety available 
yet that report on the reliability of this task. Adult studies however, showed low to moderate reliability of 
this task (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennerbaker, 2000; Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010).
Implicit Association Test 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is a task in which the child is 
asked to sort stimuli into two target categories (such as ‘me’ versus ‘other’), and other stimuli into two 
attribute categories (such as ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’), using only two response buttons. A typical IAT 
consists of 5 phases; the goal of the first two phases is to introduce the different stimuli related to the 
target and attribute categories. The child’s task is to categorize different words related to the target 
categories in the first phase by pressing, for example, the left button for words related to ‘me’ and the 
right button for words related to ‘other’. In the second phase, the child categorizes different words related 
to the attribute categories, for example, positive words with the left button, and negative words with the 
right button. The third phase is a test phase in which the child’s task is to sort words related to both the 
attribute and target categories with the same response buttons as in phase one and two. In this case, the 
child presses the left button for words related to ‘me’ and ‘positive’ and the right button for words related 
to ‘other’ and ‘negative’. In the fourth phase, the response buttons for the target categories from phase 
one are switched. Thus, when following the example, the child now practices to respond with the left 
button for words related to ‘other’ and with the right button for words related to ‘me’. The final phase is a 
test phase again. This phase is almost the same as phase three; the only difference is that the buttons for 
the target categories are still switched, and thus the same as in the fourth phase. In this case, the child 
presses the left button for words related to ‘other’ and ‘positive’ and the right button for words related 
to ‘me and ‘negative’. This ‘associative strength’ is reflected in the reaction times during the IAT. The main 
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idea of this task is that children are expected to respond faster when the target stimuli are associated 
more strongly in memory (congruent) with the attribute category, than when the target stimuli and the 
attribute category are associated less strongly in memory (incongruent). For example, if the child has a 
low self-esteem, it is expected that the reaction times for the combination ‘me’ and ‘negative’ (congruent) 
are faster than the reaction times for the combination ‘me’ and ‘positive’. Usually, similar to the APT, the 
difference in performance between the congruent and incongruent trials is referred to as the IAT effect, 
and is an indication of the strength of the fear-related association. An advantage of this task is that 
the internal consistency and reliability are generally better than those of other reaction time based 
tasks (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000). Disadvantages of this task are that the task can only be used to assess 
the relative associations between two concepts, for example ‘me’ versus ‘other’, and two attributes, e.g. 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ making the result highly relative. Moreover, as may have become obvious from 
the description of the task, it is quite complicated, and it may be too difficult for children. A variation of 
the IAT is the Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT, Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2005) 
in which the child’s task is to pair only one target with two attributes. An advantage of this task is that it 
is irrelevant whether the target has a meaningful contrast or not, because it only consists of one target. 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task 
The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) is a task in which stimuli related to one 
target category (e.g., animals) and stimuli related to two attribute categories (e.g., positive and negative) 
have to be sorted using two response buttons. This task is more indirect than the IAT, as this task uses 
irrelevant task features, such as the color or the shape of the target stimuli. The task consists of two 
different phases; in the first phase, attribute stimuli have to be sorted according to their valence, for 
example negative and positive words have to be sorted as either negative (left button) or positive (right 
button). As a result, one of the response buttons will be evaluated as positive, the other response button 
will be evaluated as negative. In the second phase, the child’s task is to sort the attribute stimuli from 
phase one again using the same buttons. Additionally, the target stimuli, for example pictures of animals 
(spiders, butterflies, bugs), are introduced and all pictures have a frame in one of two colors (e.g., red or 
blue). These target pictures have to be sorted based on their frame color, and all pictures are presented in 
both frame colors. The child’s task is, for example, to push the left button for negative stimulus attribute 
words and red-framed pictures of animals and the right button for the positive stimulus attribute words 
and blue-framed pictures of animals. The main idea of this task is that the children first learn to associate 
a specific button with positive or negative. Hence, in the critical second phase children are expected 
to be faster to respond when the target stimulus and the valence of the button are similar (congruent) 
than when a target stimulus and the valence of the button are not similar (incongruent). Thus, children 
who are afraid of spiders are expected to respond faster when the picture of the spider frame is red, as 
they have to push the ‘negative’ button, than when the picture of the spider frame is green, as this is 
the ‘positive’ button. Usually, the difference in the reaction time between the stimuli (e.g., pictures of a 
spider) with the positive button versus the negative button is used as an indication of the strength of 
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the association. A disadvantage of this task is that this task may be relatively difficult for children, as they 
have to pay attention to both valence and color of the stimuli at the same time. 
Attention bias
Emotional Stroop Task
In the original Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), participants have to name the color of words denoting colors 
(e.g., blue, red). In the Emotional Stroop Task (EST), however, the words do not denote colors, but are 
emotionally valenced, for example words related to spiders or butterflies. The child’s task is to name 
the colors of emotional stimuli as quickly as possible while ignoring the meaning of the stimuli. There 
are many different versions of the EST; for example, stimuli can be words or pictures, and these can be 
presented as single stimuli or in a card format. There are mostly three types of stimuli/cards, ‘emotional’ 
(e.g., spiders), ‘neutral’ (e.g., wheels) and ‘positive’ (e.g., butterflies). Usually, the difference in reaction time 
between the neutral stimuli and the anxiety-related stimuli is used as an indication of the interference. 
The main idea of this task is that it is expected that anxious children will be slower and make more errors 
to name the color of a frightening stimulus compared to the color of a neutral or positive stimulus, i.e. 
the contents of the stimulus interferes with the task to name the colors and is the attention bias.  
Dot Probe Task
The Dot Probe Task (Dot Probe; Halkiopoulos, 1981) is a task in which the child is asked to first look 
at two stimuli appearing on the left and the right side of the screen and then to respond as quickly 
as possible to a dot (or other symbol, e.g., arrow or letter) that replaces the pictures by pressing the 
corresponding response button. These two stimuli have different valences, for example neutral, positive 
or anxiety-related (e.g., wheels, butterflies, spiders) and stimuli can be either words or pictures. Usually, 
the difference in reaction time between the neutral stimuli and the anxiety-related stimuli is used as an 
indication of the strength of the relative attention bias towards anxiety-related stimuli. The main idea 
of this task is that anxious children are expected to be faster if the dot is presented on the same side of 
the screen as the anxiety-related stimulus, than if the dot is presented on the opposite side. This process 
is also described as vigilance or the difficulty to disengage attention from these anxiety-related stimuli. 
Interpretation bias
Questionnaires
The Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire (Leitenberg, Leonard, & Carroll-Wilson, 1986) and 
the Children’s Evaluation of Everyday Social Encounters Questionnaires (CHEESE; Bell, Luebbe, Swenson, 
& Allwood, 2009) are examples of questionnaires that measure self-reported interpretation bias. In the 
CHEESE, for example, the child is asked to answer different questions related to an ambiguous situation 
(e.g., ‘You’re going to the movies with a friend. Your friend wants to see one movie, but you heard it 
wasn’t good and you really don’t want to see it’). These questions are related to ‘why’ this situation would 
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happen, ‘how’ the child would feel in such a situation, and ‘what’ the child would do in such a situation, 
and they reflect the child’s interpretation of the situation. Most questions are multiple-choice. The main 
idea of these questionnaires is that anxious children are expected to choose more negative outcomes 
than non-anxious children, which reflects the interpretation bias. A disadvantage of these questionnaires 
is that they are highly sensitive to socially desirable answering.
Ambiguous vignette paradigm
In the ambiguous vignette paradigm, the child’s task is to interpret ambiguous scenarios about everyday 
situations (for a review, see Muris, 2010). These scenarios can be presented in a multiple-choice format, 
that is the child chooses their answer out of a number of possible endings presented. The scenarios can 
also be open-ended where the child is asked to come up with their own ending to the scenarios. An 
example of an ambiguous scenario is as follows: “Today you are visiting friends of your parents. Their dog 
is sitting beside you. Suddenly the dog knocks over your drink. The people stop talking and look at you...”. 
The main idea of this task is that anxious children are expected to finish the scenarios in a more negative 
way than non-anxious children. 
Homophone task 
In the homophone task (Hadwin, Frost, French, & Richards, 1997; Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule & 
Dalgleish, 2000), words with the same pronunciation, but different spelling are presented; the word has 
both a neutral meaning and a threatening meaning (e.g., pain versus pane). The child’s task is to select an 
interpretation (e.g., picture or sentence) that represents the meaning of the word best. The main idea of 
this task is that anxious children are expected to choose the threatening meaning more often than the 
alternative neutral meaning. Disadvantages of the task are that in most languages other than English, 
it is close-to-impossible to find homophones with a neutral and a fearful meaning, and that even in 
English words might differ in familiarity and as a result, one alternative may be picked more often than 
the other by everyone.
Auditory Interpretation Task 
In the Auditory Interpretation Task (AIT; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002), 
two words that differ by only one phoneme (e.g., “threat” and “thread”) are presented acoustically at the 
same time. Due to the fact that phoneme perception is categorical (e.g., Eimas & Corbit, 1973), listeners 
do not hear a blend of phonemes, but either one phoneme or the other. As a result, they will hear only 
one of the two words, usually without being aware of the fact that there might be a second possible 
interpretation. When using this task to assess threat interpretations, one of the words is related to fear, 
while the other word has a neutral valence. The child’s task is to simply listen to the words and report 
what they hear, by writing down the word they heard or by choosing the word from a list of words. The 
main idea of this task is that anxious children are expected to hear the fear-related words more often 
than the neutral words.
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Visual perception task 
In the visual perception task (Clerkin, Cody, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Teachman, 2009; Teachman, Stefanucci, 
Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt, 2008; Vasey et al., 2012) the child’s task is to estimate the size of and/or distance 
to a feared object or situation, for example the size of a spider, or the distance to a spider (Vasey et al., 
2012). The main idea of this task is that anxious children will estimate the size of the feared object (e.g., 
a spider) to be larger than the original size, or they will estimate that the distance to the feared object is 
closer than it actually is. A disadvantage of this task is that not all anxieties may be suitable to estimate 
size or distances.
Memory bias
In general, two sorts of tasks can be distinguished, explicit memory tasks and implicit memory tasks. 
Explicit memory tasks are tasks that are designed to measure conscious, intentional recollection of 
previous experiences, such as recall and recognition tasks. In a recall task, the child is asked to recall as 
much information from the encoding phase as possible. There are different variations of recall tasks, for 
example, variations in which the child’s task is to simply recall all the stimuli (e.g., words related to spiders 
or butterflies) they remember (free recall), or variations in which the child receive cues, such as the 
initial letter of each word (cued recall). In a recognition task, the child’s task is to recognize information 
from the encoding phase. An example of a recognition task could be a list of words that consists of the 
presented stimuli mixed with stimuli that were not presented during the encoding phase. The child’s 
task is to indicate which words were presented earlier. Implicit memory tasks are tasks that provide no 
specific instruction to intentionally retrieve memory, such as a stimulus completion task. An example of 
a stimulus completion task could be that the child is asked to fill in missing letters of word fragments, for 
example words that are related to spiders. The child is unaware of the fact that he has seen part of the 
words during the encoding phase, and there is also no mention of the task being a memory task. The 
main idea of implicit memory tasks is that anxious children are expected to be more accurate and faster 
to complete previously presented anxiety-related stimulus materials than to complete neutral stimulus 
materials. 
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All children experience fear and 
anxiety, which is expected at some 
points during normal development. 
However, some children do not 
outgrow these fears or experience 
extensively high and long-lasting 
levels of anxiety. To get a better 
understanding of the development 
and maintenance of fear and anxiety 
in children, this dissertation focuses 
on cognitive and behavioral aspects 
that play a role in childhood fear 
and anxiety. What makes anxious 
children different from their non-
anxious peers? Do they perceive the 
world differently? How do fearful 
children behave in fearful situations? 
And how can we reduce anxiety in 
these children?
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